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INTRODUCTION

It is common, or even fashionable, in contemporary
discussions of ethics, to refer to ethical theories as
being examples of "internalism" or of "externalism."
· Internalism and externalism refer to differing theories of
moral motivation.

The issue represents the struggle to

clarify the relationship between judgments about moral
obligation and moral motivation.

Attempts are made to

defend one theory of moral motivation over another, or to
correctly label traditional major ethical theories as
internalist or externalist.

The distinction is supposed to

provide a template by wpich ethical theories can be
classified.

And each side of the distinction purports to

reflect the truth concerning the relation between moral
obligation and moral motivation.
An

oddity becomes apparent, however, even on the most

cursory reading of the literature relating to the issue.
There seems to be little agreement when it comes to the
classification of theories as examples of internalism or
externalism.

To cite a few glaring illustrations:

.William

2

Frankena labels Kant as an externalist, while Thomas Nagel
and Christine Korsgaard consider Kant to be a
. " in
. t erna l 'is t • 1
"paradigmatic

Nagel labels Hume an

internalist, though of an anti-rationalist sort, while
Korsgaard's argument seems to imply that Hume is an
externalist. 2

Charlotte Brown suggests that Hume's moral

epistemology commits him to internalism, but when Hume
turns to the problem of moral motivation he gives an
externalist account, so that it is problematic to classify
him as one or the other. 3

Frankena suggests that at least

one aspect of the debate between Plato and Aristotle is
that Plato is an internalist and Aristotle is an
externalist, while Korsgaard and Nagel align Aristotle with
Kant on the side of internalism. 4

Frankena claims that

intuitionism is a "striking example" of externalism, while
Korsgaard describes intuitionists as "minimal"
1william Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in
Recent Moral Philosophy," in A. I Meldon's Essays in Moral
Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958),
44; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 11-12; and
Christine Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason,"
The Journal of Philosophy 83 No. 1, (January 1986): 10.
2 see Nagel, 10. Korsgaard's interpretation of Hume as
an externalist will be explained in Chapter Three.
3charlotte Brown, "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of
the History of Philosophy 26 (January 1988): 69-87.
4 see Frankena, 41; Korsgaard, 18; Nagel, 11.
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externalists, "just falling short" of being internalists. 5
Nagel and Korsgaard refer to Mill's ethical philosophy as a
prime example of externalism, and John Robertson classifies
him as an internalist. 6
These examples of disagreement are astonishing.
surely the disagreement is significant.

It could indicate

either a lack of consensus concerning the nature or
criterion of internalism and the nature or criterion of
externalism.

Or it could indicate a fundamental ambiguity

or fuzziness about all these notions which makes them
subject to such a variety of interpretations and
applications.

One could obviously conclude that the

distinction between internalism and externalism is simply
unhelpful as a way of understanding the differences between
moral theories in regard to the problem of moral motivation
or anything else.

On this response, the distinction ought

to be· simply disregarded.

But there is another response

which proposes that the various ways in which the
distinction has been drawn need to be formulated with
greater precision.

The goal, obviously, will be to make

the distinction in a way which avoids ambiguity.

When the

categories are clearly distinguished, consensus of
5 Frankena, 43; Korsgaard, 10.
6Nagel, 8 - 9; Korsgaard, 9; John Robertson,
"Internalism about Moral Reason" Pacific Philosophical
Quarterly 67 (1986): 124.

4

'fication should be facilitated and the real
claS S1
usefulness of the internalist/externalist distinction can
be tested.
1 will argue that most of the dispute about these
categories is a result of the lack of conceptual clarity in
the characterization of internalism and externalism.

I

will also show that a careful review of the various
authors' formulations of the distinction will reveal that
terms have been shared by individuals, but with each using
them in slightly, or perhaps even significantly, different
ways from the others.

Further, I will argue that one way

of formulating of the internalist/externalist distinction
will prove more helpful or of greater philosophical
interest than others.

In this version of the distinction,

internalism refers to the view that reason has a
motivational influence in morality.

I will refer to this

version of internalism as Rational Internalism, following a
lead by Nagel.

Thus, the contemporary philosophical

distinction between internalism and externalism reawakens
one of the central, and most exciting debates in the
history of ethical philosophy.
These suspicions yield a program for this
dissertation.

The first part of the dissertation will

focus on a critical examination of the distinction between
internalism and externalism in contemporary moral
Philosophy.

I will begin by showing that the distinction

5

between internalism and externalism has not been adequately
and consistently drawn.

In fact, I will identify four

different ways the distinction has been articulated.

I

will then examine the various versions of the distinction
in an effort to pinpoint, and then to rectify, the
ambiguity or other sources of confusion.
since Thomas Nagel has popularized the distinction in
this decade, I will start, in Chapter I, with his
characterizations and then trace the distinction back to
Falk and Frankena, since Nagel attributes the origin of the
distinction to them.

We will see that even though Falk is

identified as the originator of the internalist\externalist
distinction; he does not use the terms to refer to theories
of moral motivation at all.

And we will see that

Frankena's use of the terms, though clearly referring to
theories of moral motivation, is significantly different
from Nagel's.

In the second chapter more contemporary

versions of this distinction will be studied in order to
see if it is further refined, altered, or simply adopted in
a confused and inarticulate manner.

Indeed, we will find

little uniformity in the way the distinction is made.
In the third chapter I will summarize and clearly
formulate the various definitions of internalism and
externalism and compare their respective merits or
inadequacies.

The focus will be on precision, helpfulness,

and philosophical interest.

I will argue that the version
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of internalism which is of greatest philosophical interest
is the version ref erred to by Nagel and Korsgaard as
Rational Internalism.

MY aspirations, however, go beyond a mere critical
appraisal of the work done on internalism and externalism
so far, and also beyond the attempt at conceptual
clarification.

In the second part of the dissertation, I

hope to provide a defense of internalism, specifically, of
"Rational Internalism," the view that reason has a
motivational influence in morality.

As the first step of

this project, in chapter four, I will identify four
objections that have been raised against internalism
generally and one objection which has been raised against
Rational Internalism specifically, and provide
counterarguments which show that these objections {although
problematic for other inferior versions of internalism)
pose no adequate or conclusive. difficulties for Rational
Internalism.

The objections that have been raised against

internalism generally are the following:

1) Internalism is

obviously false because it entails that reason always takes
precedence as a motivator among other motivating
influences, and hence, makes no allowance for moral
weakness.

This is a superficial objection, in need only of

a statement of clarification to escape.

Yet at least one

prominent theorist in the subject, William Frankena, has at
times seemed to criticize internalism in this way.

2)

7

Internalism is false because it is logically possible for a
person to objectively have an obligation and yet have no
motivation to act accordingly.

This is also a position

maintained by William Frankena, as we will see in Chapter
2•

3)

Internalism is false because it is possible to make

a moral judgment, even a genuine moral judgment, and not be
motivated by it.

Thus, Ronald Milo argues that a moral

evaluative standard may be applied in order to make a moral
judgment, and yet the moral agent remain completely unmoved
by it. 7

4) Internalism is false because it cannot account

for moral indifferentism or amoralism generally.

David

Brink raises this objection, and claims that in light of
it, externalism is obviously the preferable view. 8
The objection which applies specifically to Rational
Internalism that will also be considered in chapter four is
the following:

5) Rational Internalism is inadequate

because it fails to recognize the importance of compassion
in ethical life.

Using Kant as his target, William Prior

raises this objection, suggesting that Rational Internalism
gives a distortive account of moral life. 9
7Ronald Milo, "Moral Indifference," Monist 64 (June
1981): 373-93.
8 oavid Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of
Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49.
9william J. Prior, "Compassion: A Critique of Moral
Rationalism," Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2 (Winter
1989): 173-91.
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The fifth chapter will be devoted to an examination of
a sixth and final objection:

Rational Internalism is false

because reason just is the sort of faculty which is
incapable of motivation.
raised by David Hume.

This, of course, is the objection

The evaluation of this objection

requires an exposition, explanation, and critical
evaluation of Hume's ethical theory.

I devote an entire

chapter to Hume because I see his position as representing
the most significant challenge to Rational Internalism.
Because Kant is seen as a "paradigmatic Rational
rnternalism," a comparison and contrast of Kant and Hume is
necessary.

I will argue that once we are clear on what

Kant means by his claim that reason, and reason alone,
determines what is moral and motivates moral action, and
once we are clear on what Hume means when he says that it
is the passions that determine what is moral and motivate
moral actions, the differences between their theories
diminish radically.

I will show that Kant's objections to

moral sense theorists are inapplicable to Hume, and Hume's
objections to moral rationalists are inapplicable to Kant;
and also that there are substantial points of agreement
between the two philosophers.

Insofar as differences

remain, I will argue, they pose no substantial objections
to Rational Internalism.

This chapter will begin with some

preliminary work on the attempt to situate Hume in the

9

internalist/externalist debate in light of a contemporary
controversy on this issue.
Having completed the defense of Rational Internalism
in light of these objections, in the sixth chapter I will
review and evaluate the contemporary defense of Rational
Internalism given by Thomas
possibility of Altruism.

Nage~

in his book

~

I will address criticisms of his

argument raised by E. J. Bond, and by Stephen Darwall,
showing that their criticisms are based on misreadings or
misunderstandings of Nagel's thesis. 10

This review will

provide the opportunity to clarify the doctrine of Rational
Internalism, to draw a distinction between Kant and Nagel's
Rational Internalism, and finally (and ironically) to show
that even Hume can be classified as a Rational Internalist,
according to Nagel's description of the view.
In the seventh and concluding chapter, I will gather
the threads of the preceding discussions together in order
to give a full and clear characterization of the view I
have called Rational Internalism.

My thesis is that

Rational Internalism, as I present it, presents a more
clear and accurate view of the relationship between moral
cognition and moral motivation.

Having identified and

sorted through the various confusions and ambiguities
10 E. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983); Stephan Darwall, Impartial Rea·son,
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
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inherent in the debate between internalism and externalism
to date, we are in a position to establish the precise
nature of this relationship.

Much of the ambiguity has to

do with the "generic" formulation of internalism as the
view that "moral belief or judgment entails moral
. t.ion. "
motiva

Rational Internalism explains, more

adequately than previous versions of internalism, in what
sense it is true to say that moral beliefs or judgments
entail moral motivation.

Therefore, as a theory of moral

motivation, its accounts more adequately for the common
intuition that people should be motivated by moral
considerations, and that the justification for choosing to
act morally need not be sought outside of the moral
considerations themselves.
What I off er here is not a new theory of moral
motivation.

My version of Rational Internalism is

consistent with the views of Kant and Nagel on this
subject.

However, I do offer a new statement of the

connection between moral cognition and moral motivation
which is more complete and accurate than statements in the
previous literature on the subject.

Since the debate in

ethics between internalism and externalism has been the
result of imprecision, incompleteness, and inaccuracy, an
improved theory of moral motivation in its relation to
moral cognition is a needed contribution.

CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OF THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNALIST/EXTERNALIST
DISTINCTION IN ETHICS

Thomas Nagel, with the publication of his book, The
Possibility of Altruism, popularized the distinction
between ethical internalism and externalism. 1

In this work

he revives the issue dividing Kant and Hume of whether or
not reason, in and of itself, has a motivational influence-that is, whether reason has the power to move a person to
action.

His argument has two parts.

He first

atte~pts

to

show that reason can provide the motivation to act
according to our own future self-interest.

That is, reason

can provide the motivation to act prudentially; reason can,
independently of any operative desire, motivate us to act
prudentially.

Then, having prepared the way with his first

argument, he develops a second, analogous argument which
shows that reason also provides the motivation to act
morally.
1Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism; hereafter,
PA in text.
11
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To be sure, Nagel does not think that, once reason
determines what is morally right, it automatically provides
sufficient motivation in a particular case to do the right
thing.

But reason can, he thinks, provide motivation, such

that in the absence of overpowering rival motives, reason
can independently lead to moral action.

In making this

claim, Nagel situates himself within what he calls the
"traditional controversy" in moral philosophy between
"internalism" and "externalism.

He cites the works of

w.

o. Falk and w. K. Frankena as the ethicians who introduced
these terms and the corresponding distinction between
alternative theories of moral motivation.
Nagel defines internalism as the view that:
motivation must be so tied to the truth, or
meaning, of ethical statements that when in a
particular case someone is (or perhaps merely
believes that he is) morally required to do
something, it follows that he has a motivation
for doing it (PA, 7).
He defines externalism as the view that "the necessary
motivation is not supplied by ethical principles and
judgments themselves, and that an additional psychological
sanction is required to motivate our compliance" (PA, 7).
Clearly, Nagel thinks of the terms "internalism" and
"externalism" as referring to differing theories of moral
motivation, i.e., of what it is that explains that a person
is motivated to act morally.

But it may not be quite so

clear what it means for motivation to be "tied to" or
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•guaranteed by" the truth or meaning of ethical
propositions.

In commenting on this, Nagel apparently

distinguishes between a weak internalism, where motivation
is tied to the meaning of ethical utterances, and strong
internalism, where motivation is tied to the truth of
ethical propositions.

In discussing the weak internalism,

Nagel explains that one way moral philosophers have "tied"
moral motivation to ethical propositions is by arguing that
ethical propositions are just the sort of thing which
express a person's inclinations.

Ethical propositions are

simply expressions of feelings or desires.
Thus, emotivism is an example of this weak
internalism, because the emotivist claims that when a
person utters an ethical proposition all the person is
doing is venting his or her own emotional responses, and
perhaps exhorting others to feel the same.

The claim,

"Stealing is wrong," is not a claim that has a truth value,
but a claim that means that the speaker has a negative
feeling regarding stealing, and therefore would be
motivated to abstain from acts of stealing.

Emotivists are

internalists because they tie motivation to the meaning of
ethical utterances, and they are "weak internalists"
because they reject the view that there are moral truths;
that is, because they reject "moral realism."
Nagel also describes a "stronger" version of
internalism where moral motivation is tied--not only to the
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'nn of ethical judgments--but to the recognition of
aeani ~
those truths, so that once one affirms that one is
obligated to do something, a motivation is therefore
present.

In this stronger version of internalism, moral

truths are held to be truths independently of any
particular person's desires or emotions.

An

ethical truth

could never be a motivator if it were not present to
consciousness in the form of recognition, but ethical truth
is nevertheless itself held to be independent of any
particular consciousness.
· Nagel then identifies two other varieties of
internalism, rational and anti-rational internalism.
According to anti-rational internalism, the foundation of
morality is desire, inclination or feeling.

Nagel regards

emotivism as anti-rational because it bases morality not on
reason, but on personal inclination, desire or feelings, in
such a way as to make morality a purely subjective matter.
He regards Hobbes and Hume as anti-rationalists because he
sees them both grounding morality in psychologically
prevalent (Hume) or universal (Hobbes) motivational
factors.

For Hume, moral motivation is grounded in

sympathy or general benevolence.

Nagel states:

"If we

cast [Hume's] view in terms of reasons, it will state that
among the conditions for the presence of a reason for
action there must always be a desire or inclination capable
of motivating one to act accordingly" (PA, 10).

For

15
Hobbes, moral motivation is grounded in self-interest, that
.

l.S I

self-interest is the condition for having a moral (or

any other) reason.

According to rational internalism, on

the other hand, moral reasons are not dependent "on the
presence of a motivational factor prior to ethics, from
which they are extracted as consequences" (PA, 11).
Nagel, then, is defending internalism over
externalism, a strong version of internalism over the weak
version, and rational internalism over anti-rational
internalism.

He defends a position on the issue which he

claims clearly divides and distinguishes Kant's moral
theory from that of Hume's.

For Nagel, Kant is a

paradigmatic example of a "rational internalist" since he
argues that reason can not only autonomously make moral
judgments, but can also be the source of an impetus, or
motivation, to act accordingly, while Hume is a
paradigmatic anti-rational. internalist, since he argues
that reason lacks both powers:

it can neither make moral

pronouncements, nor can it be the source of action.

Nagel

argues on the side of Kant by attempting to show that
reason is practical.

He defends a version of internalism

which is self-consciously Kantian:

Kant held that the

categorical imperative exercised a direct and possibly
decisive influence on the will; Nagel argues that there are
"reasons for actions which are specifically moral," that is
to say, sometimes we perform actions for no other reason
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than that they are morally required (PA, 13).
But there seems to be some confusion in the
distinctions Nagel draws between rational and antirational
internalism and externalism.

Internalists, he says, have

identified various types of motivational factors.

Nagel

mentions sympathy, self-interest, benevolence as examples
of internalist sources of motivation (PA, 7).

But if

internalism is defined as the theory of moral motivation
according to which moral motivation is "directly tied" to
the recognition of the truth of moral propositions or to
the meaning of ethical utterances, and if externalism is
defined as the theory of moral motivation which denies that
there is such a direct tie but which maintains that some
other "psychological" sanction is required for moral
motivation, one wonders why theories that ground motivation
in sympathy or self-interest or approval should be
classified as "internalist" rather than "externalist."
Isn't sympathy a psychological sanction?
seems so.

It certainly

How exactly does Hume's concept of sympathy

differ from "psychological sanctions" of the externalist?
What really is the distinction between anti-rational
internalism and externalism?

Perhaps Nagel did not choose

his words carefully when articulating his distinctions.
But the issue receives no

clarificat~on,

only further

confusion, when Nagel engages in a brief history of ethical
philosophy in light of his internalist/externalist

17

distinction.
Mill.

His examples of externalists are Moore and

His reason for classifying Moore as an externalist

is poorly stated and consequently terribly vague.

It

actually seems that Nagel regards Moore as an externalist
iust because Moore did not give a forthright internalist
account.

Then Nagel says he suspects that Moore is an

internalist "underneath it all" (,EA, 7) .

But this claim is

also far from clear. So Nagel's classifying Moore as an
externalist does nothing to help us understand the
externalist position.
Nagel's other example of an externalist is Mill.

His

explanation is contained in two sentences, somewhat more
clear than the explanation for Moore, but nonetheless, not
much.

Mill is classified as an externalist because Mill

thought it necessary to include a separate chapter on what
he calls the "sanctions" for the principle of utility. 1
Nagei takes this to mean that the question of the truth of
the principle of utility is separate from, that is,
independent of, the explanation of why people act according
to it.

But the fact that Mill discusses these matters in

separate sections of his book does not clearly indicate by
any means that Mill is an externalist, as Nagel has
1 christine Korsgaard follows Nagel's reasoning in her
slightly more detailed account of the classification of
Mill as an externalist. She stresses Mill's emphasis on
the importance of education for morals. See her
"Skepticism about Practical Reason," 10.
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described externalism, nor does it shed any new light on
what Nagel means by "externalism."
Mill may well have devoted a separate chapter to the
question of moral justification just because we can and do
ask these questions as two different questions:

How do we

know what is moral?

So the

What

mak~s

us act morally?

fact that these two questions are separated in Mill's essay
does not show that he believes that, within the individual
agent, the recognition of a moral truth is separate from
the motivation to act accordingly.

The question of whether

Mill is an internalist or an externalist according to some
clear sense of this distinction, is important and will be
given much more careful analysis later in this work.

But

an equally brief, and considerably more compelling argument
that Mill is an internalist can be given right here.
Mill argues explicitly in Utilitarianism that, far
more important for an understanding of morality than
"external sanctions" (reward, punishment, the experience of
approval or disapproval of others), is the ultimate
"internal" sanction of the personal conscience. 2

We have a

conscience, Mill argues further, only because we have the
capacity for sympathy; so we could say that the ultimate
sanction is sympathy, or is based in sympathy.

Thus, Mill

2John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Oskar Piest,
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1957),
.34-37.
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is saying that we recognize something as right or wrong
because we experience sympathy, and sympathy provides the
motivation to act morally {i.e, in accord with the
principle of utility.)

But then Mill is an internalist

according to Nagel's definition of internalism:

the

motivation to act morally is "tied to the recognition of
the truth of a moral proposition" because both are a
function of sympathy.
This argument does not rule out the possibility that
there are both "internal" and "external" aspects to Mill's
theory.

For Mill obviously recognizes that fear of

punishment and hope of regard are also motivating factors-that is, he grants that there are "external" reasons for
acting morally.

But the present point is that Mill

certainly holds that there are other than "external"
reasons which provide moral motivation as well.

And this

brings us back to wondering if Nagel's distinction between
"internalism" and "externalism" is really clear enough to
do important philosophical work.
It may be that lack of clarity in the distinction
between externalism and anti-rationalism is not of crucial
importance in Nagel's overall project.

For his primary

intent is to defend the view that reason has, in and of
itself, practical import.

He has simply adopted an

available terminology in an attempt to clarify his own
position by contrasting it with another {"externalism"),

20

though he need not have.

On the other hand, since he does

characterize his own position as a version of rational
"internalism", his defense of his position would be much
more complete if he had provided a more careful account of
"externalism."
suppose we interpret Nagel's rational internalism to
be what his words say it is:

as the view that moral

motivation is tied to the recognition of moral truths
through reason, without it being clear as yet what "tied
to" means here.

Then anti-rational internalism is the view

that moral motivation is tied to the recognition of moral
truth, but not through reason; and externalism is the view
that moral motivation is simply not tied at all to either
the meaning or the recognition of moral truths.

One can

very well wonder whether an example of an externalist can
be found in the entire history of moral philosophy, and
further, whether externalism is a viable or serious
position a moral philosopher could even take.

For Nagel's

formulation makes externalism out to be a very unattractive
moral theory, indeed something of a "straw-man."
If externalism is the view not only that one can
recognize that an act is morally required and yet have
absolutely no motivation to act accordingly on that
account, but also that motivation to act morally must arise
from something completely outside of the moral agent and
his or her moral knowledge and apprehension of moral
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meaning, such as brute fear of punishment or hope of reward
from an external authority, then it seems to be a theory
which applies appropriately only to children, or very
child-like individuals.
theory at all.

It is doubtful if it is a

mor~l

So no wonder it is difficult to find an

example of it in the history of ethical theory.

on the

other hand, there may be other ways to characterize
externalism in which it is a respectable, perhaps even
seriously defensible, theory of moral motivation.
Since the distinction between internalism and
externalism is either not clearly drawn, or is drawn in a
problematic way by Nagel, and given the ambiguity and
apparent difficulty of the classification of moral theories
as internalist or externalist we have noted, it seems
appropriate to see how the originators of the distinction
drew it.

According to Nagel, the originator of the terms

"internalism and "externalism" as identifying theories
about moral motivation was William Frankena, who he says
derived the distinction in turn from

w.

D. Falk.

Let us

begin with Falk.
A perusal of Falk's article "'Ought' and Motivation,"
within the context of recent moral philosophy, draws one's
attention immediately to a peculiarity. 3

Clearly, when

3w. D. Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation~" Ought. Reasons.
and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 2142. First Published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 48 (1947-48), 492-510.
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Nagel refers to internalism and externalism, he is
referring to contrasting theories of moral motivation.

so,

too, are Frankena, Korsgaard, and the others who have later
used this distinction.

Moreover, since Frankena says he

borrows the terms from Falk, one is naturally led to think
that Falk also used the terms to ref er to contrasting
theories of moral motivation.

But Falk does not.

In fact,

he never uses the terms "internalism" and "externalism" in
this way.
Instead, Falk makes use of a distinction between
"internalist" and "externalist" senses of the word "ought"
in order to contrast different sorts of reasons that people
have for doing something.

He points out that sometimes

when a duty is recognized, "I ought" means "I am from
outside of myself demanded to do some act. 114

such an

obligation might be a result of a rule or command imposed
by a parent, a relation, a deity, a cultural norm or a
civil law.

But he holds there is also a sense of "ought"

which comes from within:

that is, which is a result of an

internal recognition of the fact that something is a duty.
His point is that we recognize that we have obligations not
just because of dictates that come from without, but also
because of dictates that come from within.

Falk therefore

applies the terms "internalist" and "externalist" not to
4 Ibid., 32.
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distinct theories of motivation, but to distinct types of
reasons which ground our decisions for action, and which
provide the motivation for those actions.

On the other

hand, Falk does, as we shall see, offer a theory of moral
motivation as a consequence of the development of his
distinction between "internal" and "external" senses of
"ought."
Falk makes this distinction in order to explain the
existence of a confusion he perceived in the moral
philosophy of his day.

I will give a summary of his

argument in order to gain a firm understanding of his
distinction between the internalist and externalist senses
of "ought" and to provide a better background for the
examination of a distinction between internalism and
externalism as theories of moral motivation that Frankena
later makes.

We will see that the transition from Falk's

distinction to Frankena's is anything·but smooth.
Falk's aim in the article is to provide a critical
evaluation of a position of Prichard's.

In his lecture,

"Duty and Interest," Prichard attacks the view he
attributes to Bishop Butler that whenever we have a duty to
do something, we have the motivation to fulfill the duty
because fulfilling our duty is consistent with our own
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qood·S

According to Falk, Prichard's attack, while pointed

in the right direction, simply doesn't go far enough.

Falk

applauds Prichard for pointing out something that he
considers obvious from common experience, that it simply is
not necessarily the case that our duty coincides with our
self-interest.

Falk criticizes Prichard, however, for not

being able to free himself from a misconception Prichard
shares with Bishop Butler.

The mistake is that Prichard

follows Butler in accepting the question, "Why should I be
moral?" as a legitimate one.

Prichard errs, Falk holds, in

accepting the view that there must be a justification for
acting dutifully which is independent of the bare fact of
the recognition of duty itself.
Prichard rejects Butler's answer to this question in
terms of our own good, and replaces it with the following:
We act morally because we have a desire to act morally.
The same view is adopted by David Ross.

Ross summarizes

the position in these words:
An act's being our duty is never the reason why
we do it ••.. [for) I did the act simply because it
was my duty [means) I did the act because I knew,
or thought it to be my duty, and because I
desired to do it, as being m6 duty, more than I
desired to do any other act.

5 For an alternative reading of Butler's theory of
moral motivation, see Amelie Rorty's "Butler on Benevolence
and Conscience," Philosophy 53 (1978), 171-184.
6 Quoted

by Falk, 27.
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Prichard and Ross posit a special desire that human beings
have, the desire to act morally.

This answer to the "Why

be moral" question is supposed to establish what is missing
in sutler's account.

So what is missing in Butler's

account is an explanation of how it is possible to act
morally when doing so conflicts with our own self-interest.
sutler fails to establish the necessary connection between
the recognition that something is an obligation and the
power to fulfill that obligation.
Falk's criticism is that Prichard's and Ross's
accounts are similarly unsuccessful.

Falk argues that our

common experience clearly shows that it is simply not true
that whenever we have an obligation we have a desire to
fulfill it.

Positing such a desire is not only untrue to

our common experience, but in fact a superfluous attempt to
explain the necessary connection between the recognition of
duty

~nd

the motivation to act accordingly.

The attempt is

superfluous because Falk implies that this connection is
already present in the recognition of duty.

Prichard's

view, Falk allows, is more in tune with "common
convictions" than is Butler's, because it is more obvious
that duty sometimes conflicts with self-interest than that
duty sometimes conflicts with desire.

That is, it is

perfectly thinkable that a person would do something,
because it is his or her duty, even though it conflicts
with their perceived self-interest.

It is less clear in
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common experience, that some one would act dutifully and
contrary to self-interested desires and yet not have some
~

of a desire to do so, even if the desire is not a

self-interested one.

Falk explains that the reason why it

may not be obvious that duty does sometimes conflict with
desire because there is a tendency to equate the concept of
"having a motive" with the concept of "having a desire."
He distinguishes two senses of "having a motive:" an
"occurrent sense and a "dispositional" sense.

When we have

a motive in the occurrent sense, we have it "actually" and
it is experienced as a desire.

When we have a motive in

the dispositional sense, we have it "potentially and
reflectively," but we do not necessarily experience that
motive as an occurrent desire.

He states:

But if, in the occurrent sense, there is at least
a close connection between 'having a motive' and
'desiring', in the dispositional sense there is
none whatever. Here a person is said to have a
motive when the thought of some act (either as
such, or as having some property or effect) is
capable of determining him to do it; and that
someone would be made to do some act if he dwelt
on the thought of it in no way e9tails that he is
being made, or desires to do it.
Falk's point is that just as it is possible to act
contrary to self-interest in the fulfillment of duty, it is
possible to act contrary to or independently of any desire
the moral agent is presently experiencing.

In fact, Falk

implies that the essence of acting dutifully can be best
7 Ibid.
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understood in light of the possibility of acting
independently of any occurrent desire.

The agonizing

experience of the recognition of a duty when its
fulfillment requires struggle and sacrifice is lost with
the introduction of the concept of the "desire" to act
dutifully.

In such circumstances, the natural and accurate

response is: "I have
case."

Il.Q

desire to fulfill my duty in this

This is a key experience whi9h ought to be captured

and explained by moral theory.

Falk's contention is that

the only way to pay tribute to this experience is to deny
that the question of moral justification, the question "Why
be moral?" is a legitimate one.

For Falk, to ask this

question is automatically to abandon the meaning of a moral
imperative.

Falk's position, then, is inspired by the

Kantian claim that moral commands cannot be cast in
hypothetical terms.

A duty cannot not be explained in

terms of other goals or purposes.
own right.

It simply exists on its

And the recognition thereof is a sufficient

condition for the fulfillment of duty.

Thus Falk claims:

It seems paradoxical that moral conduct should
require more than one kind of justification •...
'You have made me realize that I ought, now
convince me that I really need to' seems a
spurious request, inviting the retort 'if you
really were convinced of the first, you would not
seriously doubt the second'. 8

8 Ibid., 29.

28

The critique of Prichard's position comprises the
first part of Falk's article, but it is in the second part
of the article that Falk introduces the terms internalism
and externalism.

The second part of his article is an

attempt to explain the occurrence of the mistaken question,
"WhY be moral?"

Falk argues that the confusion in

Prichard's, Ross's and Butler's attempt to identify a
justification for morality emanates from an ambiguity in
both ordinary language and in moral theory in the use of
words like "ought" and "duty."
Sometimes when we say "I ought," we mean that we are
required to act or refrain from acting by demands which are
given by some external authority such as a parent, priest,
or political authority.

Thus, Falk claims that some moral

theories view obligation as a result of a "demand, made on
(us] without regard to (our] desires; and ••• this demand
issues essentially from outside the agent:

that, whether

made by a deity or society, or the situation ••• it has an
objective existence of its own. 119

When we use "ought" in

this sense we are using it in an "externalist" sense.

Falk

says that when we use ought in the externalist sense, it
makes perfect sense, and is entirely natural, to ask:
should

I

do what

I

ought to do?

Why

He states: "the view that

morality needs some sanction is a traditional associate of
9 Ibid., 32.
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all views of this kind and indeed their natural
corollary.

.. 10

It is entirely possible that one would have

a total lack of motivation to fulfill a demand which is
imposed on us by a deity, by society or by a "situation."
At least part of the reason for this is that it is
perfectly natural to question the legitimacy of those
demands.
But Falk insists that there is another sense of ought
which cannot be reduced to an external demand, but is a
result of an inner (internal) conviction that something is
a duty.

This Falk calls the "purely formal motivation"

sense of "ought. 1111

In respect to this sense of "ought,"

it is absurd to demand any further justification; the moral
imperative and the conviction that a moral imperative
exists, is all the justification required.

The purely

formal motivation sense of "ought" is "formally complete,"
meaning that we need not look beyond the recognition of the
moral obligation for the motivation to comply with it.
Thus, Falk states:

"It is when such an 'ought' is

identified with a moral 'ought' or duty that the connection
of duty with sufficient motivation becomes logically
necessary. 1112
lOibid.
11 Ibid.

I

34.

12 Ibid.

I

39

o
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so Falk suggests that the demand for justification of
morality is often a result of the ambiguity in the use of
the word "ought."

We slip rather easily from one use to.

the other and so demand for both sorts of uses a
justification only appropriate for one use.

The demands

qiven to us by our deities or by our cultures are absorbed,
ingrained, rethought and appropriated as dictates, not just
of external forces or authorities, but of our own internal
consciences.

When the dictate is an internal one,

commanded by a person aware of the "capacity of reasoned
choice," Falk claims that all the motivation required to
bring the command to fruition is present.

The reason that

something is a duty is, he says, all the motive required.
It should be obvious by now that while Falk uses the
terms "internalist" and "externalist" to refer to different
senses of "ought," he also, in the development of that
distinction, offers a theory of moral motivation.

I have

noted an awkwardness in ref erring to Falk as an ancestor of
the distinction between internalism and externalism as
theories of moral motivation:

he manifestly does not

introduce these terms as ref erring to theories of moral
motivation.

Nevertheless, Falk commits himself to a theory

of moral motivation according to which moral motivation is
a logical consequence of the acknowledgement, in the form
of a "inner dictate of conscience," of the existence of .a
duty.

The theory of moral motivation to which he adheres
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is one, he thinks, which is clearly operative in ordinary
moral consciousness.

Since he allows that there are

"internal reasons" for actions which can motivate the
fulfillment of moral obligation independently of any
concern for self-interest, and independently of any desire,
it is natural to think of him as. holding an "internalist"
theory of moral motivation. 13 Therefore, thinking of him
as the originator of the distinction between "internalist"
and "externalist" theories of moral motivation is not
altogether inappropriate, as long as one recognizes that
that distinction is only hinted at in his works, and
remains undeveloped.

We can take clues about what for him

would be an internalist theory of moral motivation by
attending to the theory of motivation he is defending, and
about what for him would be an externalist theory of moral
motivation by attending to the views he is rejecting.
Falk cites Kant as the sole moral philosopher who
gives an account of the "purist" view of "ought" and
motivation, and thus the only philosopher who adequately
pays tribute to the common notion that if something is a
duty it commands absolutely, that is, independently of
self-interest or desire, and that the command, in and of
13 Frankena clearly interprets Falk as holding an
"internalist" theory of moral motivation. See his article,
"Obligation and Motivation 'in Recent Moral Philosophy," in
A. I. Meldon Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle, 1958),
75·.
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itself, has a motivating power.

Falk is himself offering a

Kantian view in that he holds that motivation to act
morally is implicit in the thought that something is a
duty.

He agrees with Kant that it is simply tautological

that "anyone who has a duty has, on this account alone, a
reason, though not necessarily an impulse or desire,
sufficient for doing the act." 14
If we interpret Falk as

providi~g

an "internalist"

theory of moral motivation based on the fact that he
insists on the internal sense of "ought" as the "purely
formal motivation sense," then an "externalist" theory of
moral motivation would be one which insisted on the
necessity of what he calls "external sanctions":

sources

of motivation which are external to the recognition of duty
itself.

Falk offers Kant as the only example of a moral

philosopher who gives an account of the necessary
connection between duty and motivation, and hence, as the
only example of an "internalist."

The examples of

externalists he gives would be Butler, because he sees
self-interest as a necessary sanction of morality,
Prichard, because he sees a desire to do what is moral as a
necessary sanction of morality, and any divine command or
cultural relativist theorist because they hold that duty

14 Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation," 35.
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arises from sources external to the moral agent, and thus
allow the moral agent to always ask:

Why be moral?

Although Falk does not develop a distinction between
internalist and externalist theories of moral motivation in
detail, it is clear that the lines he draws between
"internalism" and "externalism" are not the same as those
drawn by Nagel.

We can at this point say that given

Nagel's description of a strong version of internalism,
Falk would be classified as an internalist because it is
cl'ear that he believes that the recognition of the truth of
ethical propositions guarantees a motivational influence.
The motivational influence is guaranteed because he
believes that it is tautological that anyone who recognizes
an "ought" in the internal sense has ipso facto a reason or
motive for doing it.

But beyond this we cannot say that

Nagel and Falk draw the lines between internalism and
externalism in the same way.

For instance, following our

interpretation, Falk would classify Prichard as an
externalist, but Nagel could classify him as an internalist
because Prichard "ties" moral motivation to the recognition
of moral obligation through the "desire to act morally."
Analogously, Falk would classify Butler as an externalist,
but Nagel could classify him as an internalist because
Butler "ties" moral motivation to the recognition of moral
obligation through self-interest.

Also, Nagel classifies

Hobbes as an internalist, but it is not at all
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Falk would, since he regards self-interest as an "external

.

sanction. "

Nagel refers to emotivists as weak

internalists, but Falk rejects the view that moral
obligations can be understood simply in terms of
"occurrent" desires or motives.

He allows that moral

obligations can be regarded as "objectively valid," and
that even when we are not feeling reasonable, that we can
be motivated to act morally. 15

Therefore, there are some

grounds upon which to infer that Falk would classify
emotivists as externalists.

Further, while Falk can be

seen as giving clear examples of externalists, Nagel does
not.

We see, then, that while Nagel identifies Falk as one

of the originators of the distinction between internalism
and externalism as theories of moral motivation, there is
ample evidence that they do not, or would not, conceive the
distinction in the same way.

We now turn to the other

originator of the distinction between internalist and
externalist theories of moral motivation, William Frankena.
Frankena, begins his article "Obligation and
Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" by expressing his
intent to focus on the question of the connection between
moral judgment and moral motivation. 16

As noted earlier,

Frankena "borrows" Falk's terminology, and refers to the
15 rbid., 38-39.
16william K. Frankena, "Obligation and Motivation in
Recent Moral Philosophy."
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two opposing views on this connection as "internalism" and
.
"
"externa 1 ism.

Given the problems of classification of

traditional moral philosophers as internalists or
externalists, it is essential to attend carefully to
Frankena's wording as he defines the two theories.
In a rough characterization, Frankena describes
externalists as "those who regard motivation as external to
obligation," and internalists as "those who regard
motivation as internal to obligation. 1117
carefully, he offers the following:

Somewhat more

"Externalists insist

that motivation is not part of the analysis of moral
judgments or of the justification of moral claims."
Internalists, on the other hand, hold that motivation is
"involved in the analysis of moral judgments and so is
essential for an action's being or being shown to be
obligatory. 1118

Exactly what it means for motivation to be

internal or external "to obligation," or to be "part of the
analysis of moral judgments" is not initially clear.
Frankena states near the beginning of his work that his
sympathies have always been with externalism, though he is
not as sure as he used to be that his sympathies are
correct. 19

He gives us no clear indication during the

17 rbid., 40-41.
18 Ibid.

I

41.

19 rbid., 41-42.
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article of why he now takes internalism more seriously.
Indeed, beyond the initial comments just mentioned, he
really gives no indication that he does.

Nor does he claim

to provide conclusive evidence for one theory over the
other.

He does not examine any specific arguments in great

detail.

Rather, he reviews the works of a large number of

philosophers who he regards as internalists, and raises
some critical remarks.

The article is long and rambling,

and one senses that throughout Frankena may actually be
struggling to sort out for himself just what "internalism"
and "externalism" are as theories of moral motivation,
rather than trying to conclude for one over the other.
Since our goal here is to try to get clear on
what Frankena means by the terms, I will not comment on
Frankena's critique or interpretation of the many
philosophers he considers.

Instead, I will focus on

identifying what it is that is at iss·ue for Frankena in the
debate between internalism and externalism.

I will glean

from Frankena's critical comments of the several
philosophers what it has been that attracts him so much
towards externalism, and what advantage of internalism
disturbs his tranquil acceptance of externalism.
Frankena explains his long-standing preference for
externalism in his introduction as follows:

"It has not

seemed to me inconceivable that one should have an
obligation and recognize that one has it and yet have no
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motivation to perform the required act. 1120

The same

concern is reiterated at various points of his article, as
summaries of his basic criticism of various 11 internalist 11
positions.

Three representative examples of his basic

criticism are the following:

1) "Logically, as far as I

can see, 'I should' and 'I shall' are distinct, and one can
admit that he ought and still not resolve to do. 1121
far as I can see, an act may be

mora~ly

2) "As

wrong even though I

am impelled to do it after full reflection.

What one is

impelled to do even after reason has done its best is still
dependent on the vagaries of one's particular conative
disposition, and I see no reason for assuming that it will
always coincide with what is in fact right or regarded as
right. 1122

3) "The record of human conduct is not such as

to make it obvious that human beings always do have some
tendency to do what they regard as their duty. 1123
Thus, internalism, Frankena is sayihg, is an
inadequate theory because it fails to account for the fact
that one can have and even recognize an obligation without
thereby having a tendency, without being impelled or
without necessarily being led to resolve to or actually to
20 rbid.

I

42.

21 Ibid.

I

71.

22 Ibid.

I

77.

23 Ibid.

I

79.
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fulfill the obligation.

In short, internalism is

inadequate because it fails to account for the fact that
moral judgment and the motivation to act morally are
distinct and separable.
If internalism is the theory of moral motivation
according to which the recognition of a moral obligation
automatically implies an overriding motivation, that is, a
motivation stronger or over-powering than all other
motivations pertaining to self-interest, desire, emotions

or

any other non-moral inclination, then it surely would be

a theory we could dismiss without much consternation.

In

passages one and two above, Frankena could be interpreted
as considering this the position he calls "internalist."
But an alternate version calls internalism the view that
the recognition of moral obligation necessarily implies at
least some motivation.
interpretation.

Passage three suggests this

Now Frankena wants to deny that even this

is true, and it appears that in this denial he thinks of
himself only as attempting to preserve accuracy in the
account of human moral conduct.

our everyday moral

experience testifies to the fact that sometimes we know we
ought to do something, and yet we have no desire to do it.
It seems best to say that this common experience is what is
really at issue for Frankena in the internalist/externalist
debate.

Insofar as either version of internalism fails ·to

accommodate this recurring fact in our moral experience, it
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is an inadequate doctrine.
WhY is it that Frankena thinks that externalism is a
preferable theory in light of this issue?

The first clue

comes from his characterization of all externalist
theories.

After identifying intuitionism, cultural

relativism, utilitarianism, and divine command theories as
examples of externalism, Frankena states:

"For all such

theories, obligation represents a fact or requirement which
is external to the agent in the sense of being independent
of his desires or needs. 1124

There are two aspects of

externalism, then, which Frankena sees as crucial:

first,

that obligation has an objective quality independent of
subjective concerns or apprehension; second, that we are
bound by objective obligation whether or not we have any
desire to act accordingly.

Obviously, given these

characteristics, Frankena also identifies Kant as an
externalist.

That these are the key issues in the debate

between internalism and externalism is verified in a
concluding passage:
What [the externalist] must deny, and the
internalist assert, is that having objectively a
certain moral obligation logically entails have
some motivation for fulfilling it, that
justifying a judgment of objective moral
obligation logically implies establis~~ng or
producing a motivational buttress ..••
24 rbid., 43.
2 5 rbid., 73, emphasis added.
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Frankena's dissatisfaction with internalism hinges on its
view of obligation as subjective or as necessarily
connected with desire and inclination.

In a concluding

statement where he claims to pinpoint the "true character
of the opposition" between internalism and externalism and
the shortcomings of each, he describes the alternatives as
follows:
Externalism •.. in seeking to keep the obligation
to act in certain ways independent of the
vagaries of individual motivation, runs the risk
that motivation may not always be present, let
alone adequate, but internalism, in insisting on
building in motivation, runs the corresponding
risk of having to t~~m obligation to the size of
individual motives.
Frankena thus admits that externalism is not a wholly
satisfactory theory because it has a problem about absent
motivation, but he thinks that the problem of internalism
is a greater defect.
Actually, Frankena's position is somewhat
inconsistent, for Frankena doesn't really believe that
morality need be backed by motivation at all.

Recall that

his objection to internalism is that, by "building"
motivation into the analysis of moral judgments,
internalism does a disservice to morality by reducing
ethical judgments to subjective desires.

The most extreme

version of this is emotivism which holds that motivation is
"part of the analysis of moral judgments" by claiming that
26 rbid., so.
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judgments of obligation are nothing but utterances
expressing emotive inclination.

But Frankena wants to

insist that moral obligation is not, and need not be,
backed by motivation.
The problem Frankena is raising is how to explain the
possibility of fulfilling obligations which are
inconsistent with or independent of personal desires and
motives.

But he explicitly prohibits the use of motivation

as the explanatory factor.

The reason for this is that he

thinks of motives as just the sort of things that are a
result of personal desires, emotions, needs and interests.
Along the same line, he claims that a distinction must be
made between two types of reasons for actions.

Borrowing

loosely from F. Hutcheson, he divides reasons for actions
between those that are "justifying reasons" and those that
are "exciting reasons. 1127

Exciting reasons are those which

are geared toward personal goals and desires: justifying
reasons are simply based on moral judgment. 28
clearly thinks that

~'1stifying

Frankena

reasons can never be

27 rbid., 44.
28 Loosely, because it is not at all clear that this is
the distinction Hutcheson makes. Hutcheson does not
identify exciting reasons with self-interested ones.
Exciting reasons include, besides inclinations for the
satisfaction of personal desire, inclinations for
benevolence and sympathy. I interpret Hutcheson as viewing
justifying reasons as exciting reasons that have been
approved by moral sense. See F. Hutcheson, Illustrations
upon Moral Sense in D. o. Raphael's British Moralists 16501800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 361.
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"exciting" ones:

"Thus a motive is one kind of reason for

action, but not all reasons for action are motives. 1129
further:

And

"it is not plausible to identify motives with

reasons for regarding an action as morally right or
obligatory." 30
This examination of Frankena's arguments indicates
clearly that he is using the term "motivation" in quite a
different sense from Falk.

For

Fran~ena,

motivation is a

subjective matter, always referring to the presence of
subjective needs, desires, or interests which are perceived
by the agent as "exciting reasons."

Falk, on the other

hand denies the association between "motives" and
"desires."

In fact, he says that while there is a

connection between desires and motives, and while in
ordinary speech we tend to refer to desires as motives,
technically speaking, desire is "perceptual evidence" of an
impulse or motive.

He says that we tend to experience

desire when our impulses are impeded, but that we have
motives without the experience of any desire at all. 31
Thus Falk uses the term "motive" in a much broader sense.
He states:
In the sense relevant to this discussion, a
reason or motive is a moving or impelling
29 Ibid.,

44.

30 Ibid., 45.
31 Falk, "'Ought' and Motivation," 25.
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thought, the thought of that for the sake, or in
view of which, some act is done ••• ! should
therefore, describe a motive as a causa rationis,
a mental antecedent which, when attended to by a
person, and in otherwise comparable conditions,
will invariably be followed by an orientation of
his organism towards the action thought of, in a
way which, except for the intervention of
distractions, counter-motives and physical
impediml2ts, will terminate in the action
itself.
For Falk, a "justifying reason" can be considered a
"exciting reason" because it can impel one to action and
because the category of "exciting reasons" is drawn so
broadly as to include all such reasons.

Frankena should

have seen that Falk was using "motivation" in this broader
sense.

What is even more peculiar is that Frankena, while

having labelled Kant an externalist, calls Falk an
internalist.

And yet, as we saw, Falk gives a

characteristically Kantian analysis of morality, insisting
that it is inappropriate to suggest that morality is
dependent on the presence of desire, and holding that, in
the truly moral sense of "ought," (the internal sense as he
distinguished the two), there is a motivation, or power, to
actualize moral commands.
It would seem to have been incumbent on Frankena to
either use the term "motivation" consistently with Falk, in
light of the fact that he was borrowing Falk's terminology
to label his theories of moral motivation, or else to warn
us of the differences.
32 Ibid.

Unless the reader recognizes that
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rrankena uses the term "motivation" in a more restricted
sense, it remains unclear why he thinks that externalism is
a superior moral theory, and why he objects to Falk's
suggestion that there can be impelling, that is,
motivating, reasons for action which are the result of
autonomous commands.
The difference between Falk's and Frankena's actual
views about the relation of morality and motivation are
more apparent than real.

They both want moral theory to

account for the basic moral experience of recognizing that
one ought, without necessarily having an associated desire.
Thus Frankena objects as strongly as Falk to those moral
theorists who posit a desire behind the acceptance of moral
judgments.

Both are also suspicious of those who demand an

account of moral motivation independent of the recognition
and acceptance of moral judgments.

The real difference

between Falk and Frankena is that while Frankena implies
that there is a mysterious connection between moral
judgments and moral motivation, Falk, like Kant, attributes
to reason the power to impel a person to moral action.

In

Frankena's language, Falk sees no problem in thinking of
"justifying" reasons has having an "exciting" power.
What has been learned in this review of the literature
Nagel cites as the origin of the terms "internalism" and
"externalism" as the names of competing theories of moral
motivation?

The most obvious lesson is that there is a
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decided lack of unanimity in the use of the very terms that
interest us.

Falk, who first used the terms, used them to

refer to different senses of the word "ought."

The

external sense of "ought" views obligation as something
imposed on the moral agent "from outside."

The internal

sense of "ought" views obligation as emanating from the
moral agent.

The moral agent judges that something is

right or wrong.

However, implicit

i~

his distinction

between the internal and external senses of "ought," and in
his critique against the views of Butler and Prichard and
all· those who neglect what he calls "the purely formal
motivation sense of ought," is the claim that a moral
judgment, in and of itself, has the power to motivate, that
is, to be the cause of a moral action.

Hence, Falk does

defend a theory of moral motivation which may reasonably be
called "internalist," due to his claim that the "internal"
recognition that something is a duty can by itself, without
the aid of desire or any other external sanction.
Frankena's main goal is to draw attention to the
inadequacy of theories which assert a necessary tie between
moral obligation and motivation that is based on personal
desires and inclinations.

He defines internalism as the

view that moral obligation is tied to motivation, which he
views as grounded in desire and self-interest, and
externalism as the view that moral obligation is
independent of personal desires.

He errs in labelling Falk
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an internalist, according to Frankena's own use of these
labels; for Falk accepts the Kantian view that moral
obligation is wholly independent of personal desires and
self-interest.

Frankena was lead to this error by failing

to recognize that his use of the term "motivation" is more
restricted than Falk's.
Now when Nagel uses the term "motivation," he uses it
in the same broad sense as Falk did.

He does not, like

Frankena, restrict motivation to desire or self-interest.
This helps explain why Nagel's and Frankena's definitions
of internalism and externalism lead, as noted above, to
inconsistent classifications of traditional moral
philosophers.

They both use the terms internalism and

externalism to name competing theories of moral motivation;
but they use the term "motivation" in significantly
different ways.

For example:

Frankena calls Kant an

externalist because Kant believes that moral obligation is
completely independent of personal desires and interests;
that is, obligation is separated from, "external" to
motivation in his sense.

Nagel, however, calls Kant an

internalist, because Kant maintains that reason has the
power to produce moral action, that reason is a kind of
motivation in his and Falk's broader sense of this term.
Frankena and Falk's classifications of moral
philosophers into their respective internalist/externalist
frameworks are not always contradictory; but consistency
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between them is merely accidental, being based on very
different criteria.

For example, when Frankena calls

emotivism an internalist position, he does so because
according to the emotivist, moral obligation is "internal
to," indeed is nothing but a reflection of the emotive
inclinations of particular persons.
emotivism an internalist position.

Nagel also calls
But he does so because,

for the emotivist, motivation is an integral part of the
acceptance of moral judgments.

Frankena, in his

classification, emphasizes the basis of obligation as being
internal or external.

Nagel emphasizes the nature of the

connection between motivation, in the broad Falkian sense,
and moral judgments themselves.

Frankena's rejection of

internalism is a consequence of his belief in the
objectivity of ethics, and his belief that

obligati~n

is

independent of personal desires and emotional responses.
Nagel's rejection of externalism is a consequence of his
belief that moral judgments based on reason have a
necessary influence on our conduct.
In fact, while Nagel is an internalist by his own use
of these categories, he is an externalist in Frankena's
sense of the term because Nagel holds that obligation is
independent of self-interest, desire or emotion.

It would

also seem that Frankena--an externalist is his own terms-must be considered an internalist according to Nagel's
definition, because Frankena certainly does not hold that
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all moral motivation (excluding self-interest, desire,
inclination) is externally induced.

This point, however,

is not very clear, since Frankena offers no explanation in
the article considered here for the possibility of moral
conduct independent of desire.
Now that the lack of consistency in the original
definitions of ethical internalism and externalism has been
established, it will be interesting to see whose definition
dominates later uses of the terms, or to see what further
developments in the distinction arise.

In the review of

subsequent literature on this subject the following
questions should provide a focus:
to Frankena's or to Nagel's?

Are later uses identical

Is there a development in the

use of the terminology such that the terms come to mean
something else again?

Given that definitions of

internalism and externalism are stipulative (we can mean by
them·anything that we want to), is there a definition which
is more helpful or of greater philosophical interest?

CHAPTER II

ETHICAL INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM IN
RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

A survey of more recent philosophical literature on
the internalist/externalist distinction in ethics shows
that later thinkers adopt the distinction to refer to
theories of moral motivation, and not just as a distinction
between different senses of "ought" described by Falk.

We

will also see that later thinkers are divided in their use
of the distinction, even though no recognition of this
confusion is given.

Some philosophers follow Frankena's

understanding of the distinction, and others follow
Nagel's.

In some cases, refinements of those positions can

be detected upon a close reading of the texts.

This

chapter reviews the literature employing the
internalist/externalist distinction from the publication of
Nagel's The Possibility of Altruism (1970) to the present.
The first section will concentrate on those who follow in
Frankena's steps, the second, on those who follow in
49
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Nagel's.

In the following chapter, the various definitions

will be evaluated in terms of usefulness and philosophical
interest.
First, however, one may wonder how the distinction
could have been used by otherwise acute thinkers in such
disparate ways without some awareness, and so without some
admission of awareness of the disparity.

A partial

explanation is that there is a way of formulating the
distinction which can apply to both Nagel's and to
Frankena's uses of it, and also to later developments of it
by Korsgaard and Brown.

Such a "generic" definition of

internalism would say that it is the theory that moral
judgment implies or entails motivation; similarly, the
"generic" definition of externalism sees it as the theory
that moral judgment does not imply or entail motivation.
These generic formulations can be found in Frankena's
article "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral
Philosophy" and, as we will see, also in later works by
other philosophers.

We may say that these generic

formulations express a common factor of all uses where the
internalist/externalist distinction is taken to apply to
theories of moral motivation. 1
From the analysis in Chapter One, we can say that for
both Frankena and Nagel moral judgment does imply (in some
1 Frankena, 51.
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way) motivation, because for Frankena the internalist holds
that a person recognizes moral obligation only if
motivation is present, and for Nagel the internalist holds
that motivation is "tied" (in some way or other) to the
recognition of moral obligation.

Thus we can say that the

generic formulation of the internalism/externalism
distinction is inclusive of both their uses of the
distinction, and that they and other thinkers adopt various
versions on the basis of how the entailment implication, or
other "tie" (or lack of it) is to be understood.

The

problems arise when thinkers present their own
specification of generic internalism or of generic
externalism, but then refer to other thinkers' versions not
as different variations on the same generic theme, but as
positions which are reflective of what is opposite (i.e.,
internalism to their externalism or externalism to their
internalism.)
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I

Three philosophers who seem to think of themselves as
adopting Frankena's version of the distinction are Ronald
Milo, John Robertson and Byron Haines.

While they phrase

their definitions in original terms, it is clear that their
basic understanding is significantly influenced by
Frankena.

Each of these writers attempts to undermine what

they regard as the internalist thesis.
Ronald Milo, in his article "Moral Indifference"
claims that "the thesis of internalism" is that "it is a
necessary condition of believing (or judging) that one has
a moral obligation to do (or not to do) an action that one
have a pro- (or con-) attitude toward it. 112

There are

obvious correlations between this definition and that of
Frankena's.

If having a pro-attitude toward a course of

action is a necessary condition for believing that it is
morally required, then motivation is indeed "internal 11 to
obligation.

However, it is not identical to the essential

distinction between internalism and externalism made by
Frankena.
Frankena reviews various ways the internalist thesis
might be advanced:
2 Mi'l o, 375.

the proposition that ."having or
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acJcnowledging an obligation to do something involves
having, either occurrently or dispositionally, some
motivation for doing it" might mean, for instance, that
when one thinks, sees, or believes that one has an
obligation, motivation is also present; or it might mean
that when one assents to an obligation, or when one says
one has an obligation, motivation is present. 3

In

reviewing these possibilities, Frankena concedes that even
an externalist might accept these views--though a "compleat
externalist" would not.

He is ready to make such

concessions because he believes that it is simply a
psychological and phenomenological fact that believing or
assenting involves an associated disposition.

From

Frankena's point of view, these concessions are peripheral
because what is essential for him about externalism is that
it denies that having an obligation (vs. believing or
assenting to it) entails having the correlative
disposition, and what is essential about internalism is
that it claims that it does. 4

He concludes his article by

3 Frankena, 58-59.
4As previously quoted, Frankena states: "What he (the
externalist] must deny, and the internalist assert, is that
having objectively a certain moral obligation logically
entails having some motivation for fulfilling it .•. that it
is logically impossible for there should be a state of
apprehending a moral obligation of one's own which is not
accompanied by such a buttress .•. " 73.
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suqqesting that the most even-handed externalist would in
fact ma ke these concessions.
It is clear, then, that what Milo takes to be "the
thesis of internalism," is not identical to what Frankena
takes it to be. 5 Frankena would agree that Milo's
formulation describes an internalist position, but he
thinks of internalism more broadly.

Milo defines

internalism as the view that having a pro-attitude is a
necessary condition of believing that one has an
obligation; Frankena says that internalism is the view that
having a pro-attitude is a necessary condition of having an
obligation.
Milo criticizes Frankena, however, for making even
these concessions to internalism.

He suggests that

Frankena only granted that believing oneself to be under
obligation or assenting to the fact of obligation implies
having motivation to act morally because of the influence
of

c. L. Stevenson and R. M. Hare. 6 Milo's efforts are

directed toward undermining this view, and he does so by
focussing on the phenomenon of moral indifference.

I will

summarize his argument in order to get clear on Milo's use
of the distinction, and to benefit from whatever insights
he has to offer on the problem of moral motivation.
5 Ml.'l 0

I

375.

6 rbid., 375.
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Milo argues for the "externalist" thesis (as he sees
it) that it is possible to believe that something is wrong
and not have a con-attitude toward it, or to believe that
something is right and not have a pro-attitude toward it.
He does admit that the internalist thesis (as he defines
it) is intuitively or superficially appealing.

If we

attend to the phenomena of believing or judging something
to be wrong or right, initially it seems very plausible
that such mental acts should be accompanied by a
corresponding motivation.

There just is something

paradoxical about the person who fails to be motivated by
his moral judgments.

Milo begins by explaining why we find

such a person paradoxical, and then proceeds to show that
the internalist thesis, as he has formulated it, is false.
Normally, if a person says he believes that something
is wrong, but does not have a negative attitude or
disposition toward committing the act, or if he says he
believes that something is morally required, but does not
have a positive attitude or disposition toward it, we would
be justified in labelling him as insincere. 7

Milo explains

that we would ordinarily regard such a person as
paradoxical because, in conversation, saying that something
is wrong conversationally implies having a negative
7A point made by c. L. Stevenson in Ethics and
Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 1617.
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attitude toward it.
~

That is, we are not generally moved to

something is wrong, to utter our disapproval, unless we

have the corresponding negative attitude, and so others
will ordinarily expect the talk and the attitude to go
together.

But this does not mean that it is impossible to

believe that something is right or wrong without having the
appropriate disposition toward it.

Milo charges that to

think this is impossible is to confuse "conversational
implication" with "logical implication. 118
Milo argues that it is possible for a person to be
cognizant of a conventional belief that a certain type of
act (X) is wrong, and to say on occasion say that "X is
wrong" while only "paying lip-service" to the conventional
standard.

In such a case the person can be described as

believing that something is wrong according to that
standard without having the corresponding negative
disposition towards the act because the person does not
necessarily accept the standard.
Now an internalist would respond that this description
is only possible because applying a standard on the grounds
of convention or authority is not the same as applying an
evaluative standard.

That is, the person who merely

applies a standard,
8Milo makes use of the distinction made by H. P.
Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax and Semantics.
vol. 3 Speech Acts, Cole and Margan, ed. (New York:
Academic Press, 1975), 45.
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can at most be said to believe (or judge) that X
is wrong in an inverted-commas (rather than a
genuinely evaluative) sense. What he believes
(or judges) is merely that X is generally held
(but not by him) to be wrong. And, if so, he
will be making, not a genuinely evaluative moral
judgment, but a merely descriptive moral
judgment. 9
Milo, however, argues that it is in fact possible to make a
genuinely evaluative moral judgment without having an
accompanying pro- or con-attitude.
He advances this argument by drawing a parallel
between moral evaluative appraisals and evaluative
appraisals of others sorts.
appraiser.

He gives an example of a wine

A wine appraiser can judge certain wines to be

good or bad independently of his own preferences in wine.
A wine appraiser knows what is regarded, among wine
connoisseurs, as a good wine, but may prefer a wine which
does not meet these standards as well as another.

Milo

finds the distinction made by Nowell-Smith between
judgments of appraisal and judgments of preference useful
here. 10

A judgment of preference is obviously accompanied

by a pro- or con-attitude, but a judgment of appraisal is
not.

Just as a wine appraiser can judge a wine to be

better than another according to accepted standards in the
wine-making industry without actually preferring it, so a
person familiar with the characteristics of a moral point
9Milo, 380.
10 see P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin
Books, Ltd. 1954), 170.
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of view can judge an action to be better than another
without actually preferring it.

In each case, Milo claims,

the person is making a genuinely evaluative judgment, and
the question of the person's pro- or con-attitude is an
independent question.
If a person makes a judgment from the moral point of
view and lacks the appropriate disposition, the person is
morally indifferent; he or she may even be an amoralist.
Milo goes so far as to say that even an amoralist, if well
enough informed about the moral point of view and if
intellectually acute, could be sought out by others for
advice about moral matters.

If the amoralist is good at

applying the standards of the moral point of view, the
question of his or her lack of a pro-attitude towards it is
a separate question.

Thus, the amoralist would be saying

that something is "morally required or morally wrong from
the moral point of view," but without any motivation for or
against that point of view."

So "X is wrong" is short for

"X is wrong from the moral point of view," and such
statements are evaluative moral claims.
Milo argues convincingly that having a moral belief or
making a moral judgment does not necessarily imply the
appropriate attitudes and dispositions.

Since the judgment

could be based on the mere application of a moral code,
since the belief could be simply acquired by making a moral
evaluation based on what others have called the "moral
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point of view," moral judgment and moral belief need not be
accompanied by a correlative attitude.

These insights are

a contribution to the internalist/externalist debate
because they identify ways in which appropriate attitudes
and dispositions may be absent, even when beliefs about
what is morally required are present.

Thus, Milo has

successfully undermined the internalist thesis as he
defines it:

having a pro- or con-attitude is not a

necessary condition of believing or judging something to be
right or wrong.

But it would be premature to say that Milo

has successfully undermined internalism, since there are
different ways of understanding this term.
Milo's argument does not undermine Frankena's version
of internalism, since Frankena begins with a different
understanding of what internalism is.

Ultimately, however,

it may be the case that Frankena's version of internalism
may not be all that attractive of a theory anyway.

Milo's

argument could be taken as grounds for necessitating a
modification of Nagel's version because Milo has shown that
"recognizing" that something is right or wrong need not
involve motivation (pro- or con-attitude) if "recognizing"
merely involved the application of a moral standard or of
the criteria of the moral point of view.

But it does not

undermine Nagel's version if Nagel's notion of
"recognizing" a moral truth involves something more than
the operations described by Milo.

The extent to which
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Milo's contributions are helpful, then, will have to be
judged after this survey of the various ways of making the
internalist/externalist distinction has been completed.
John Robertson follows Frankena's definition of
internalism more closely than does Milo.

He defines

internalism as the view that "the truth of a claim
ascribing a reason to an agent to perform a certain action
or to aim at a certain goal entails that the agent has a
desire that would be satisfied by performing that action or
achieving that goal" and, borrowing Frankena's phrase,
externalism as the view that "denies that reason
ascriptions are thus 'hostage to the vagaries of
individuals' desires. 11111

It is clear that for Robertson

what is at issue in the inter~alist/externalist debate is,
as for Frankena, the objectivity of moral truths.

However,

there is a subtle difference, and also some development in
the analysis.

The difference is that he, substitutes

"having a reason to perform an action" for "having a moral
obligation" that has the effect of broadening the
application of the internali3t/externalist distinction out
11John Robertson,

"Internalism about Moral Reason"
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 {1986): 124.
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beyond the ethical and into a wider practical sphere. 12
The development is that Robertson distinguishes between
extreme, moderate and ersatz internalism.

Extreme

internalism is the view that "aims and motives are not open
to criticism at all," a position that he ascribes,
problematically, I believe, to Hume.

Ersatz internalism is

an internalism which is really an externalism in disguise:
moral and immoral agents are differentiated not by their
desires but by their beliefs.

Thus, Plato is an

in'ternalist because he maintains that they consider good
what they desire, but an ersatz internalist because he
holds all human beings desire what is really good and they
simply make mistakes in judgment about what that really is.
But then Plato is really an externalist because he believes
that what is morally correct is so independently of any
particular person's desires.

Moderate internalism is,

unfortunately not carefully described by Robertson; but one
12 This substitution may be a result of the influence
of such philosophers as Gilbert Harman and Bernard
Williams, who also speak of internal and external reasons
for action that include but are not restricted to moral
reasons. See Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended," The
Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 3-22. and Williams'
"Internal and External Reasons," originally published in
Rational Action, ed., Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980) and reprinted in Moral Luck, (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101-113.
References in this text are to the latter. Or, it may be
the case that all these thinkers are influenced by Nagel's
arguments in The Possibility of Altruism for the practical
efficacy of reason, in matters of both prudence and
morality, even though his use of the internal/external
language differs from theirs.
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is led to assume, given the characterizations of extreme
and ersatz internalism that moderate internalism is one
which allows some rational criticism of aims and motives.
yet in his criticism of moderate internalism, Robertson
uses arguments which apply to extreme internalism, and one
is left wondering what advantage is gained in the
distinction between the two.

Since the distinction between

moderate and extreme internalism does not seem to be of any
consequence, and it can be safely ignored in the remainder
of this examination.
Robertson attempts to refute internalism (i.e. extreme
rather than ersatz) by showing how ill-suited the theory is
to account for the common experience of regret.

We all

know the pain of regret in having failed to act as we
should have, or of having failed to recognize that we
should have acted in a certain way.

Any theory of

morality, or of action generally, which fails to account
for this experience, is clearly defective.

He states:

"Moderate internalism is wrong because it requires us to
misdescribe certain familiar cases of realizing one has,
and has had, reason to act differently than one has acted,
as rather massive changes of taste ...• 1113

If we adopt

internalism as our theory of moral motivation, he says we
are committed to think of Scrooge as "a man whose level of
13 Robertson, 130.
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"that one can have a reason for an action such as to
justify that action only if one is motivated to that
action," and externalism is the view that "a motive for an
action is, in the logical sense, external to the action's
being justified. 1114

He comments on the fact that those who

defend internalism typically reject the Kantian view that
reason is a source of motivation, and side with Hume in his
view of reason as powerless in motivation. 15 Note,
however, that Nagel defends both internalism and the
Kantian view of reason as "practically" motivating.

Since

Nagel is a key figure among those who have contributed to
the literature on ethical internalism and externalism,
Haines's listing of defenders of internalism is obviously
selective.
Haines poses a key question:

is reason, or is reason

not, efficacious in bringing about moral motivation?

But

he does not, unfortunately, pursue this question, directing
his attention instead to the weakness of internalism, as he
and Robertson understand it.

Haines' argument against

internalism and in favor of externalism calls attention to
important features of moral training subscribed to, he
14 Byron L. Haines, "Internalism and Moral Training,"
The Journal of Value Inquiry 20 (1986): 64 and 68, footnote
2.

15Haines cites Gilbert Harman as a philosopher who
rejects the Kantian view of reason as a motivator and
accepts the Humean view of reason as powerless in terms of
motivation. See Harman's "Moral Relativism Defended."
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claims, by most of humanity--even the internalists
themselves--when they are not biased by their own
philosophical views.
Haines offers two cases to advance his argument.

One

case involves the attempt of a parent to instruct a small
child in a moral practice which is beyond the
comprehensibility of the child.

For instance, the practice

of promising is a sophisticated practice requiring a
significant degree of moral sensitivity and involving the
assuming of a moral obligation, and the conferring of a
right.

Since the child lacks this understanding and

sensitivity, says Haines, he or she will also lack any
incentive for keeping promises.

Haines's point is that the

child has a reason, a moral obligation, to keep a promise
irrespective of the lack of incentive or motivation.

The

second case involves the attempt of a parent to instruct an
older child who already has motives for behaving in a
certain way to behave in another way.

For instance, the

child, under the influence of peer pressure, uses racist
slurs and insults against other children.

The parent will

feel that the child, even though not aware, has a reason to
act differently.

And the parent will hope that when the

child comes to have an incentive to behave in the better
way, it will be because of the recognition that one has a
reason for doing so.
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Haines' examples do not constitute a compelling
argument against internalism as he defines it.

In the

first case, if the child is too young to understand what it
means to make a promise, then the child doesn't really have
an obligation to keep a promise.

It seems worth asking if,

when still unable to understand the practice, the child
should be said to "have a reason" regarding promisekeeping.

We would not dispute that there is a reason for

the child to keep a promise, only that the young child
should be said to have a reason.
underlies the second case.

The same confusion

Clearly there is a reason for

the child prone to racial slurs to refrain from uttering
them; but it is not at all clear that the child sees
himself as having such a reason.

Haines' argument against

internalism depends on the confusion between "having an
obligation or reason" and "there being an obligation or
reason.

The argument is successful only if internalism is

interpreted as the view that "there being an obligation or
reason" entails motivation, but not if it is interpreted as
the view that "having and obligation or reason" entails
motivation.

His argument does show that some conceptual

clarification is required on what it means to "have an
obligation."
Since Nagel's view of internalism does not have the
effect of holding moral obligation "hostage" to personal
desires and emotions, his version of internalism has
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remained untouched.

A final evaluation, then, of Haines's

arguments against internalism, like Robertson's, must now
await an evaluation of the various versions of the
internalist/externalist distinction in the next chapter.

II

Thomas Wren, Christine Korsgaard, and Charlotte Brown
are three contemporary moral philosophers who shift their
focus away from Frankena's and towards Nagel's formulation
of the internalist/externalist distinction.

While Milo,

Robertson and Haines all put forth attempts to refute a
doctrine of internalism, among these writers only Korsgaard
attempts to take sides on the issue, and even in her case,
the defense of a version of internalism is not her primary
focus.

It is not too premature to suggest that this is

because Nagel's formulation of internalism is more
difficult to refute, or because, as Korsgaard says,
"examples of unquestionably external[ist] theories are not
easy to find. 11 16
Wren, in his article "Metaethical Internalism: Can
Moral Beliefs Motivate?" offers his own statement of the
16 Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason, 9.
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distinction as the following:

"What is basic to the

internalist-externalist distinction is the essentially
metaethical idea that conceptions of morality can be
differentiated according to whether or not they build a
motivational component into the very meaning of a
cognition's being a moral judgment. 1117

He comments on the

fact that internalism is the "dominant view" in
contemporary philosophy, which appears odd in light of the
attempts to refute internalism we have just reviewed.

He

mentions Falk as the originator of the distinction, though
unfortunately, without mentioning that Falk refers to
internalist and externalist senses of ought, and not to
internalism or externalism as theories of moral motivation.
Wren cites both Frankena and Nagel as philosophers who
make the distinction without pointing out that the two
philosophers obviously hold differing ideas about how the
distinction should be drawn, as is evidenced by the glaring
fact that Frankena thinks of Kant as an externalist, and
Nagel thinks of him as an internalist.

The likely reason,

however, is that Wren's formulation of the distinction
combines, like the one we have labelled the "generic"
definition, both Frankena's and Nagel's definitions, so
that his formulation is sufficiently broad to apply to
17 Thomas E. Wren, "Metaethical Internalism: Can Moral

Beliefs Motivate?" Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association (1985): 63.
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both.

For Frankena, the internalist claims that the

motivational component is built into "the meaning of
cognition's being a moral judgment" because moral judgments
are determined by motives possessed by the agent.

For

Nagel, this is only one way motivation is built into moral
judgment.

He believes that moral judgment does not

necessarily reflect motivation (tendencies) but that moral
motivation is "tied to" or "guaranteed by" moral judgment.
While examining Frankena's description of the internalist
thesis as maintaining that there is a "logical entailment"
between recognizing a moral obligation and having
motivation with respect to it, Wren wisely notes the need
to be more specific about what is meant by this "logical
entailment," and he distinguishes between two types of
internalism based on the kind of logical entailment
involved.

Now when Frankena speaks of the logical

entailment between obligation and motivation, it seems
clear that he is thinking of Stevenson. 18

As an emotivist,

Stevenson believed that moral judgments are simply
expressions of personal tendencies, and nothing more.
Since there is nothing objective about moral judgments in
his view, moral claims are just the sort of thing that
express occurrent tendencies within the subject.

Wren

18 While Frankena uses the phrase "logical entailment"
in his introductory paragraph, it does not reoccur until
his discussion of Stevenson (54).

70

c1assif ies this type of logical entailment as falling under
an gxpressive version of internalism.

But logical

entailment does not have to be restricted to analysis.

It

maY be the case that the recognition of a moral obligation
~cessarily

brings about motivation.

causal version of internalism.

Wren labels this a

The causal version of

internalism is adopted by rationalists, says Wren, notably
Kant; whereas the expressive version is adopted by Hume and
many nonrationalists.

Wren considers these categories

exhaustive of the views of the entailment relation
currently under discussion.
Wren does not attempt to advance an argument to defend
or refute either internalism (causal or expressive) or
externalism.

He says that he thinks of himself as an

internalist, and mentions two reasons for rejecting
externalism.

The first is the same reason that Nagel

gives: externalism is "unacceptable" because it allows a
person who admits being bound by a moral obligation to ask
why he should do it (PA, 9).

The second is that Wren

believes that externalism cannot account for the
phenomenological facts of moral experience.

He states:

"Externalism undercuts the regard which moral agents
typically have of themselves as autonomous actors." 19

19 wren, 73.
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In this article, however, Wren's intention is to draw
parallels between contemporary philosophical accounts of
the relation between the recognition of moral obligation
and motivation, and those of contemporary moral psychology,
and to encourage interdisciplinary rapport.

He observes

that while most philosophers have tended to be internalists
and most psychologists (behaviorists, nee-behaviorists, and
social pyschologists) have tended to be externalists, the
prospects of the two disciplines achieving what he calls
"reflective equilibrium" are especially good due to the
work in moral philosophy by R. M. Hare and the work done in
moral psychology by Piaget and Kohlberg.

Hare follows in

the Kantian tradition which attributes to reason a
motivational efficacy; and Kohlberg's empirical studies
indicate that individuals capable of moral reasoning at
higher stages are in fact more apt to resist temptation,
peer pressure, and authoritative influence; that is, there
is evidence of an empirical correlation between moral
reasoning and people's conduct. 20

Such evidence, Wren

notes, is essential in response to the externalist
tendencies of social psychologists.
Kohlberg also distinguishes within moral cognition the
"deontic judgment about moral rightness or justice" and
"the responsibility judgment about personal requiredness."
20 wren, 75.
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To wren this suggests that the "logical entailment"
relationship between the recognition of moral obligation
and the respective motivation must be examined more fully
and a third interpretation developed beyond the expressive
and the causal interpretation.

Wren observes in cognitive

developmental psychology a "shift of motivational weight
from deontic propositions to aretaic ones," and encourages
philosophers to follow suit.

His point is that the

motivation to act according to the dictates of morality
follows not simply from the recognition of a moral
obligation, but from "one's sense of self" or character:
not simply from the desire to be moral, but from the desire
to be virtuous.

For Wren, the whole story on the relation

of moral judgment and moral motivation has not yet been
told.
Christine Korsgaard and Charlotte Brown also follow
Nagel's distinction.

I think it may be argued either that

Korsgaard simply adopts Nagel's definitions, or that she
offers a formulation which is more precise than Nagel's.
At first, her review of the distinction makes it appear
that she is adopting Nagel's definition without alteration.
She states:
An internalist theory is a theory according to
which the knowledge (or the truth or the
acceptance) of a moral judgment implies the
existence of a motive (not necessarily
overriding) for acting on that judgment ••• on an
externalist theory, by contrast, such a
conjunction of moral comprehension and total
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unmotivatedness is perfectly possible: ~owledge
is one thing and motivation is another. 2
This certainly seems to parallel Nagel's idea of motivation
being tied to or guaranteed by the recognition of moral
truths.
However, in her discussion of examples of externalism,
she seems to go beyond Nagel and. specify more clearly how
motivation is guaranteed by moral cognition.

While

admitting that examples of externalism are difficult to
identify, she argues, like Nagel, but more thoroughly, that
Mill is an externalist.

Mill, she says, is an externalist

because for him the "'ultimate sanction' of the principle
of utility is not that it can be proved, but that it is in
accordance with our natural social feelings," and more
clearly, because for him the reason why the act is right is
not the reason why we do it.

The reasons why we act

morally, the motives, are induced by a social upbringing
and education. 22

But the internalist, Korsgaard says,

holds that "the reason why the act is right is the reason,
21Korsgaard, 8-9.
22 r still believe that the classification of Mill as
an externalist, even with this more specific statement of
the internalist/externalist distinction, is questionable.
As I hinted at in the chapter one, Mill says that the
ultimate sanction is sympathy. Just because he talks about
the importance of a utilitarian upbringing does not mean
that he is an externalist. Kant also stressed the
importance of moral education, but Nagel, Korsgaard and
Brown label him an internalist. As I will argue more
forcefully in the next chapter, I believe that for Mill
sympathy is both the reason, and the motive, for acting
morally.
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and the motive, for doing it:

it is a practical reason. 1123

Another example of an externalist theory, for
Korsgaard is intuitionism.

Intuitionists, like Ross and

Prichard, hold that morality is discovered by intuition,
but that the intuition that something is moral triggers the
desire to do what is right.

Since the relationship between

moral apprehension and moral motivation is one of
"triggering" it is possible for the apprehension to occur
without the motivation.

By contrast, for the internalist,

since the reason why something is right is also the motive
for· doing it, it is not possible for apprehension to occur
without motivation.24
Now all Nagel says is that motivation must be "tied
to" or "guaranteed by" the truth or meaning of ethical
judgments; but he doesn't say how the motivation is
guaranteed or tied.

On the other hand, the more detailed

formulation of the distinction Korsgaard develops in her
discussion of externalists would designate as internalist
all the examples of internalism provided by Nagel, the
moral theories of Hobbes, Hume and Kant.

For each of these

thinkers, the reason why something is right is also the
motive.

Hobbes says that our ethical obligations are

23 Korsgaard, 10.
24 Korsgaard speaks of the triggering relationship
described by the intuitionists (8) and Brown discusses it
in more detail in a footnote (74).
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simply consequences of what we already are motivated to do;
self-interest determines what is ethically required, and it
also provides the motivation to act accordingly.

Hume says

that our passions of sympathy or benevolence both determine
what is morally required and also provide the motivation
for ethical activity.

For Kant, reason determines what is

right and it acts as a motive.

Whereas for both Hobbes and

for Hume psychological motivation is prior to ethical
principles, for Kant it is a consequence of the rational
recognition of ethical principles; but for all, the reason
why the act is right is the motive for doing it.

So we

have here a more specific account of internalism than
Nagel's, but one that seems completely consistent with his
own examples, and therefore, one that he might readily
adopt.
In her article Korsgaard claims that arguments to the
effect that reason lacks motivational power (a Humean view)
are based on arguments to the effect that the content of
reason is not morally informative.

As she puts it, Hume's

"motivational skepticism" about reason is based on his
"content skepticism" about reason. 25

Although she

criticizes this Humean view of reason, she clearly supports
the internalist thesis as she has described it.

She, along

with Nagel, maintains that any view that permits the
25 Korsgaard, 7.

76

possibility of asking why we should do something after
recognizing that it is morally required is unsatisfactory.
one of Korsgaard's chief points is that human failures to
be motivated by moral reasons do not weaken the internalist
case.

The reason is that when people act in such a way,

they are not acting rationally.

Hume believed that people

are irrational only when they make false judgments of
existence, or when they draw insufficient means-ends
inferences.

But, Korsgaard argues, there is another way we

think people act irrationally:

by perceiving a means-end

relationship, and then failing to act in light of it.

In

fact, Korsgaard points out, this is a more genuine form of
irrationality than the cases pointed out by Hume, for if a
person has false beliefs about existence or means-ends
relationships, then his or her actions are not truly
irrational.

She says Hume in fact seems to hold that

people never really act in truly irrational ways.
Korsgaard holds that persons who fail to act on their
perceptions of means/ends relationships are practically
irrational, and that when we do not act morally once we
recognize what is morally required, we are morally
irrational.

Now Korsgaard maintains that, although we know

we can act this way, we nevertheless recognize as an ideal
the practically rational person--the person who is
motivated according to his or her moral perceptions.
is, we subscribe to what she calls the "internalist

That
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requi·rement" which is that "practical-reason claims, if
theY are really to present us with reasons for action, must
be capable of motivating rational persons. 1126

The fact .

that we consider it irrational not to heed our judgments
about what we ought to do supports, rather than weakens,
internalism (of a Kantian, not a Humean variety).
Brown clearly adopts Korsgaard's interpretation of the
distinction between internalism and externalism as having
to do with whether or not the reason why something is
judged to be morally required is also the reason it is a
motivating factor. 27

The thesis of her article is that

there is an inconsistency between Hume's "destructive
phase" and his "constructive phase."

In his "destructive

phase," she argues, Hume attempts to undermine the idea
that reason has motivational power, and support the idea
that only passions motivate.

He commits himself to an

internalist thesis that passions of moral sentiment both
determine what is right or wrong and provide motivational
power.

But in his "constructive phase" he argues that

pride and the desire to be happy (self-interest) are the
real motivating powers, even though they are not the basis
of moral rectitude.
26 Korsgaard,

27 Brown, 74.

11.

Both this argument and Korsgaard's
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arguments about Hume will be examined in the fifth chapter
which is devoted to Hume's moral theory.

The point here is

to note that Brown employs an interpretation of the
internalist/externalist distinction that follows
Korsgaard's within the Nagelian tradition.
A review of current

philos~phical

literature on the

internalist/externalist distinction has revealed that the
transition from the already muddled historical origins has
muddled on.

Frankena's understanding of the distinction

has not been uniformly interpreted; and no attempt to
reconcile the differences between Nagel and Frankena has
been made.

Wren has noted the need for more careful

accounts of Frankena's entailment relation.

Korsgaard has

found a way to make Nagel's formulation more precise.

But

the criticisms of and arguments for internalism and the
criticisms of and arguments for externalism have all
assumed prematurely that internalism·and externalism have
been adequately defined.
In surveying this literature we have shown that the
various definitions of internalism and externalism are not
all coextensive.

So the task at hand is to clearly

distinguish various formulations of the distinctions, and
then to determine which, if any, of the formulations is of
significant philosophical interest.

A philosophically

interesting formulation is first, one which offers a
convincing and acceptable theory of moral motivation.
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secondly, a formulation is philosophically interesting if
the distinction is useful in categorizing traditional moral
theories and in evaluating contemporary ethical works.
Focusing our attention on one such formulation of the
internalist/externalist distinction is the task of Chapter
Three.

CHAPTER THREE
EVALUATION OF THE VARIOUS DISTINCTIONS

Although Falk did not himself offer a theory of
internalism or externalism as a theory of moral motivation,
I would like to begin this chapter by noting that he offers
a possibility that perhaps is insightful and should not be
overlooked by those who do.

Falk distinguishes between the

internal and the external sense of ought:

I can feel

obliged to do something either as a result of some external
power or authority, or I can feel obliged to do something
on the basis of my own convictions or the dictates of my
own conscience.

Certainly, one does not have to be very

advanced in moral development, or educated in moral
philosophy, to recognize both experiences.

So no theory of

moral motivation that excludes this primitive awareness can
be a significant theory of moral motivation.

While there

may be something distinctive that separates internalism and
externalism, either theory of moral motivation must make
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room for the fact that we experience both internal and
external sources of moral motivation.
The problems and contradictions that have been noted
in the literature to date on the distinction between
internalism and externalism as theories of moral motivation
might, it has been suggested, just be a result of
imprecision and ambiguity in the formulations offered.
without making the Wittgensteinian claim that the whole
issue can be resolved through a linguistic analysis, that
all these philosophical puzzles can be dissolved through
semantic clarification, it still seems obvious that there
is a great need for clarification of key terms here.

The

most obvious example of this need concerns the term
"motivation" itself.

Frankena uses the word to mean

inclination or tendency based on emotion, desire, feeling
or self-interest, Falk and Nagel obviously use it in a
wider sense to mean any force or tendency that moves one to
action.
But this is only the most obvious example of multiple
meanings of terms in this tradition.

In fact, someone

could easily review this literature and conclude that he or
she had achieved no real grasp of what the terms
"internalism" or "externalism" mean in the first place.
may have the experience that what we

tho~ght

We

we understood

upon first acquaintance with the distinction, in fact we
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really don't understand at all.

In this chapter each of

the attempts to formulate a distinction between internalism
and externalism will be examined again in an attempt to
establish clarity and precision where it has hitherto been
lacking.

Then we can evaluate that particular version of

the distinction in terms of its usefulness and
philosophical interest.

I will argue that the

philosophical question of the greatest interest in all
these versions of the distinction identified so far is the
question of the motivational efficacy of reason, which
Nagel represents as the choice between rational and antirational internalism.

Frankena.

What really does Frankena mean when he says that

motivation, which is already ambiguous as he uses the term,
is either "internal" or "external" to obligation?

Is the

spatial metaphor that he uses here all that illuminating?
Frankena later substitutes another spatial metaphor for
this original one:
moral judgment.

motivation is or is not "built into"

Do we understand what this "built into"

relationship refers to or implies?

If all it means for

motivation to be built into moral judgment is that it is
"part of the analysis" of moral judgment, such that
something is not a moral judgment unless it entails the
proposition that the one judging is also motivated
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accordingly, then what philosopher or ethical position
adheres to the internalist claim?

When we realize, by the

end of Frankena's article, that the claim that motivation
is "built into" moral judgment means that it is not
"logically possible" either to see or to have a moral
obligation without having a corresponding motivation, we
realize that the internalist is none other than the
emotivist, because only one's own feelings and tendencies
count as motivations for Frankena, as already noted. 1
Remember, however, that Frankena's version of internalism
is not that believing, or assenting, or saying that one has
a moral obligation entails moral motivation, but that
having an obligation entails moral motivation.

So he can

believe externalism is correct as long as he denies that
having a moral obligation entails having motivation in the
form of personal desires.

That is, Frankena's version of

internalism is essentially a rejection of moral realism. 2
Externalism, for Frankena, encompasses intuitionism,
cultural and theological relativism, utilitarianism, and
deontological ethical systems--any moral theory which
allows for some degree of objectivity. 3

If the

internalists are those who deny moral realism, that is, who
1 Frankena, 73.
2see Chapter 1, 34-39.
3see Frankena, 43.
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deny that there are objective moral truths, and who assert
that moral judgments gyg moral judgments are reflections of
personal feelings or inclinations, then it appears that the
debate between internalism and externalism is antiquated.
Introductory ethics textbooks abound with arguments against
this sort of subjectivism, and moral developmental
psychologists suggest that it is but a manifestation of a
primitive level of moral consciousne.ss.

Emotivism is no

longer seriously defended in philosophical circles, and was
not ever seriously defended in non-philosophical circles.
As one puts emotivism in its place in the history of
philosophy, it appears to have been but an unfortunate
implication of logical positivism.

So, for the purposes of

this study, I will simply "let the dead horse lie."
According to Frankena's own analysis, most
philosophers have been externalists, meaning that they have
not reduced moral judgments to expressions of personal
feelings.

Nevertheless, for Frankena emotivism presented a

significant challenge.

What was it that bothered Frankena,

who was so intuitively committed to objectivity in ethics,
so much that he was led to express doubt that his natural
proclivity to externalism could be trusted?

The answer

appears to be that he could not himself respond to the
objection raised by the "internalists" of his time, namely
that the externalists, those who hold that morality is
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objective, could not explain the connection between
morality and motivation.

Frankena considered it a weakness

of externalism that it seemed to allow "a gap between
perceived obligation and motivation. 114

This is a weakness

because, from our common sense perspective, we all expect
there to be a close connection between moral awareness and
motivation:

we expect people to be influenced or affected

by the recognition of moral obligations.
Frankena accepts without question that this is a
weakness of externalism and claims that the choice between
internalism and externalism then has to be made in view of
each theory's relative strengths and weaknesses.

To him,

the motivational gap in externalism is ineluctable.
However, the gap disappears if the concept of motivation is
not restricted to subjective concerns.

If it is allowed

that we are not moved to action simply by our present set
of emotions and inclinati9ns, but that we can be moved to
action by a variety of movers, including the awareness of
an objectively binding moral obligation, then externalism
does not suffer from this weakness.

on the whole, then,

Frankena's formulation of the distinction between
internalism and externalism is of limited philosophical
interest, not only because it considers emotivism a serious
moral theory, but because is serves to distinguish only
4 rbid., 78.
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emotivism from all other moral theories.

It is also of

limited philosophical interest because Frankena gives no
argument to show that there is a mysterious gap between the
awareness of moral obligation and the power to act
accordingly, independent of private concerns.

Further, a

philosophically interesting distinction could never be one
which had as a central concept, a concept so unclear as the
concept of motivation is for Frankena.

Milo.

We have seen that while Haines and Robertson give

formulations of the distinction between internalism and
externalism which are, at least when applied to the moral
sphere, functionally equivalent to that given by Frankena
(overlooking for now any difference of meaning carried by
an expression they use, "having a reason to act"), Milo
does not. 5

Milo defines internalism as the view that

believing or judging that something is a moral obligation
or is morally prohibited entails having a corresponding
positive or negative attitude toward doing it.

In logical

notation, for Frankena internalism is the thesis that
H

~

M, for Milo internalism is the thesis that B

= having

a moral obligation, B

= believing

~

M.

(H

one has a moral

obligation, M = having motivation, or a pro- or conattitude.)

Milo's version of internalism allows for the

5 see Chapter 2, 52-60.
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possibility that there are objective moral truths
independent of personal beliefs.
Milo's version of internalism actually applies to
moral obligation and its relation to psychological
characteristics of belief.

For, we might tend to think

that having a belief entails having a corresponding
attitude or inclination.

Thus, if I believe it will rain

this afternoon, and I believe getting rained on is
uncomfortable, then I will be inclined to bring an umbrella
for protection.

If I believe a test will be difficult and

I believe that doing well on it is important, then I will
be inclined to study hard for it.

Thus we normally think

our beliefs have a motivating influence on our actions.
But Milo gives instances where holding a belief is not
necessarily associated with corresponding attitudes, and
may fail to be motivating at all.
Thus he argues that it is perfectly possible to hold a
belief and not be motivated by it.

We can accept, on the

authority of our culture, or our church, or our parent, or
our ethics professor, that a moral belief is correct,
without having any concomitant dispositions to act.

In

fact, Milo says, a belief can even be the result of a
genuine evaluation, and still be accompanied by
indifference on the motivational side; and his examples are
very convincing.

Just as I can make a genuine evaluation
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of a wine using an accepted standard, without myself having
a corresponding attitude toward that wine, so I can judge
an action to be wrong or right from an accepted moral
normative guide without the corresponding motivation.

Thus

I could master even sophisticated utilitarian methods of
determining what is morally required, or some other theory
of morality, and nevertheless be personally unmoved by
them.
There seems to be no doubt that if internalism is to
be identified with the theory that any and every moral
belief entails a concomitant motivation or attitude, then
internalism is a theory that is easily refuted.
examples make this clear.

Milo's

We need not dismiss the theory

only on the basis of isolated or idiosyncratic examples of
moral indifferentists.

We can also dismiss it on the basis

of the common experience we have of being totally
unmotivated towards a duty that is simply externally
imposed, rather than conscientiously and authentically
undertaken or accepted.

Thus, I think we can conclude that

while Milo's argument is convincing, his formulation of the
distinction between internalism and externalism is of
rather limited philosophical interest.

Nagel.

Nagel defines internalism as the view that moral

motivation is "tied to the truth or meaning of ethical
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statements," and externalism as the denial of this view.
When it is thought that motivation is tied to the meaning
of a ethical statement, rather than to its truth, then the
resulting internalism is of a philosophically weaker sort,
and Nagel clearly has emotivism in mind here.

In the

stronger version of internalism, moral motivation is tied,
not just to the meaning, but to the recognition of the
truth of an ethical proposition (PA, 8).

Nagel further

distinguishes between a rational and an anti-rational
version of internalism, in light of the debate in moral
philosophy between those who hold that reason is capable of
providing motivation and those who do not.
But, the term "recognize" is broad enough to include
"believe" or "judge."

If I believe that birth control is

considered immoral within the teachings of my religion, I
can be said to "recognize" that birth control is wrong.

If

I judge something to be morally correct on the basis of a
utilitarian calculation, I can be said to "recognize" that
it is correct.

But in either case I may fail to have an

associated disposition.

Unless the term "recognition" is

further clarified or specified, Nagel's internalism appears
to be rather easily undone by arguments like Milo's.
Nagel would likely respond by suggesting that,
although it is possible for one to believe a moral
proposition, or judge it to be true, without having an ·
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associated disposition to act accordingly, it is not
possible to really believe or really judge that something
has a positive or negative moral quality and not have the
associated disposition.

By "really" believe or judge, I

mean to arrive at a belief or a judgment on one's own.

The

mere acceptance of a belief or of the principle through
which one arrives at a belief understandably has a less
powerful effect, or perhaps no effect at all, than does the
arrival at a belief through an authentic process.

In

comparison to beliefs that result from the process of
personal reflection (authentic beliefs) such beliefs are
deficient.

Authentic beliefs, by their nature, have

motivational content; beliefs which are merely accepted do
not.

The Nagelian internalist, in making this kind of

distinction, is able to sidestep Milo's argument.

The

internalist could argue that the sorts of beliefs that Milo
recounts amount to "external" reasons· for action, and that
when people act according to those beliefs, they are acting
in light of the external sense of "ought."

The

internalist's concern, they would say, is to point to the
continuity between genuine moral realizations and moral
dispositions.

Now some philosophers have objected to this

version of internalism by claiming that not all moral
indifference can be explained away simply by making a
distinction between "really" believing or judging vs.

91

merely applying a belief as a standard.

This objection to

Nagelian internalism, based on the possibility of moral
indifference, will be examined in more detail in the next
chapter.
Now we must now ask whether or not the distinction
between internalism and externalism as formulated by Nagel
is philosophically interesting, once the just mentioned
clarification is made in Nagel's account, so that the focus
is on

genuine recognition, real belief, authentic

judgment.

In the first chapter, it was proposed that

Nagel's examples of externalists in the history of
philosophy were problematic.

In the case of Moore it was

claimed, Nagel's explanation lacks sufficient clarity; and
in the case of Mill, Nagel's analysis was said to be
unconvincing.

Who else, then of the major figures in the

history of moral philosophy, is a Nagelian externalist?
Who holds that the authentic recognition of a moral truth
does not provide moral motivation?

Nagel tells us that it

is certainly not Plato, or Aristotle, or Hobbes, or Kant,
or Hume, or the emotivists.

All of these hold that the

recognition of a moral obligation, if properly attended to,
and in the absence of overpowering counter-instincts, is
naturally associated with a motivation to fulfill the
obligation.

If Nagel proves incapable of providing a

convincing example of externalism, we are naturally led to
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wonder whether the distinction between internalism and
externalism is of any philosophical significance.

For the

usefulness of the distinction depends in part on whether or
not the distinction can be used to classify moral theories.
In fact, Nagel's own interest shifts from the debate
between internalism and externalism to the debate between
rational and anti-rational internalism.
Before we follow him in the same direction, we should
return to the points made in the first chapter to consider
carefully whether Moore and Mill are examples of Nagel's
externalism, and in the course of this determine more
precisely just what externalism is.

Unfortunately, looking

at Moore, Nagel's first example of an externalist, will not
help us.

First of all, Moore never directly discusses the

problem of moral motivation.

Secondly, Nagel is extremely

vague in his explanation of why he considers Moore an
externalist.

Finally, Nagel comments that Moore's argument

against naturalism betrays an "unrecognized assumption of
internalism;" so even Nagel seems to be confused about the
proper classification of Moore (PA, 8).

Therefore the

whole case falls on Nagel's analysis of Mill as an
externalist.
Nagel argues that Mill is an externalist because Mill
regards "the question [of the sanctions of the principle of
utility as] separate from that of the principle's

truth~
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and the answers he provides are unrelated to his arguments
for the principle" (PA, 8).

I assume that Nagel is saying

that if the sanctions for the principle of utility are not
related to the proof of the principle, then moral
motivation would not be guaranteed by the recognition of
the truth of a moral obligation, hence Mill is not an
internalist.

Korsgaard, analyzing Mill along similar

lines, calls attention to Mill's statement that the motives
for acting according to the utilitarian principle, rather
than their being an automatic outcome of the rational
application of the principle of utility, must be "acquired
in a utilitarian upbringing. 116

Since the guarantee of

moral belief yielding motivation exists only in moral
theories according to which the reason why something is
right is itself the reason why we do it, this argument
holds, Mill must be an externalist.

Let us see, then, if

Mill's discussion of sanctions really does leave them
"unrelated" to the truth of the principle of utility.
It is certainly true that Mill devotes separate
chapters of his Utilitarianism to the "proof" of the
principle of utility and to the question of its sanctions.
Since the questions of how we know that something is right
or wrong and of why we do what we think is morally
obligatory are pervasive questions in the. history of
6Korsgaard, 9.
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ethics, the philosopher is led to pose both questions, and
it is not unnatural for Mill to devote separate sections of
his work to each.

But the important question is whether

the answer Mill gives to the question, "Why should I do
what I ought to do?" is really unrelated to the his answer
to the question "how do I know what is morally required"?
so we must look at his answers to each question.
In answer to the question "Why be moral?" Mill
distinguishes between two kinds of sanctions, external and
internal (used in Falk's sense) for the principle of
utility.

External sanctions are "hope of favor and the

fear of displeasure" from other human beings, or from God.
such external sanctions are the grounds for what Falk has
called the external sources of "ought."

There is no doubt

that Mill thought of these external sanctions as extremely
powerful forces in molding our moral natures.

The

principle of utility, like any other moral or social
principle, has a binding force because we all naturally
desire reward and fear punishment.

Korsgaard, in

supporting her classification of Mill as an externalist,
directs our attention to the passage where Mill even says
that our moral faculty is "susceptible, by a sufficient use
of the external sanctions and of the force of early
impressions, of being cultivated in almost any direction,
so that there is hardly anything so absurd or so
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mischievous that it may not ••. be made to act on the human
mind with all the authority of conscience." 7
Nevertheless, Mill puts his emphasis on the internal
sanction, calling it in fact the "ultimate sanction" of
morality.

This internal sanction is "the conscientious
feelings of mankind." 8 Mill says that most human beings

possess these moral feelings which incline them, even in
the absence of all possibilities of rewards or punishments,
to do that which enhances the happiness of those around
them--that which encourages harmony between the self and
others.

He does admit that there are people "whose mind is

a moral blank" and who simply do not possess the moral
feelings which are the ground of conscience, and that there
are others in whom the moral feelings are so inadequately
developed as to even permit the possibility of the question
"Need I obey my conscience?"

For these, the only hope of

assuring moral behavior is through the establishment of
effective external sanctions. 9
Now it is possible that these comments provide textual
evidence that Mill does not think that motivation is
necessarily tied to, or guaranteed by, the recognition of
the truth of a moral proposition.
7Mill, 39.
8Mill, 37.
9Mill, 38-43.

Moral feelings,
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including the internal sanction, he claims, are not innate
and are ordinarily in need of cultivation.

Yet, on the

other hand, Mill describes our moral feelings as being so
natural that they are capable of "springing up
spontaneously" and are "susceptible of being brought by
cultivation to a high degree of development. 1110

But if he

concedes that there are some who lack even minimal internal
moral motivation, could he not consi.stently hold, given
what he has already said, that such persons are not capable
of a real, genuine, authentic moral judgment or belief,
which is why only external sanctions will affect their
behavior?

That is, if we can allow Nagel this

clarification, then we should allow it to Mill as well.
For the rest of us, however, Mill holds that the sheer
confrontation with the moral fact inclines us toward moral
behavior.

So we naturally think of ourselves as "members

of a body" and thus we naturally identify our feelings with
the good of others.

We are caught up in a "contagion of

sympathy. 1111
After looking at all the relevant passages, including
those in which Mill describes the "ultimate" internal
sanction, it seems both inaccurate and unfair to proclaim
that Mill is an externalist.
lOMill, 39.
11Mill, 41.

The strongest argument for
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his being an externalist is that he denies that moral
motivation is guaranteed in all cases.

He concedes that

there are those whose minds are "moral blanks" or who lack
even the most rudimentary moral cultivation so that moral
motivation is not attendant on moral recognition, if the
latter is possible at all.

Mill's view, that is, is that

normally moral motivation is attendant on moral awareness,
presuming at least minimal moral cultivation, so that only
in adverse cultural or emotional conditions is it lacking.
But then Mill is an externalist only if externalism is
understood as no more than the view that there do exist
individuals for whom motivation is not tied to minimal
forms of moral awareness.

If this is externalism, then it

is a moral theory designed to accommodate the existence
only of the morally retarded, and it is profoundly limited
in its philosophical interest.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that others in
the history of philosophy classified by Nagel as
internalists recognize that there are individuals in whom
the awareness of moral obligation appears to fail to
motivate.

Plato has Thrasymachus to contend with, and

Aristotle, in his classification of the types of moral
character, does not feel he has exhausted those deprived of
virtue with the incontinent or the intemperate, but makes
room for those totally incapable of virtue--the "bestial"--
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as well.

Both of these Greek philosophers put a tremendous

emphasis on the importance of a virtuous state, believing
that citizens in general are only as moral as their
political systems.

Even Kant, Nagel's paradigmatic

rational internalist, recognized that moral natures must be
developed through a proper education. 12

If admitting the

possibility of the morally retarded is tantamount to the
acceptance of externalism, then not only Mill, but Plato,
Aristotle, and Kant are all externalists.

If this is what

is meant, then externalism, as a theory, is rendered
trivial.
Now let us address the question in the other
direction.

What is the relation between Mill's proof for

the principle of utility and what he says about its
sanctions.

Is it really "totally unrelated"?

Mill says that his demonstration of the principle of
utility is not a "proof" in a formal, deductive sense,
since it is not the sort of truth that admits of deductive
proofs, being concerned with ultimate ends.

Nevertheless,

he explains, his demonstration is a "proof" in an informal
1 2see Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Part Two of
the Metaphysics of Morals, Part II, First Section, "The
Didactics of Ethics.; "Lecture-Notes on Pedagogy,"
especially the Introduction and section entitled "Moral
Education." Also, in the Critique of Judgment Kant states:
"In fact, without development of moral ideas, that which
we, prepared by culture, call sublime, presents itself to
the uneducated man merely as terrible." trans. J. H.
Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951), 105.
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sense, in that its presentation has the power of winning
the assent of those who are exposed to it.

He states:

"The subject is within the cognizance of the rational
faculty ••• considerations may be presented capable of
determining the intellect either to give or withhold its
assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. 11 13
The considerations he presents to convince us of the
principle of utility are the following:

1)

The sole

evidence it is possible to produce that anything is
desirable is that people do actually desire it.

2) Each

person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires
his own happiness.

3)

Happiness is a good:

each person's

happiness is a good to that person and the general
happiness is a good to the aggregate of all persons.

4)

Human nature desires nothing except insofar as it
contributes to happiness:

nothing is a good to each person

except insofar as it contributes to his or her own
happiness and nothing is a good to the aggregate of all
persons except insofar as it contributes to the good of the
whole.

5) Thus, the general happiness is the sole end of

human action.

13 Mill, 7.
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our task here is not to evaluate the logic of the
argument, but only to determine whether or not the
discussion of sanctions is totally unrelated to it. 14
Now if Mill had concentrated his attention only on the
external sanctions for morality, we could agree that the
answer to the question of sanctions is unrelated to the
proof of the correctness of the principle of utility.
he didn't.

But

Instead, the larger part of the discussion on

sanctions is devoted to the internal sanction in which the
operative principle is our natural social feelings and our
capacity for sympathy.
"proof."

But this is also at the core of his

For, were it not for this factor, Mill could not

have claimed assent for the view that the general happiness
is a good to the aggregate of persons and the sole end of
human action.
related.

The two conceptions are thus intimately

Indeed, we could justifiably say that for Mill,

the reason why something is right is ·also the motive for
doing it.
These arguments suffice to show that Nagel has given
no clear example of externalism among moral philosophers.
They also show that he has given no clear definition of
externalism--other than the trivial one mentioned above-14 For a careful examination of the cogency of Mill's
"proof" see Henry R West, "Mill's 'Proof' of Utility," in
The Limits of Utilitarianism, eds., Harlan B. Miller and
William H. Williams, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1982), 23-34.
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since even those philosophers classified as internalists do
not believe that moral motivation is always tied to the
recognition of moral truths.

Furthermore, since we have

uncovered the fuzziness of externalism, we must also
realize that we really have no clear idea of what the
opposite of externalism, namely internalism really is.

If

a distinction is going to be philosophically interesting,
the first criterion it must meet is clarity in the
distinction itself.

summary.

Reviewing the entire relevant literature on the

internalist/externalist distinctions we can see that quite
a variety of terms have been used to characterize the
relationship between moral cognition and moral motivation.
The following chart indicates the most important
expressions that have been used:

102

havinq
believinq one has
sayinq one has

is tied to

seeinq one has

guarantees

feeling

judqinq one has

reflects

subjective motive

implies

moral motives

causes

pro attitudes

builds in

a motive to act

a moral

perceivinq
acknowledqinq

obligation

assentinq to

a reason to act

recoqnizinq
eX'periencinq
thinkinq one has
havinq a reason for

Obviously we receive little direction in drawing a
clear and significant distinction from a listing of so many
and such ill-defined terms as those presented in this body
of literature.

In search of clarity, I will now recast the

distinction as formulated .by Frankena, Milo, and Nagel.

1)

Frankena's formulation of the distinction, stated most

clearly, is the following:

Internalism is the thesis that having a moral obligation
implies the existence of motivation, in the form of a
personal desire or inclination, in the moral agent to
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fulfill that obligation; externalism is the denial of that
thesis.
~ent:

The distinction is reasonably precise, and to that extent,
helpful.

It is possible to identify both internalists and

externalists, though most ethicians have been externalists.
If emotivism is considered a philosophically viable theory,
the distinction between internalism and externalism is an
interesting one.

The current attitude toward emotivism, I

believe, is that it can safely be ignored, having only
occurred as an oddity in the history of philosophical
ethics.

Anyone who believes that moral obligation is an

objective matter, that is, any moral realist, easily
accepts the doctrine of externalism.

2)

Milo's formulation of the distinction, stated most

clearly, is the following:

Internalism is the thesis that any belief or judgment that
one has a moral obligation implies the existence of at
least some motivation to fulfill that obligation;
externalism is the denial of that thesis.
Comment:
The distinction is also reasonably precise, and to this
extent helpful.

It is not at all what Frankena has in
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mind, contrary to Milo's interpretation of him.

The

distinction is helpful in that it contributes to the
clarification of the phenomenon of belief and its relation
to motivational attitudes.

Milo rightfully points out that

not all instances of belief or judgment are accompanied by
attitudinal frames of mind.

However, I believe the

distinction as such lacks any significant degree of
philosophical interest.

Once the distinction is explained,

the natural response is to opt for externalism.

Any honest

observer of moral behavior will admit the possibility of
applying unheld standards and of making inauthentic, but
nevertheless logical, evaluative judgements, without
thereby possessing associated attitudes.

The formulation

is of philosophical interest only insofar as it forces us
to recognize and admit the complexities of the nature of
belief.

But beyond that, contrasts of internalism and

externalism in Milo's sense are not particularly useful.

3)

Nagel's original formulation, as found in the opening

pages of The Possibility of Altruism, is vague.

However,

if all the information Nagel gives is taken up and fully
expressed, I believe his definition of the distinction can
be stated as follows:
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Internalism is the thesis that authentically and genuinely
perceiving, judging, or believing that one has a moral
obligation entails either motivation in the form of
personal desire or inclination within the moral agent, or
purely moral motivation, and externalism is the thesis that
denies it.
comment:
This formulation is reasonably precise, at least if we
understand moral motivation to be motivation to act morally
that is based on nothing other than the recognition that
something is moral.

On this formulation of the

distinction, internalism is an extremely attractive thesis,
in that it captures the bare minimum of what we expect from
moral consciousness:

that moral consciousness is something

which affects behavior by being in itself a basis for
action.

From Aristotle to Iris Murdoch ethicians have

recognized two goals.

Moral philosophy should be both

realistic in its description of our moral natures and
idealistic in that it should offer us a moral idea1. 15
Moral consciousness is the basis of this twofold purpose:
it is in its essence responsive to the ideal human nature.
An ethical system which neglected this essential nature
would be unsatisfying.

Thus Nagel says of externalist

15 see Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good Over Other
Concepts, Leslie Stephen Lecture, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1967).
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theories that they are simply unacceptable because they
permit someone who already recognizes a moral obligation to
demand a further justification (,EA, 9).

The fact that the

moral obligation is reflective of the ideal is reason
enough for it to be fulfilled.

But the requirement on a

moral theory is so basic and obvious that the distinction
between internalism and externalism makes us doubt its
philosophical significance.

One is tempted to simply label

externalism as jejune.
Nagel has given such a broad definition of internalism
that it encompasses all major moral theories, even as
diverse as Kant's theory is from Hobbes', or as emotivism
is from naturalism.

It is not at all surprising that Nagel

turns his own attention away from the debate (if there is
any) between internalism and externalism, and towards a
more interesting one between rational and anti-rational
internal ism.
Similarly, if we look back again to Frankena's paper,
the really interesting question is one that he fails to
ask.

Instead of just assuming that the awareness of a

moral obligation is only motivating in terms of some
occurrent desire or inclination, he should have challenged
this by asking if something other than a desire or
inclination, e.g. a moral judgment, can motivate.

Given

his own intuition that moral obligations are objective and
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are independent of our desires, and given that moral
obligation is by its very nature something we ought to
fulfill, it would have been natural for him to do so.
This, indeed, is the fascinating question that has
occupied much of the history of moral philosophy.

It is

this question that finds its culmination in the opposing
views attributed to Hume and Kant.

Hume is described as

the champion of all those who have seen moral motivation
only in our passions and desires; Kant is described as the
champion of all those who see in our rational faculty
itself a motivational power.

On the other hand, while Hume

sees our moral natures as necessarily continuous with our
passionate natures, Kant sees it as radically
discontinuous, capable of being expressed appropriately
only through categorical, rather than hypothetical
imperatives.
In the same vein, Korsgaard speaks of the "internalist
requirement" of accounts of practical reasons:

"Practical-

reason claims, if they are really to present us with
reasons for action, must be capable of motivating rational
persons. 1116

The issue that Nagel finally focuses on, the

difference between rational and antirational version of
(his version of) internalism is here articulated by
Korsgaard in terms of her "internalist requirement" of
16Korsgaard, 11.

108

practical reason.

Hume is the target in opposition to whom

Nagel's "rational internalism" should be defended.

Hume's

denial of the practical efficacy of reason must be
challenged.
Given the problems and triviality of the formulations
evaluated above, there seems to be no good reason to use
the terms in any of those ways.

We could then just throw

the "internal/external" terminology out altogether.

But a

crucial issue is still with us, to which the terminology of
"internal" and "external" aptly applies.

Consequently, it

does seem that if "internalism" and "externalism" are terms
to be used in dealing with the problem of moral motivation,
an extremely interesting philosophical distinction is this
one, suggested by Korsgaard:

Rational Internalism is the theory that reason is capable,
unaided by self-interest or personal desire, of moral
motivation; externalism is the theory that reason lacks
such motivational power.

It is to this question that the remainder of this work
shall be dedicated.

In the next chapter we will see how a

Rational Internalist would respond to various common
objections to Rational Internalism.

The .chapter following

that will examine Hume's rejection of the internalist
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requirement on practical reason, this being the most
formidable objection to Rational Internalism that the
history of Western moral philosophy offers.
Now that the various formulations of the distinction
between internalism and externalism have been identified
and clarified, we can see how the contradictions in the
classifications of traditional moral theories by these
contributors are explained.

Frankena's classification of

Kant as an externalist is not at all surprising, as
Korsgaard claims, given his understanding of what
internalism really is.

It is natural for Nagel to think of

Hume as an internalist given his broad understanding of
internalism, and natural for Korsgaard to think of him as a
violator of the internalist requirement and hence as an
externalist.

Frankena thinks of Aristotle as an

externalist because of the latter's belief that obligation
is present regardless of whatever personal desires may be
represent, and Nagel and Korsgaard think of him has an
internalist because of his belief in the motivational
capacity of reason as evidenced in his notion of the
practically wise person.

Frankena believes that

intuitionism is an obvious example of externalism, because
of his identification of externalism as the view that
morality is objective; and Korsgaard describes intuitionism
as "almost" internalism because it is the rational
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intuition of moral obligation that triggers the desire to
act morally.

It is no wonder that Frankena thinks of

externalism as the more popular theory, whereas Wren claims
that most philosophers have been internalists.
By recasting the use of these terms, following
Korsgaard's suggestion and

buil~ing

on Nagel's

rational/anti-rationalist distinction, this study will try
to apply the insights of all these thinkers to one of the
central questions of moral philosophy, namely the role of

.n mora 1 mo t '1vat 'ion.
reason 1~

CHAPTER IV
RATIONAL INTERNALISM
AND

COMMON REFUTATIONS OF INTERNALISM

various objections that have been raised to the
several versions of internalism are relevant to Rational
Internalism, the version of internalism which is, I have
argued, of the most significant philosophical interest.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine these objections
in order to see if or to what extent these objections are
problems for Rational Internalism.

Following Nagel, I take

Rational Internalism to be the view that reason can
guarantee (some degree of) motivation to be moral.

The

motivation that reason provides is a purely moral one, that
is, the motive or reason for acting morally is nothing
other than that an obligation is recognized.

According to

Rational Internalism, reason has the power to bring about
moral action.

I will argue that Rational Internalism can

be defended against all of the relevant objections to
various forms of internalism.
111

In the first section of this
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chapter I will show that many objections against
internalism really apply only to other, less interesting,
versions of internalism, but not to Rational Internalism.
In the second section I will deal with the more serious
problem of amoralism or moral indifferentism, and will
determine if and to what extent it poses a difficulty for
Rational Internalism.

In the third section, I will examine

an objection by William Prior raised specifically against
the view here called Rational Internalism, namely that
Rational Internalism is an inadequate moral theory because
it gives a distorted account of our moral lives by ignoring
the motivating power of compassion.

Finally, there will

remain the objection to Rational Internalism that it is
false because reason has no motivating power.

This, of

course, is the objection raised by David Hume; it is
probably the most formidable objection to Rational
Internalism.

Its examination requires a thorough analysis

of David Hume's theory of morality, and for this reason, I
choose to devote the entire subsequent chapter to this
objection.

A.

Objections which apply only to other versions of

internal ism
There are two objections which fall under this
category, and each can be dealt with very briefly in light
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of the fact that we have already demonstrated that some
versions of internalism are easily refutable.
The first objection is the following:

Internalism is

obviously false because we know that human beings are
A.Cratic, that is, they exhibit moral weakness.

Sometimes

we know what is right and we nevertheless do otherwise.
Therefore, the recognition of a moral obligation does not
entail the motivation to act accordingly.

This objection

has already been discussed in a preliminary way in the
examination of Mill's views in Chapter Three.
This objection arises as a result of an exaggerated
interpretation of the claim that "moral judgment entails
motivation."

If we interpret this to mean that, whenever

we judge something to be morally required, we fulfil that
obligation, or whenever we judge something to be immoral we
refrain from doing it, internalism would clearly be false.
For such a doctrine is obviously contrary to the facts of
human experience, and on these grounds is easily rejected.
Any realistic moral theory must account for the phenomenon
of doing otherwise than we judge we ought, most often
understood as the consequence of acrasia or moral weakness.
Now some thinkers claim that this phenomenon never
occurs, that whatever a person does is what he or she
judges ought to be done, so all wrongdoing is simply bad
judgment.

But for present purposes this study will accept

the common sense evidence that the phenomenon is real.
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Recall, now, the passage quoted earlier, for instance,
where Frankena explains his preference for externalism over
internalism by pointing out that it is possible to claim
that one ought to do something and yet refrain from
resolving to do it. 1

Frankena is assuming here a version

of internalism that excludes the acratic phenomenon.

But

the Rational Internalist says, not that reason guarantees a
~nclusively

motivating force, such that moral dictates

always find expression in action, but rather, that reason
quarantees some degree of motivation.

According to

Rational Internalism the motivating force of reason may,
for example, be overwhelmed by other forces:

motivation

which arises from other powerful sources such as physical
desires, emotion, or self-interest, or perhaps fatigue.
Indeed, these other forces may be so powerful that whatever
force reason may have may be imperceptible in their midst.
·Kant, for example, the paradigmatic Rational
Internalist, clearly allows for acting contrary to moral
reason.

He states:

This 'I ought' is properly an 'I would,' valid
for every rational being, provided only that
reason determined his actions without any
hindrance. But for beings that are in addition
affected as we are by springs of a different
kind, namely sensibility, and in whose case that
is not always done which reason alone would do,
for these that necessity is expressed only as an

1see my chapter I, 36-37.
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'ought,' and the subjective n~cessity is
different from the objective.
The sensible influences are so ubiquitous that Kant admits
that it is impossible to judge in practice whether an act,
either of our own or of others, has actually been done
purely "for the sake of duty" or in response to such
affective desires.

This is why,. for Kant, the possibility

of a purely moral motivation must be something we know g
priori, rather than from experience; so, for Kant, Freedom,
which makes purely moral motivation possible, is an g
priori condition for morality.

That is, we cannot, in any

ordinary sense, prove that we are free, or that any
particular action is a result of Freedom; and yet the very
fact that we feel the burden of obligation in the form of a
categorical imperative, presupposes the possibility of
Freedom.

Thus, Kant is giving a "transcendental" proof of

freedom, in showing that freedom is a necessary
precondition of morality.
Nagel, for his part, identifies weakness, cowardice,
laziness, repression, rationalization, blindness, and panic
as factors which inhibit the efficacy of practical reason;
and he also points out that "countervailing reasons" can
also interfere--reasons which might also be moral, but
which lead to contrary moral conclusions (PA, 65-66; 82).
2 rmmanuel Kant, Fundamental Principle of the
Metaphysics of Morals, trans., Thomas K. Abbott,
(Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, Inc., 1949), 66. Hereafter,
U in text.
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Thus, contrary reasons (even moral ones), contrary desires
or emotions, and contrary states of character are all
inhibitors to the moral motivation guaranteed by a
particular recognition of a moral obligation.
Korsgaard also states very clearly that the
motivational influence of a moral consideration can suffer
in light of many kinds of interferences.

She claims:

"Rage, passion, depression, distraction, grief, physical or
mental illness: all these things could cause us to act
irrationally, that is, to fail to be motivationally
responsive to the rational considerations available to
us. 113
All the Rational Internalist claims, then, is that
reason guarantees some motivation for the corresponding
moral action, but not necessarily motivation we choose to
act on.

Thus, the Rational Internalist claims that it is

absurd to ask if we are motivated to do what morality
dictates.

While other reasons may be given, ultimately,

moral reasons are reasons in themselves for action, and no
other types of reasons are necessary to explain a decision
to act morally.
motivating:

That is, moral reasons are independently

no other source of motivation is required in

order to explain moral action.

When they fail to lead to

the action in keeping with morality, an explanation for the
3 Korsgaard, 13.
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failure will have to be found in the influences of selfinterest, desire or emotion, deficient states of character,
or other lesser moral motives.

As was already argued in

chapter Three, any version of internalism which makes the
alternative claim that the recognition of moral obligation
leads inevitably to corresponding moral action is trivial
and philosophically uninteresting.
The second objection is:

Internalism is false because

having a moral obligation does not analytically entail
having an associated motivation.

This is Frankena's

objection to internalism and his reason for opting for
externalism.

But this is not an objection which applies to

all forms of internalism, and it certainly doesn't apply to
Rational Internalism.

Only the emotivist claims that

having a moral obligation is analytically equal to having
moral motivation; and this is because the emotivist simply
identifies moral judgments as mere expressions of personal
attitudes.

Moral obligations are thus dependent on the

presence in the moral agent of positive or negative
attitudes towards certain types of actions.
Clearly, the Rational Internalist is not committed to
this view.

Rather, the Rational Internalist holds that, if

one uses the processes of reason to discover a moral truth,
then one experiences the phenomenon of moral motivation.
If one has not been made aware of the fact of a moral
obligation through reason, there would be no purely moral
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motivation experienced at all.

There may be other kinds of

motivational influences present, however, even ones which
encourage the performance of a moral action, but no
motivation arising from moral judgments themselves.

The

Rational Internalist claims not that having, but that the
recognition of moral obligation through reason, "entails"
moral motivation.

(How it is that the recognition of moral

obligation entails moral motivation, is not, as yet clear.
The entailment relationship will be examined closely in
Chapter Seven. )

B.

Objections based on Moral Indifference or Amoralism
A more serious objection to internalism is that it

does not allow for, or cannot explain, moral indifference
or amoralism.
follows:

The argument can be generally stated as

Internalism is the doctrine that the recognition

of moral truths entails or guarantees (some) motivation to
act morally.

But all of us sometimes experience

indifference to the demands of morality, and some people
(the moral indifferentist or the amoralist), generally lack
the motivation to behave morally.

Therefore, internalism

is false.
The argument has an intuitive appeal, at least as
stated above.

In order to evaluate the

~trength

of this

argument against internalism, I think it would be useful to
first identify five types of moral indifference, for it may
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be that not all cases of such indifference count as
evidence against internalism.

Objections based on moral

indifference raised by two contemporary philosophers will
be examined, both in terms of the initial categorization of
types of moral indifference and also in terms of their
effectiveness in undermining Rational Internalism.

I will

argue, in fact, that only one type of moral indifference
poses a problem for the Rational Internalist.
Probably the most common type of moral indifference is
that which is experienced as a result of moral weakness.
This type of moral indifference is sporadic rather than
pervasive, occurring only in the presence of significantly
strong counter desires, emotions or inclinations.

It is

the indifference to a particular moral demand, but not to
the claims of morality generally.

Let us refer to this

phenomenon as Acratic Moral Indifference.

We have already

examined the relationship between the phenomenon of acrasia
and Rational Internalism in the previous section, and need
not add anything here, except to distinguish this form of
indifference from others.

The distinctive mark of Acratic

Moral Indifference is its evanescence:

it disappears with

the subsiding of the countervailing emotions and desires,
and is most often replaced by feelings of anguish or regret
over one's moral failings.

Thus, Acratic Moral

Indifference is susceptible to guilt.

I recognize that

"moral indifference" is here being used in a much broader
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sense than is usual.

But the fact that we experience

indifference to moral obligations, justifies the expansion
of the term "moral indifference" to cover this common
phenomenon.
Another common type of moral indifference is that
which is experienced toward externally imposed beliefs.

It

is possible to be indifferent to, i.e., to experience no
motivation towards, a moral belief that is relevant simply
on the basis of convention or authority.

The lack of

motivation in this case could be a result of the fact that
one finds the particular conventionally held belief, or the
more general, conventionally held, criterion of moral
belief, spurious, inadequate, or even repugnant.

We may

find ourselves or others indifferent to all or only to some
conventionally held moral beliefs.

Let us refer to this

type of indifference as Conventional Moral Indifference.
Moral indifference, however, may be a result of a
thoroughgoing lack of concern towards moral situations or
issues.

Unlike the occasional indifference based on

convention, or occasional acratic moral indifference, this
indifference is so constant or pervasive that we are
warranted in referring to the phenomenon as "amoralism."
Amoralism is constant, pervasive indifference that excludes
normal experiences of guilt.

There do seem to be

individuals who simply do not engage themselves in
deliberation over the moral aspects of their actions, and
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e unimpressed, in any way, by the deliberation of
whO ar
others.
such a thoroughgoing lack of concern towards the moral
aspects of situations may be found in two sorts of
individuals.

One group is driven exclusively by impulses,

altogether lacking the capacity for self-control.

Such

individuals, described by Aristotle as the "bestial," are,
fortunately, extremely rare.

They are among the

emotionally disturbed and are the psychopaths of society.
Either these individuals lack appropriate emotional
responses, or they totally lack control over their
emotions.

We may refer to the phenomenon of their

indifference as Emotionally Perverted Amoralism.

The

emotional perversion may be either pervasive, extending to
all areas of morality and hence extremely rare, or
selective, extending only to certain moral situations.
Consider, for instance, the mafia member who murders
regularly, but would never lie to his mother.

He might

appear to have moral sensitivity and responsiveness in some
areas but not in others, so his emotional perversion
appears to be selective rather than pervasive.

But note

that it is possible that emotional perversion need not be
expressed in action; and the emotionally perverted person
may be sufficiently rational, or sufficiently controlled,
to conform to social norms.

This motivation would not be a

moral one, but only self-interested or based on fear of
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punishment or the like.

This is Emotionally Perverted

.Amoral ism.
On the other hand, the amoralist might have considered
views behind his or her amoralism.

The amoralist might

believe that "morality" is for the weak, or uncreative, or
the docile.

We can refer to this phenomenon as

intellectually Perverted Amoralism.

It seems almost

certain that the intellectually perverted amoralist is also
emotionally perverted; but the distinction between these
two instances is that the intellectually perverted attempt
to defend their lack of concern on intellectual grounds.
Plato's Thrasymachus is a good example.

After listening to

the discussion on the nature of justice between Socrates,
Cephalus and Polemarchus, he interrupts their discussion
with name-calling and derision.

They are all "Simple

Simons" and their discourse on justice is nothing but
"balderdash." . He then claims that he can show that the
unjust life is better than the just life, provided the
injustice is sufficiently strong to overcome justice.

But

his criterion of morality is "might makes right," an absurd
notion of morality that he cannot defend and that arguably
betrays an underlying emotional disturbance.

It is no

wonder that Plato has Socrates describe Thrasymachus as a
Wild beast ready to tear Socrates and his interlocutors to
Pieces, and it is no wonder that Socrates' own reaction to
Thrasymachus is one of fear.
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Finally, we must consider whether there is a form of
moral indifference in which there is a lack of motivation
even when a moral judgment or belief has been arrived at
authentically, that is, as a result of moral deliberation
on the part of a generally thoughtful and emotionally
normal person.

Let us refer to this type of moral

indifference as Authentic Moral Indifference.

While we

know that moral indifference based on acrasia, or on
convention, or on emotional and/or intellectual aberrations
or disturbances is possible, it may legitimately be asked
whether Authentic Moral Indifference is really possible.
we shall return to this topic shortly.
Now that the various types of moral indifference have
been identified, we are in a better position to examine
objections to internalism based on moral indifference, and
to determine to what extent, if any, these undermine
Rational Internalism.

Two objections in contemporary

literature on the subject will be examined, and then
further general comments will be offered.
Ronald Milo, we saw, construes internalism as the
doctrine that believing or judging something to be right or
wrong entails having an appropriate pro- or con-disposition
toward it.

He then criticizes this view by arguing that it

is possible, and showing how it is possible, to have or to
arrive at a moral belief without also experiencing the
associated disposition.

In this way, Milo argues for the
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"externalist" thesis, as he sees it, that it is possible to
believe that something is wrong and not have a con-attitude
toward it, or to believe that something is right and not
have a pro-attitude toward it.
Milo does admit that the internalist thesis is at
least intuitively or superficially appealing because if we
attend to the phenomena of believing or judging something
to be wrong or right, initially it seems very plausible
that such mental acts should be accompanied by a
corresponding motivation.

If a person said he believed

that something was wrong, but did not have a negative
attitude or disposition toward committing the act, or if he
said he believed that something was morally required, but
did not have a positive attitude or disposition toward it,
we would ordinarily be justified in labelling him as
insincere. 4

Such a person would be regarded as paradoxical

because in conversation, saying that something is wrong
conventionally implies having a negative attitude toward
it.

We are not generally moved to say something is wrong,

to utter our disapproval, unless we have the corresponding
negative attitude.

But this does not mean that it is

impossible to believe that something is right or wrong
without having the appropriate disposition toward it.

As

4A point made by c. L. Stevenson in Ethics and
Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 1617.
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we saw in Chapter Two, Milo argues that to think this is
impossible, i.e., to support internalism as he understands
it, is to confuse "conversational implication" with
"logical implication."
Thus, Milo argues convincingly that having a moral
belief or making a moral judgment does not necessarily
imply the appropriate attitudes and dispositions.

For a

belief can be acquired through mere application of a moral
code or by making a moral evaluation based on what others
have called the "moral point of view"; and such a belief
need not be accompanied by a correlative attitude.

What

Milo is describing here is what we have called Conventional
Moral Indifference.

As indicated above, Milo's insights do

not undermine Nagel's version of internalism, and so do not
challenge Rational Internalism, provided if "recognizing" a
moral truth is taken to mean something more than the
operations described by Milo.

Such terms as "genuine,

real, authentic moral belief or judgments" were suggested
to mark this difference.

Rational Internalism, as put

forth either by Kant or by Nagel, is certainly not the view
that when reason is used only in Milo's more limited sense-to see if a certain course of action is consistent with
convention, or with standards considered hypothetically or
as held by others--that it is accompanied by motivation.
Secondly, David Brink criticizes internalism on the
basis of the phenomenon of moral indifference.

He rejects
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internalism because it "overstates the connection between
· " and b ecause
morality and mo ti va t ion

11 1' t

amoralist's challenge seriously enough. 115

does not take the
Amoralism is

defined by Brink as a type of moral scepticism.

Whereas I

distinguished amoralism as a type of moral indifferentism-as moral indifferentism which is pervasive rather than
sporatic; Brink uses the two terms interchangeably.

The

amoralist, for Brink is "someone who recognizes the
existence of moral considerations and remains unmoved."6
Brink does not rest his case against internalism on
conventional Moral Indifferentism as Milo does.

He

expressly and correctly claims that not all moral
indifferentism can be reduced to the conventional type. 7
Because not all moral indifferentism is the result of the
acceptance of a mere conventional moral belief, and because
it is possible to imagine that someone can recognize an
obligation and yet remain unmoved by it,- Brink claims that
internalism must be rejected.
Why exactly does Brink think that internalism must be
rejected in view of the fact of non-conventional moral
5 oavid Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of
Ethics {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 49.
This criticism against internalist was originally advanced
by Brink in his article "Externalism Moral Realism," The
Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986) Vol. XXIV,
Supplement, 23-41.
6 Brink, Moral Realism, 46.
7 rbid., 46-47.
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indifferentism?

We must first examine just how he

conceives of internalism.
following definition:

He initially offers the

internalism is "the view that there

is an internal or conceptual connection between moral
considerations and action or the sources of action," and
then, (in light of the fact that some authors speak of
"internalism about motivation" and others of "internalism
about reasons for action") as the "claim that it is part of
the concept of a moral consideration that such
considerations motivate the agent to perform the moral
action or provide the agent with reason to perform the
moral action. 118

Further, Brink makes some attempt to

distinguish between three types of internalism.

The first

type, "agent internalism" is the view that "moral
obligations motivate, or provide reason for, the agent to
do the moral thing. 119

The second type, "appraiser

internalism" is the view that "it is in virtue of the
concept of morality that moral belief or moral judgment
provides the appraiser with motivation or reason for
action. 1110

The third type, "hybrid internalism" is the

view that "the recognition of a moral obligation motivates
or provides the agent (the person who recognizes his
8 Ibid., 38-39.
9 Ibid., 40.
lOibid.
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oJ:>liqation) with reason for action. 1111

Each of these will

J:>e considered further in a moment.
In addition, Brink distinguishes between weak and
.1trong internalism.

Weak internalism is the view that

"moral considerations provide some motivation" and strong
internalism is the view that "moral considerations provide
sufficient motivation. 1112
Now Brink's criticisms of internalism do not depend on
the strong version, but only the weak, so the argument
offered earlier that Rational Internalist is untouched by
criticisms of the former versions does not apply here.
Brink's point is to deny that moral considerations
necessarily provides even a minimal degree of motivation
because of the phenomena of moral indifference.
Having made all these distinctions, Brink identifies
three central internalist claims:

1) that moral

considerations necessarily motivate 2) that it is a priori
that moral considerations do motivate and 3) the
motivational power of moral considerations are not
dependent on what it is that morality requires, or on facts
about the agent. 13

Externalism is the view that "the

motivational force and rationality of moral considerations
11 I b'd
1 •

I

41.

I

42.

12 Ibid.
13 I b'd
1 •
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depend on factors external to the moral considerations
themselves. 14 so externalism recognizes that motivation
maY be contingent rather than necessary, and can be known
only a posteriori rather than a priori, and is dependent on
what it is that morality requires and facts about the
agent.
Brink's rejection of internalism is best grasped as
part of his larger task of defending moral realism, the
view that there are objective moral truths.

He identifies

noncognitivism as the most traditional antirealist view,
and emotivism and prescriptivism as common forms of
noncognitivism which deny that moral judgments refer to
objective moral facts and which characterize moral
judgments as merely expressive or exhortative.

Emotivism

and prescriptivism are examples of internalism, because
they both hold that it is part of the meaning of a moral
judgment that agents hold a positive disposition to the
acts they regard as moral and a negative disposition to the
acts they regard as immoral.

For both, it is a conceptual

truth that moral obligations motivate. 15

Thus, it may be

that Brink's criticisms of internalism are influenced by
its association with noncognitivism in the form of
emotivism or prescriptivism.
14 rbid.
15 Ibid., 44.

For he clearly thinks of
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.xternalism as the theory which best accommodates both the
vieW of moral realism, and the view that morality is
•practical" or "action-guiding."

Internalism, he

maintains, cannot give an adequate account of the "actionquiding" character of morality.
Now back to "Agent Internalism."

Agent Internalism,

Brink argues, is obviously mistaken and can be dismissed,
because if it were true, "it would seem that our views
about people's moral obligations would have to be
restricted or tailored to actions which people already have
a desire to perform. 1116

This objection to agent

internalism may not be at all obvious given his definition
of it, yet it is clear that he associates agent internalism
with Frankena's notion of internalism as the view that
having an obligation entails motivation because his
objection is phrased in Frankena's terms.

For Frankena,

internalism is a noncognitivist theory which denies
objective moral facts.

For emotivists, for example, having

an obligation entails having an associated motivation only
because they believe that the obligation doesn't exist
unless you experience the motivation.

Brink rejects agent

internalism because he thinks it is obvious that our
obligations are not restricted to the desires we have, and

16 Ibid.,

45.
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that restricting our obligations to desires ignores the
practical or action-guiding character of morality.
It is on the grounds of the phenomenon of amoralism
that Brink rejects both the "appraiser" and the "hybrid"
forms of internalism.

He states:

But internalism, so construed (either as
appraiser or as hybrid internalism], seems just
false to the psychological facts. Although
indifference to what is regarded as moral
considerations may be fairly rare, it does seem
to exist. Some people (e.g. certain sociopaths)
do not care about what they regard as moral
considerations .•. The (appraiser or hybrid)
internalist about motives claims it is a
conceptual truth about morality that moral
judgment or belief motivates. According to the
internalist, then, it must be conceptually
impossible for someone to recognize a moral
consideration or assert a moral judgment and
remain unmoved. This fact raises a problem for
internalism, internalism makes the amoralist
conceptually impossible. 17
This passage, because it concentrates on the
sociopaths and the psychologically disordered, seems to
indicate that the type of .indifference Brink has in mind in
his argument against internalism is Emotionally Perverted
Amoralism.

Other passages are less specific than this.

Brink simply speaks of the fact that "we can imagine
someone who regards certain demands as moral demands ••• and
yet remains unmoved. 1118

But we have seen that there are at

least four other distinguishable kinds of moral
17 Ibid.

I

46.

18 Ibid.

I

48.
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indifference phenomena, even when we have excluded
conventional Moral Indifference.

Brink thinks that the

phenomenon of moral indifference is so obvious that it
counts without further argument as sufficient proof for the
truth of externalism.

For only the externalist, he says,

can take the amoralist (who asks, "Why should I care about
moral considerations?) seriously.
In response to Brink's objection, we can ask:

Is it

true that only the externalist can come to grips with the
amoralist or make sense out of the question "Why be moral?"
Brink's objection is a significant objection to the forms
of internalism described by Frankena or Milo; and if
"externalism" is only the denial of these forms of
internalism the Rational Internalist could agree with such
externalism.

But these forms of internalism have already

been rejected in view of their limited philosophical
interest.

So our question remains:

How significant are

the phenomena of moral indifference as evidence for the
inadequacy of Rational Internalism?
We have already seen that the phenomena of Acratic and
Conventional Moral Indifference pose no difficulty for
Rational Internalism.

The Rational Internalist can

accommodate both these forms of indifference rather easily,
and take them very seriously indeed.

Acratic Moral

Indifference is possible because of the hindering
influences of other motivating powers; Conventional Moral
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Indifference occurs when a person is not using their powers
of reason authentically and sincerely in applying a moral
standard and making a moral judgment.

What about

Emotionally Perverted Amoralism?
The argument on the part of the externalist, including
Brink in some passages, appears to be that because there
are individuals who suffer from psychological disorders
preventing normal moral responses, internalism is false.
As mentioned, this objection clearly does undermine both
Frankena's and Milo's versions of internalism.

It shows

that neither having, nor believing, nor (inauthentically)
judging that one has an obligation necessarily implies
moral motivation.

But does it apply to Rational

Internal ism?
I believe that Rational Internalism is unscathed by
this objection, and in order to demonstrate this I shall
rely Dn an analogical argument.

We would not deny that the

human eye has the power to see color on the basis of the
fact that certain individuals are color blind.

In the same

way, I believe, we should not deny that human reason has
the power to guarantee moral motivation on the basis of the
fact that certain individuals are not capable of such
motivation.

Color blindness is a result of a structural

defect in the anatomy of the eye, present only in a few
individuals.

Emotional perversion which makes us

indifferent to the suffering of others, is also rare.

When
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we say that the human eye has the power to see color we
mean that in most suitably constituted individuals the eye
perceives color.

When the Rational Internalist says that

human reason has the power to motivate, he or she means
that in most suitably constituted individuals reason
provides moral motivation.

Contrary to Brink, the rarity

of such individuals is indeed relevant.

Not only do we

think that it is normal for people to be able to see color,
and to be able to be responsive to the recognition of moral
obligations, but we think that it is desirable and
valuable.
Since, as I have suggested, Intellectually Perverted
Amoralism depends on the presence in the individual of an
emotional perversion, the comments made on Emotionally
Perverted Amoralism apply as well to Intellectually
Perverted Amoralism.

Rational Internalism is not refuted

by the admission that such amoralism exists, because
Rational Internalism can admit that it presupposes not only
normal, but desirable and valuable human traits.
Brink argues that in view of the sociopath, the
"internalist must give up his claim that recognition of
moral considerations implies actual motivation. 1119
Rational Internalist needn't do this.

But the

What the Rational

Internalist must admit, however, when they advance the
19 Ibid., 27.
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thesis of the morally motivating power of reason, they mean
•in a suitably constituted, normal, individual"; that is,
in an individual that is not defective.

It is true that

this is a more limited claim, but we would not object to
the claim that the human eye has the capacity to see color
on the basis of its similar limitedness.

As was suggested

during the examination of Mill's views earlier, what the
Rational Internalist is questioning is whether or not it is
really possible for emotionally perverted sociopaths to
"recognize" the obligations to which they are indifferent.
· We are left with questions of whether what we have
called Authentic Moral Indifference can be called upon to
formulate a rejection of Rational Internalism.

Authentic

Moral Indifference occurs when a normally constituted human
being, untethered by powerful inclinations, recognizes a
moral obligation and remains unmoved.

If indeed this

possibility exists, and if the recognition of the moral
obligation is through reason, then Rational Internalism is
false.

But the Rational Internalist can simply deny that

it is possible.

Any counterexample raised by the

externalist will be explained away by the Rational
Internalist in terms of one of the other forms of moral
indifference; no proof could possibly be given that none of
the alternative accounts are adequate.
If my categorization of types of moral indifference is
adequate, then, the phenomena of moral indifference do not
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themselves provide proof that Rational Internalism is false
unless evidence of Authentic Moral Indifference can be
offered.

But the Rational Internalist will claim that it

cannot be demonstrated that there are examples of this form
of indifference, because all experiential examples fall
into the other four categories.

This is what Brink means

when he says that for the internalist, moral motivation is
an a priori part of moral reasoning and is not dependent on
what it is that is in fact required, or on subjective facts
about the agent's desires or wishes.

Note, however, that

for Rational Internalism, moral motivation is not a priori
because the meaning of having a moral obligation is that
one has a certain positive or negative disposition; this is
the emotivist version of internalism set aside earlier.
Reason is understood by Rational Internalism to guarantee,
by its very nature, motivation to act.

I will discuss the

idea of the a priori conne.ction in Chapter 7, where I
examine the precise nature of the so-called entailment
relation between moral cognition and moral motivation.
Now Brink believes that the contention that moral
motivation is a priori is not true to the facts; the truth
is the externalist claim that moral motivation can be known
only a posteriori.

Common sense, he says, recognizes that

moral considerations motivate only contingently--that there
are limitations on the actual motivating force a moral
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consideration might have. 20

As above, however, the

Rational Internalist can agree that it is a contingent
~atter

whether or not moral considerations will be the

ultimate or overriding motivation, and whether or not a
qiven individual will have moral motivation or be aberrant.
What the Rational Internalist maintains is that the
rational recognition, if there is any, of a moral
obligation, is essentially motivating.

Brink does not

adduce any facts or any other arguments that disprove the
Rational Internalist's claim here.

c.

Objection to Rational Internalism by

w.

Prior:

Rational Internalism gives a distortive account of morality
Unlike the objections we have considered so far, the
objection to be examined in this section is one which is
directed against Rational Internalism specifically.

I

think that the objection is worthy of consideration,
because it puts into argument form a very common suspicion
about Kantian ethics.

The objection is articulated by

William Prior in his article, "Compassion: A Critique of
Moral Rationalism. 1121

Moral Rationalism is defined vaguely

by Prior as the theory that reason is the "source of moral
20 Ibid., 49.
21William J. Prior, "Compassion: A Critique of Moral
Rationalism," Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2 (Winter,
1989): 173-91.
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value," that "moral goodness and rightness are the products
of rationality. 1122 This definition is vague because it
could mean that reason is the source of moral value or that
moral goodness is a product of reason either because reason
discovers what is moral or good, or because reason
motivates actions which are morally good, or both.

Prior

vacillates between criticisms of the view that reason
provides the justification for morality and the view that
reason provides the motivation for morality without
acknowledgement.

Since our focus is on theories of moral

motivation, I will concentrate on his objections to
rationalist theories of motivation.

He identifies Kant as

a moral rationalist, and argues that Kant's theory of moral
motivation (that is, Kant's Rational Internalism) is
inadequate because it "provides a distorted picture of our
moral lives. 1123

Kant's Rational Internalism distorts moral

life·by claiming that only actions done for the sake of
duty (recognizable by reason alone) have moral worth.
Prior argues that not enough attention is paid to the
role of the sentiment of compassion, and that in the
history of ethical philosophy only David Hume has
22 Ibid., 179.
23 rbid., 173.
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adequately noted its central role in moral life. 24

By

saying that compassion is the true source of moral value,
prior means both that compassion tells us what to do and
that compassion provides the motivation to act accordingly.
Rationalists have ignored the importance of compassion, he
says, and for this reason, give an unsatisfactory account
of morality.
Prior begins his article by recounting the biblical
story of the Good Samaritan, and arguing that the Good
Samaritan acted, not on the dictates of reason, but through
compassion, as the biblical text expressly indicates.

The

Samaritan had the motivation to help the "half-dead" man
because of his compassion for him, while those who passed
by failed to respond because of their lack of compassion.
Compassion is the mark of a normal and psychologically
healthy individual.

Those who lack compassion are simply

emotionally def icient--they are lacking an important part
of their emotional make up.
and practical wisdom.

The Samaritan exhibits virtue

He has practical wisdom because "he

is able to find and follow a course of action that benefits
the victim of the robbers. 11 2 5

24 Prior ignores others who have emphasized the role of
compassion in moral life, notably Adam Smith, Lord
Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson.
25 Prior, 174.
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Prior traces the etymology of the word, "compassion,"
to its Greek origins.
~splangchnisthe,

The Greek word for compassion is

which derives from the word

splangchnizomai.

The splangchna refer to bodily organs,

and so the word means:

"to feel in one's innards."

Therefore, the word, "compassion," originally had a
connotation of being a "visceral reaction."

For Prior,

compassion, at least in its paradigm cases, "is a strong
emotion or sentiment with physical components. 112 6

He

classifies compassion along with our other "physical
·appetites;" he identifies others as guilt, pride, greed,
and varieties of love.
"springs of action."

These are emotions which serve as
He concludes that "compassion is the

emotion that causes us to act well toward others in
need. 1127

Compassion is primarily to be understood as a

response to another human being in need, but it is possible
to experience compassion toward non-humans (animals or
aliens) because of their similar psychological, physical or
emotional constitutions.
While he emphasizes the emotional aspect of
compassion, Prior nevertheless does maintain that
compassion does have a "cognitive component," and hence
that reason plays an important role in moral life.
26 I b'd
l. . , 175.

27 Ibid.
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compassion would never be aroused unless we could identify
the situations where compassion would be the appropriate
response.

We need to recognize, cognitively, situations

where people are in need.

The discrimination which is

necessary for this recognition is cognitive.

He even

allows that sometimes actions are done without any feeling
of compassion.

But Prior does not think that the cognitive

recognition is prior to compassionate response.

He states:

we do not, I think, first recognize the
occurrence of these situations by the use of our
cognitive faculties, and then respond to them via
our emotion; rather we recognize and respond to
these situations in virtue of a single fac~aty
with both cognitive and emotional aspects.
Prior's quarrel, then, is not with those who claim
that there is a role for reason in morality, but with those
who exclude the role of compassion and sentiment from
morality.

Prior sees Kant as doing just that, because Kant

claimed that actions have moral worth only if they are
motivated by reason,

rathe~

than inclination.

Inclinations

are feelings, emotions, desires and sentiments which
influence conduct.

Kant's view, Prior says, is that "Even

these positive inclinations .•• are devoid of moral worth;
for an action to be of moral worth it must be motivated
solely by a sense of duty, and duty is determined by reason
rather than inclination. 1129
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.,

179.

Citing the passage where Kant
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expressly denies that the actions done by the
sympathetically constituted philanthropist have moral
worth, Prior claims that Kant prefers the actions of the
"unhappy philanthropist," the "person who is charitable
from duty over the person who is charitable because of a
sympathetic constitution. 1130

Surely, he urges, this should

lead us to suspect that Kant's moral theory gives a
distorted account of moral life.
This indeed is a problematic claim for many readers of
Kant.

And since Kant has been identified as the

paradigmatic Rational Internalist, it raises a problem for
Rational Internalism.

Based on Kant's claim that only

dutiful actions have true moral worth, Rational Internalism
might be interpreted as the view that the only motivator to
morally correct actions is reason.

But Prior's error, and

the error of those who raise the same objection, arises
generally out of a failure to attend to the passages in his
best known works, and also in the lesser known ones, in
which Kant speaks positively about the role of natural
human sentiments such as sympathy and compassion; and
specifically, out of a failure to understand and to keep in
perspective Kant's claim that only actions done for the
sake of duty have moral worth, or are moral in the strict
sense.

In addressing Prior's criticism

JOibid., 180.

o~

Kant's theory of

143
aoral aotivation, I will first show that a more careful and
coaprehensive reading of Kant's works shows that he

~

think that natural sentiments of sympathy and compassion
play an important motivational role in ethical life.

Then

I will argue that if Kant's claim that only actions done
for the sake of duty have true moral worth is understood
properly, it does not have to be seen as a view which is
distortive, or inconsistent with common attitudes about
moral life.
Kant nowhere in his mature ethical works says, or even
implies, that it is wrong or ignoble to take pleasure out
of acting morally, or to feel compassion or sympathy for
our fellow human beings.

In fact, he explicitly, even if

not often, claims that it is good to experience such
pleasure, and to respond sympathetically and
compassionately with others.

In his early lectures on

ethics, Kant claimed that feelings of sympathy should be
cultivated, in order to encourage virtuous conduct.

"To be

humane is to have sympathy with the fate of others" he
says, and "the more we refine the crude elements of our
nature, the more we refine our humanity and the more
capable it grows of feeling the driving force of virtuous
principles. 1131

In the Fundamental Principles, Kant does

31 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans., Louis
Infield, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 198;
237.
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say that the philanthropist who experiences joy in their
benevolence "deserves praise and encouragement" (.[f, 14).
In the Critique of Practical Reason, in fact, he goes as
far as to say that we have the duty to "establish and
cultivate" the feeling of satisfaction in the fulfillment
of duty. 32
These ideas are expressed in more detail in his later
ethical work, The Metaphysics of Morals.

There Kant calls

compassion a "natural predisposition very serviceable to
morality. 1133

He makes a distinction between humanitas

practica, the humanity "which is seated in the capacity and
will to share another's feeling" and humanitas aesthetica,
the "susceptibility for mutual feelings of enjoyment or
pain which nature herself provides. 1134

Only the former is

a result of freedom and practical reason; the latter is
simply a somewhat contagious natural feeling.

Kant claims

that we cannot have a duty to have feelings of compassion,
sympathy, or pity, but we do have a duty of humanitas
practica.

He states:

32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans.,
Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc.,
1956), 40. Hereafter, referred to in text as CPrR.
33 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of
Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysics of Morals., trans. James
Ellington, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964)
106.
.
34 Kant, The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, 121.
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But though it is not in itself a duty to feel
pity and so likewise to rejoice with others,
active sympathizing with their lot is a duty. To
this end it accordingly is an indirect duty to
cultivate our natural (sensitive) feelings for
others, and to make use of them as so many means
for sympathy based on moral principles and the
feeling appropriate to them ••• It is a duty not to
shun sickrooms or prisons and so on in order to
avoid the pain of compassion, which one may not
be able to resist. For this feeling, though
painful, nevertheless is one of the impulses
placed in us by nature for effecting what the
represeq5ation of duty might not accomplish by
itself.
Far from denying, then, that feelings of sympathy or
satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty are motivators to
moral action, Kant is actually claiming that we have a duty
to cultivate them--that we should develop within ourselves
these feelings because they are instrumental in the
perfection of our moral

lives~

These passages show that

Kant regarded these feelings as not only natural but
serviceable to morality.

Because they are so serviceable,

Kant says that the perfection and enhancement of our moral
existences requires their cultivation.
Turning now to the specific error of Prior's
interpretation of Kant's Rational Internalism, I will argue
that just because Kant attributes true moral worth only to
actions done for the sake of duty, does not mean that he
thought of actions done out of inclination as immoral, or
even that he thought of action done for the sake of duty as
the only ones which are moral, in a looser sense of being
35 Ibid.,

122.
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!D.9rallv correct.

Admittedly, the confusion is

understandable in light of certain statements made by Kant.
I believe, however, that Kant's claim that only actions
done for the sake of duty have true moral worth can be
understood in such a way as to allow other motivators to
moral action, and in such a way which is not distortive or
out of keeping with common attitudes about morality.

I

turn now, then, to an examination of Kant's writing in
order to show that Kant, in claiming that only actions done
for the sake of duty have true moral worth, has not given a
distorted theory about moral motivation.
In the Preface to the Fundamental Principles Kant
claims that "in order that an action should be morally
good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law,
but it must also be done for the sake of the law; otherwise
that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain" (FP,
6).

From this.passage it certainly seems like Kant is

saying that only those acts which are done for the sake of
the law are moral acts.

On this interpretation, we need

not claim that the act which coheres with, but is not done
for the sake of duty is immoral, because not all acts which
are not moral are immoral; some are amoral.

And surely

Kant could not have possibly meant (nor does he give any
indication of meaning) that if I preserve my life out of
inclination, then I am acting immorally.

Even in light of

this clarification, then, we would have to admit that on
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this interpretation Kant would say that if Mother Theresa's
acts of charity were undertaken for the purpose of
achieving everlasting life, or out of a natural sympathy
for her fellow human beings, then her acts are not moral-that is, that they are amoral acts.

Yet I think most would

want to say that Mother Theresa's acts (however motivated)
are definitely moral.
The confusion arises because when Kant refers to
actions as "morally good" or as "having moral worth" he is
speaking in a strict, we could even say, in a stipulative
sense.

He does not think that actions done out of

inclinations are devoid of moral worth in that they are
morally incorrect.

A passage which indicates that such

actions are moral in the sense of being morally correct is
the following:
If the determination of the will occurs in
accordance with the moral law but only by means
of a feeling of any kind whatsoever, which must
be presupposed in order that the law may become a
determining ground of the will, and if the action
thus occurs not for the sake of the law, it has
legality but not morality (CPrR, 74, emphasis
added).
When Kant speaks of an action as having "legality" he is
speaking of actions which are moral in the common, everyday
sense of being morally correct.

He maintains that these

actions are both "proper" and "amiable" (FP, 16).

But when

Kant speaks of an action as being moral in his strict
sense, he is referring to actions which are done for the
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sake of duty.

But why does Kant stipulate that only

morally correct actions done for the sake of duty have true
moral worth, while at the same time encouraging us to
develop, indeed, telling us that we have a duty to develop,
feelings of sympathy and the satisfaction of acting
dutifully?
The answer to this question can only be understood in
light of Kant's overall project in both the Fundamental
frinciples and the Critique of Practical Reason.

In these

works Kant is attempting to discover the conditions or the
"grounds" of morality, and he says repeatedly that morality
would not be possible without the requirement of freedom.
It is actions done for the sake of duty that reveal the
possibility and grounds of morality most clearly and in a
way that actions dictated by a heteronomous will do not.
When we act for the sake of duty we are most aware of our
Freedom as moral beings; it is in these acts that Freedom's
role as the ground of morality is most evident.

So by

distinguishing actions done for the sake of duty from those
which are done out of inclination, Kant uncovers the
grounds or conditions of morality in general most clearly.
Because actions done for the sake of duty reveal the
conditions of the possibility of morality they are said to
have true moral worth.

Now, it is not inconsistent with

common intuitions to think of actions done from duty as
somehow separate, and "more special" than those done simply
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out of inclination.

Kant can make this claim even while

allowing that most of our (morally correct) actions may be
done out of inclination.
Now that we have seen that Kant recognizes the value
of sympathy and compassion, and now that we understand
Kant's claim that only actions done for the sake of duty
have true moral worth as a stipulative one, we can turn our
attention back to Prier's claim that Kant prefers the
actions of the "unhappy philanthropist," in order to see if
or in what way it is true, and then to determine whether or
not Kant's theory of moral motivation is distortive of
morality.
There are senses in which it is true that Kant prefers
acts which are done from a sense of duty, i.e., that have
moral worth, to those which are a result of natural
inclinations--even those of sympathy or compassion.

As I

have already shown, duty is a reliable source for
understanding the grounds for the possibility of morality
while inclination is not.

So Kant "prefers" actions done

for the sake of duty because they reveal the possibility of
morality in a way other actions do not.

Moreover, Kant

prefers acts which are done out of a sense of duty because
he believes that duty provides a more reliable guide than
inclinations.

Desires and inclinations are by their nature

particular, sporadic, and contingent; hence, they cannot be
reliable sources of moral motivation.

A sympathetic person
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habituated only to act from inclination may be taken
advantage of by others, and as a result become suspicious
and misanthropic, losing all sympathetic inclination.

If

the sense of duty were not itself motivating, we could not
speak of moral obligation where sympathy is absent. 36

But

if the person has disciplined themselves to act from a
sense of duty, regardless of any desire in them to
experience pleasure, the motivation
assured.

~o

act morally is

Only in this sense does Kant does prefer the

person who acts from duty to the person who acts from
inclination, however noble.
Prior here ignores Kant's passages that urge us to
become the sort of persons who take pleasure in acting
morally.

But, as we have seen, Kant says that the

philanthropist deserves praise and encouragement because
the joy that he experiences facilitates concordance with
the moral law (CPrR, 122).

Kant says he does not deserve

our esteem unless he is free to act benevolently even where
he will experience no such pleasure.

Prior's claim that

Kant prefers the "unhappy" philanthropist is further
distorted in that Kant clearly holds that, while the
highest good for man is the perfection of his moral
character--his ability to act for the sake of duty, the
supreme good exists only when the philanthropist who acts
36 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 193.
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from the sense of duty, is also rewarded in happiness.
I<ant prefers not the "unhappy" philanthropist, but the
philanthropist who acts for the sake of duty, and who is
also happy. 37
It is true that Kant does not dwell on the important
experience of compassion, and on the indubitable fact of
its motivating power, in his studies of the grounds of
morality.

Yet, this lack of emphasis is understandable in

view of his whole approach to the phenomenon and the
me·aning of morality.

Kant, as a Rational Internalist,

seeks only to assert the positive claim that reason has
motivating power.

He does not make the negative claim that

it is the only source of moral motivation.
Although Prior's objection to moral rationalism is
targeted at Kant, his objections are also not applicable to
other Rational Internalists, such as Nagel and Korsgaard.
While it is true that Nagel does not dwell on the
experience of compassion and its role in moral life, it is
also true that he says nothing to deny that compassion can,
or even often does, operate behind moral acts of
benevolence, or using Nagel's term, "altruism 11 • 38

He

37 see Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 128-132,
where Kant criticizes the Stoical ideal in light of the
fact that they equated happiness with virtue.
38 Nagel defines altruism not as "abject selfsacrifice", but as the "willingness to act in consideration
of the interests of other persons, without the need of
ulterior motives" (79).
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doesn't dwell on the experience of compassion because, like
xant, he is intent on showing that the motivation to act
aorallY is guaranteed by the recognition of moral
obligations themselves, and even when the feeling of
compassion is absent in a situation where benevolence is
aorallY required, it is possible to act altruistically.

In

fact, the point of his argument in The Possibility of
Altruism is that the appeal to compassion in the account of
altruistic actions, like the appeal to self-interest or
sympathy, is unnecessary.

In his "general reply" to those

who insist on such other appeals, Nagel states:
Without question people may be motivated by
benevolence, sympathy, love, redirected selfinterest, and various other influences, on some
of the occasions on which they pursue the
interests of others, but that there is also
something else, a motivation available when none
of those are, and also operative when they are
present, which has genuinely the status of a
rational requirement on human conduct (PA, 80).
Since Korsgaard's main focus in her article was simply
to show that "motivational skepticism" is based on "content
skepticism" she does not develop in detail a theory of
rational internalism.

However, she says nothing to deny

that compassion plays an important role in moral life, and
nothing she says could count as evidence for the view that
Rational Internalism, as a theory of moral motivation,
gives an essentially distortive account of moral life.
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~nclusion.

What have we learned in this chapter?

We have

learned that none of the objections to versions of
internalism in the recent philosophical literature
undermines Rational Internalism's claim to correctly
describe moral motivation.

Some of the objections are

addressed to other philosophically less interesting
versions of internalism, and don't apply to Rational
Internalism at all.

Others call attention to forms of

moral indifference whose reality Rational Internalism has
no need to deny.

Prior's argument, is based on a

misreading of Kant's account of moral motivation, and thus,
of the theory here called Rational Internalism generally.
We are left, then, with the original common sense
argument for Rational Internalism, which Nagel summarizes
when he says that it is unacceptable to "permit someone who
has acknowledged that he should do something and has seen
why it is the case that he should do it to ask whether he
has any reason for doing it" (PA, 9).

We need now to

confront the remaining objection still threatening Rational
Internalism, Hume's objection that Rational Internalism is
false because reason is incapable of providing moral
motivation.

CHAPTER 5

HUME'S CHALLENGE

If Rational Internalism is understood to be the view
that reason is itself a source of moral motivation, then
its most formidable opponent in the history of philosophy
is usually taken to be David Hume.

Hume denies that reason

can function in either of these ways:

by itself it can

neither determine what is morally right or wrong, nor
provide any motivation to act morally.

"Reason," he says,

"is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and
can never pretend to any other off ice than to serve and
obey them. 111

If we take Kant as a "paradigmatic rational-

internalist," then his position and that of Hume's would
seem to be diametrically opposed; and an evaluation of
Rational Internalism as a theoretical view surely must
include an examination of the points of opposition between
these two philosophers.

In order to make an adequate

1 oavid Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 2nd edition,
ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, (dxford: Clarendon Press, 1978),
415. Hereafter, referred to in the text as 1·
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appraisal of the dispute we need to be able to identify
what is really at issue between their views.
In this chapter I will focus on the dispute between
Kant and Hume.

I will argue that the differences between

them are far less than is often thought, and that the
appearance of opposition is a result of the different
emphases each philosopher has in light of their respective
tasks.

Thus, once we understand why.Hume says that reason

can only be the slave of the passions, and once we
understand why Kant says that only reason can determine
what is moral, the differences are greatly lessened.

I

will also argue that the real dispute between them is not
so much on matters of ethics as it is on matters of
metaphysics.

That is, the differences between Kant and

Hume as moral philosophers are actually a function of their
opposing views of the nature of reason.

When this

examination has been completed, we will have arrived at a
much clearer understanding of Rational Internalism and be
able to make progress in determining if, and to what
extent, it is a defensible theory.
Before contrasting Kant with Hume on the role of
reason in morality, however, a comment is needed on the
current debate about whether Hume should be classified as
an internalist or as an externalist.

Of course, Hume can

be labelled as either one or the other depending on what
the terms "internalism" and "externalism" are taken to
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mean.

Whether Hume is an internalist or an externalist

depends on the understanding of the internalist/externalist
distinction with which one begins.

However, Charlotte

Brown raises the question of whether Hume is an internalist
given Nagel's version of internalism.

She argues that

while Hume's argument from motivation used to refute the
rationalists of his time commits him to (Nagelian)
internalism, what he says in his "constructive phase"
reveals that he is really a (Nagelian) externalist. 1
Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I will
untangle the debate on the classification of Hume within
the internalist/externalist debate.

Then in the second

section, I will examine Hume's arguments that reason can
neither determine what is moral, nor be a moral motivator,
and try to determine what exactly is the role of reason in
morality for Hume.

In the third section, I will examine

Kant's argument that only.reason can determine what is
moral, and his argument that reason is a moral motivator.
In the final section, as I have indicated, I will show that
a careful comparison of their arguments leads to a
significant deemphasis of the differences between Kant and
Hume, and that to the extent that there remains a real
difference, this difference is a metaphysical one having to
do with their understanding of the nature of reason.

In

1charlotte Brown, "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of
.the History of Philosophy 26, January, 1988.
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doinq this I will also establish that Hume's objections to
what I have called Rational Internalism are not at all
convincinq.

I

Is Hume an Internalist or an Externalist?

Let us begin by reviewing Hume's place in the
internalist/externalist distinctions of Frankena, Milo,
Nagel, and Korsgaard, in order to set the scene for
Charlotte Brown, the most recent commentator of Hume as an
internalist or an externalist.

For Frankena, internalism

is the thesis that having a moral obligation implies the
existence of personal inclination or desire, so that a
person is not obligated to do something unless they in fact
have a desire to do it, whereas externalism denies this,
holding that obligations exist independent of any
particular agent's desires.

Whether or not Hume is an

internalist or an externalist on this account depends on
whether Hume is or is not committed to moral realism.
Those who interpret Hume as an emotivist or as some other
kind of subjectivist will, on Frankena's definition, think
of Hume as an internalist; while those

wh~

interpret Hume

as a moral realist, will think of Hume as an externalist.
There are a surprising number of Hume scholars who
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interpret Hume as a subjectivist. 2
is that Hume is a moral realist.

My own interpretation
A typical passage which

supports this interpretation is the following:
The intercourse of sentiments, therefore, in
society and conversation, makes us form some
general unalterable standard, by which we may
approve or disapprove of characters and manners.
And tho' the heart does not always take part with
those general notions, or regulate its love and
hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for
discourse, and serve all of our purposes in
company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in
the schools(~, 603).
The fact that Hume speaks of a "general unalterable
standard" shows that he believes that morality is
universal, involving the same standard for all human
beings.

Hume acknowledges the fact that our feelings of

sympathy can be unreliable; but he expresses confidence in
our moral judgments.

He states:

"though our sympathies

vary, yet our moral judgments do not vary with them; for we
fix on some steady and general points of view, and always
in our thought place ourselves in them whatever may be our
present situation"

(~,

581).

Further evidence for Hume's

standing as a moral realist rather than a subjectivist are
2 some who have interpreted Hume as an emotivist or a
subjectivist are C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), x, 85-86; D. c.
c. McNabb, The Encylopedia of Philosophy; Geoffrey Hunter,
"Hume on Is and Ought," Philosophy, 37 (1962): 151-152;
Philippa Foot, "Hume on Moral Judgement," in David Hume: A
Symposium (London: Macmillan, 1966), 70-72; Antony Flew,
"Hume," in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, ed. D.
J. O'Connor (London: Macmillan, 1964 ), 271; and Thomas
Reid, Philosophical Works (Hildesheim: Georg Olms
Verlagsbuchandlung, 1967), 670-679.
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found in the Enquiry, where he states that moral
distinctions "arise from the original constitution of human
nature" and "can only be explained by a sentiment common to
all men and extending to the actions of all men however
remote. 113

David Fate Norton, Pall Ardal, and

are three important figures who

~eject

w.

D. Falk

the subjectivist

interpretation in favor of the view that Hume is a moral
realist. 4 In Frankena's categorization, then, Hume would
be an "externalist."
The classification of Hume as internalist or
externalist on Milo's interpretation of the distinction is
straightforward.

For Milo thinks of internalism as the

thesis that any moral belief or judgment implies the
existence of a pro-attitude or motivation to act
accordingly (though this motivation may be overridden by
other motivators), and of externalism as the thesis that it
is possible to have a moral belief, or to make a moral
judgment, without thereby have the corresponding motivation
to act or refrain from acting.

Clearly, when Hume talks

3oavid Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals in Enquiries, ed., L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed.,
(Westport, Connecticut: Oxford University Press, 1980),
173; 221-222. (Hereafter, ~-)
4David Fate Norton, David Hume: Common Sense Moralist,
Sceptical Metaphysician, (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton
~niversity Press, 1982), 110; Pall Ardal, Passion and Value
J.11 Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1966), 208; w. o. Falk, "Hume on Practical Reason" in
~qht. Reasons. and Morality (Ithaca: Cornell University
ress, 1986), 144-148.
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about moral beliefs or judgment, he is referring to the
beliefs or judgments which accompany moral sentiment.
Following Hutcheson, Hume thinks of moral beliefs or
judgments as arising when we "consult our own breasts," and
experience moral approval or disapproval. 5

Hume, like

Milo, could very well envision inauthentic statements of
moral belief or inauthentic judgments (judgments based on a
standard one does not genuinely accept) unaccompanied by
any corresponding attitudes.

On this interpretation of

"internalism," then, Hume would join Milo in siding with
"externalism."

While there is no textual evidence that

Hume would accept this possibility of inauthentic beliefs
or judgments without corresponding motivational attitudes,
the assumption that he would is natural, since it is an
obvious possibility, and he says nothing to the contrary.
Nagel clearly thinks of Hume as a "strong antirational internalist."

He thinks of Hume as an internalist

because, for Hume, moral motivation is "guaranteed by the
truth or the meaning of ethical propositions."

His

"internalism" is strong, because he ties motivation not to
the meaning, but to the recognition of the truth of ethical
propositions.

He is an anti-rational internalist because

he denies that reason in and of itself (independently of
6Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral Good
and Evil, in British Moralists 1650-1800, ed., o. D.
Raphael {Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 303; David Hume,
Treatise, 469.
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desire or inclination) has motivational influence--that is,
because he holds that all moral motivation is rooted in
desire.

Nagel states:

If we cast [Hume's anti-rational internalist
view] in terms of reasons, it will state that
among the conditions for the presence of a reason
for action there must always be a desire or
inclination ~apable of motivating one to act
accordingly.
we saw that Korsgaard interprets Nagel as suggesting
that internalism is the view that the reason for the action
is itself the motive for doing it.

In Chapter 3 I

suggested that this interpretation is defensible in light
of some of Nagel's example, but that it wasn't entirely
clear that this formulation is coextensive with Nagel's.
According to this formulation, Hume is an internalist
because he believes that sympathy determines what is moral
and also provides the motive for being moral.
As I have interpreted Korsgaard, the "internalism" she
defends is Nagel's "strong rational internalism."

I

suggested that this may be the most interesting question
underlying the internalist\externalist debate, and that
Korsgaard suggests that internalism should be thought of as

6 Nagel, ,EA, 10.
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Rational Internalism.

Since Hume is an anti-rationalist,
awne would be considered by her to be an externalist. 7
Brown claims that the standard interpretation of Hume
is as an internalist.

Citing Nagel, she describes

internalism as the view that "the awareness that a certain
course of action is the right one by itself provides an
agent with a motive, though not necessarily one sufficient
to outweigh others which might also be present. 118

She

argues that "charity" requires the interpretation of Hume
as such an internalist, because otherwise Hume's argument
from motivation is invalid.

Let us see why Brown claims

that Hume's argument from motivation commits him to
internalism in the above sense, and then why Brown argues
that Hume is inconsistent in his internalism.
Hume's argument from motivation draws the conclusion
that reason cannot determine what is morally right or wrong
from the following two premises: 1) Morality is practical,
that is, it influences actions (l, 457), and 2) reason
alone is incapable of influencing either passions or
actions (l, 457; 413-418).

Now Brown argues that Hume's

7This inference followed from the fact that Korsgaard
defends Nagel's "rational internalism" and she appears to
take Hume as her main target. In a later unpublished
paper, "Normativity as Reflexivity," Brown gives a
different reason for thinking of Hume as an externalist.
Her reason for labelling Hume an externalist in this paper
is the same reason given by Charlotte Brown in her article
to be considered shortly.
8 Brown,

74.
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premise that morality is practical can be interpreted in
either of two ways.

One way morality can be practical is

if moral perceptions (the awareness of moral obligation).
"trigger" a desire to do what is moral.

Another way

morality can be practical is if moral perceptions
themselves are motivators.

on the former view, the

"trigger" view, recognition of a moral obligation and the
motivation to act accordingly are distinct and therefore
logically separable. 9 But on the latter view, the
"internalist" view, they are not:

moral perceptions are

themselves necessarily motivating, and if the moral agent
lacks any motivation to act morally, he or she simply has
not perceived a moral obligation.
If Hume is interpreted as holding that the recognition
of a moral obligation stimulates or motivates by triggering
a desire to do what is right (rather than being itself the
source of motivation to act morally), then his conclusion
that reason cannot make moral distinctions does not follow.
On the "trigger view" it would be possible for reason to
make moral distinctions, even if morality is practical and
even if reason alone cannot motivate.

Therefore, on the

"trigger" theorist's understanding of how morality can be
practical, Hume's argument from motivation is invalid.

So,

9 Brown, 74: "moral thought or perception and
motivation are not logically distinct on [the
internalist's] view, as they are according to the trigger
theory."
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srown claims that in order for the argument to be valid,

aume must adopt the "internalist" interpretation.
For Brown, the question of whether Hume really is an
internalist depends on whether or not he consistently holds
that the moral sentiments are in themselves motivating.
For those who think it is obvious that Hume thinks of moral
sentiments as moral determinators and moral motivators,
Brown raises two problems.

Then she cites passages where

awne seems to be claiming that it is really something else
that provides moral motivation besides moral sentiment.
The first reason we cannot assume that moral sentiment
is morally motivating, she says, is that although Hume
clearly holds that all motivation, both moral and nonmoral, is derived from feeling, and although he holds that
moral sentiments are a kind of feeling, it does not follow
that moral sentiments do in fact motivate.

Brown argues

that moral sentiment may not have a motivating influence
because, according to Hume, not all feelings are
motivators.

Love and hate are feelings, but they are not,

in themselves, motives.

They motivate only by giving rise

to benevolence and anger, feelings which do motivate.
Brown points out that Hume gives no clear cut criteria with
which to discriminate motivating and nonmotivating
feelings. 10
10 Brown, 77.
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secondly, Brown argues that we cannot assume that just
because moral sentiments ref er to moral approval or
disapproval, that motivation is conceptually implied.
Although normally approval carries with it connotations of
inclination and hence motivation, Hume is using the terms
in a technical sense, as referring to a unique kind of
moral feeling.

These moral feelings are simple, so they

cannot be defined, and hence, cannot.be said to be
motivating on conceptual grounds.11
Brown now goes on to argue that Hume, in fact, quite
explicitly identifies other motivating factors.

She

reviews Hume's discussion of actions performed from a sense
of duty.

Hume admits that sometimes people, realizing in

themselves the lack of a natural human sentiment, perform
actions out of a sense of duty.

He states:

When any virtuous motive or principle is common
in human nature, a person, who feels his heart
devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon
that account, and may perform the action without
the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in
order to acquire by practice, that virtuous
principle, or at least, to disguise to himself,
as much as possible his want of it(~, 479).
Further, Hume claims that virtue is associated with
feelings of pride and love, and vice is associated with
humility and

hate(~,

294-97, 336-39, 575).

Hume also

believes that we can only feel proud of ourselves and love
ourselves if we are virtuous:
11 Brown, 77-78.

"Inward peace of mind,

166

consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our
own conduct--these are circumstances very requisite to our
happiness" (E., 283) •
on the basis of these statements Brown concludes that
according to Hume it is actually pride and the desire for
happiness that provides motivation to act morally.

Where

virtuous motives are lacking and a person acts for the sake
of duty, Brown claims, then for Hume,
that regard (for the moral worth of the action]
has motivational force only because it triggers
self-hatred and the desire to be happy ••• The
regard for the moral worth of the actio~ does not
by itself provide agents with a motive. 2
This, she concludes, is not an internalist view; that is,
it is not a view in which the apprehension of a moral
obligation itself is the motivation to act morally.
Now I do not believe that Brown has given a
convincing account of Hume's views.

In response to the

first problem that we can not be sure that Hume thought of
moral sentiments as intrinsically motivating because not
all feelings motivate, I need only cite a passage which
provides contrary evidence:
As to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice,
'tis an evident consequence of the sentiments of
pleasure or uneasiness. These sentiments produce
love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the
original constitution of human passion. is
attended with benevolence or anger (~, 591,
emphasis added).
12 Brown, 83.
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If virtue and vice naturally produce pleasure and
uneasiness in the form of moral sentiment, and these in
turn naturally produce love and hatred, and these in turn
produce, by our natural constitution as human beings,
benevolence and anger, there can be no doubt that moral
sentiments are regarded by Hume as morally motivating.

So,

qiven Brown's understanding of the internalist thesis Hume

i i an internalist.
In response to the second problem that we cannot on
any conceptual basis assume that moral sentiment of
approval or disapproval are morally motivating because
these are simple concepts, and as such, insusceptible of
definition, I need only point out that the simplicity of
the concept of moral approval does not prevent us from
recognizing intuitively its motivating force.

One might as

well say that, because the notion of goodness is simple and
incapable of definition, then we cannot know whether it is
desirable.
The textual evidence Brown gives to support her
externalist conclusion is quite meagre.

Undoubtedly, Hume

does claim that people can act from a sense of duty, and be
actually motivated by a desire to be happy.

Had he not

allowed for this "moral" phenomenon, he would have given an
incomplete account of moral psychology.

.But the tenor of

Hume's moral writings overwhelmingly contrasts with the
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view that morality depends on self-love, either in the form
of self-interest or the desire to be happy.
Hume, and Hutcheson before him, take pains to
dissociate themselves from a Hobbesian view of morality.
Hutcheson identifies his main task in his work Inguiry
concerning Moral Good and Evil as attempting to prove both
that there is a moral sense by which we approve of actions

gng that it is possible to commit moral actions
independently of any self-interest. 13 Hume's Treatise
contains long and numerous passages on the efficacy of
sympathy, as the motivating force behind both artificial
and natural virtues.

While he allows self-interest as an

"original motive" to justice, an artificial virtue, he
insists that "sympathy with public interest is the source
of the moral approbation which attends that virtue"
499-500).

(~,

He states:

·We are to consider this distinction betwixt
justice and injustice, as having two different
foundations, viz. that of self-interest, when men
observe, that 'tis impossible to live in society
without restraining themselves by certain rules;
and that of morality, when this interest is once
observ'd to be common to all mankind, and men
receive a pleasure from the view of such actions
as tend to the peace of society, and an
uneasiness from such as are contrary to it (~,
533).
This pleasure or uneasiness is a result of our
capacity for moral sentiment.

We approve of natural

13 Francis Hutcheson, Inguiry Concerning Moral Good and
Evil, in British Moralists, 306.
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virtues for the same reason we approve of artificial
virtues like justice--they contribute to the good of
society.

But we naturally approve of virtue; it is an

immediate and irresistible response.

He states:

"the

tendency of qualities to the good of society, is the sole
cause of our approbation; without any suspicion of the
concurrence of another principle" (l'., 578). 14

Brown's

interpretation that Hume says we act morally in order to be
happy explicitly contradicts this claim:

it is to assert

the necessity of the "concurrence of another principle".
Further, the passage depended heavily upon by Brown
where Hume notes the important role integrity and peace of
mind for personal happiness

(~,

283) must be understood

within the context of the discussion in which it occurs.
It occurs in the last part of the conclusion of the Enquiry
as an afterthought to the main discourse on the nature and
efficacy of moral sentiment.

He introduces the

afterthought by saying:
there remains nothing but briefly to consider our
interested obligation to [virtue], and to inquire
whether every man, who has any regard to his own
happiness and welfare, will not best find his
account in the practice of every moral duty (~,
278).

14 Also: "After [justice] is establish'd by these
conventions, it is naturally attended with a strong
sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our
sympathy with the interests of society" (l'., 579-580).
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Here he clearly notes that an honest and ingenuous person
will recognize, in contrast to the "sensible knave," that
happiness is impossible without virtue.
sensible knaves are persons who, recognizing the
expedience of moral rules, generally obey them, but take
advantage of any exceptions where disregarding the rule
causes no significant harm to society, but brings about
advantage to themselves

(~,

282-83) •. The view that "virtue

is its own reward" is easily understood and accepted by the
honest and ingenuous person, and may be used in answer to
the· sensible knave who inquires whether there is any reason
to obey a moral rule in the case that its disregard might
be personally advantageous.

The answer will not likely be

convincing to dishonest knaves, who because of their
defective natures, have lost the only true motive to
virtue:

moral approval and disapproval.

Only those who

have corrupted moral sentiments demand moral justification
going beyond the simple recognition that something is wrong
or right.

However, it is the only answer available to such

persons; it is the last resort we naturally pursue even
realizing its limited convincing power.

But our recourse

to the insight that virtue is its own reward does not mean
that we think that the desire to make ourselves happy is
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the only sufficient motivation to act morally. 15

All the

preceding chapters of the Enquiry, and large sections in
the

~reatise,

are testimony to the contrary.

we may conclude that, based on Nagel's formulation of
internalism which Brown adopts, Hume is undoubtedly an
internalist after all.

For he believes that moral

sentiment both makes moral distinctions and provides for
moral motivation.

Nevertheless, as we saw, both Nagel, in

his distinction between "rational" and "anti-rational"
accounts of motivation, and Korsgaard have suggested
another possible formulation of the internalist/externalist
distinction according to which Hume would be classified as
an externalist, where internalism is the view that reason
is morally motivating, and externalism is the view that
denies it.

This is the version of the internalist/

externalist distinction adopted for study here under the
label of "Rational Internalism."

Therefore, we should turn

now to an examination of Hume's arguments for reason's
moral inefficacy.

15 oorothy Coleman, in her unpublished paper "Placing
Hume in the Internalist/Externalist Debate" makes this
point nicely. See 6-7.
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II
Hume and the Role of Reason in Morality

Hume's claim that "reason is, and ought only to be,
the slave of the passions" had an historical context.

It

was surely crafted to have a shock value for the moral
philosophers of his time.

His target was the moral

rationalism espoused by such thinkers as Richard
Cumberland, Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke and William
wollaston.

Each of these moral philosophers believed that

distinctions between good and evil, between moral right or
wrong, or between vice and virtue, are made on the basis of
reason.

Hume wanted to challenge this view.

Cumberland claimed that "the greatest good is the
greatest end prescribed by reason. 1116

Ralph Cudworth

maintained that all things that are either naturally good
or positively good are "such things as the intellectual
nature obliges. 1117

Samuel Clarke believed that moral

obligation is based on "eternal and necessary differences
of things" and that it is reason which determines what is
right or fitting based on these differences.

"Virtue and

16 Richard Cumberland, De Legibus Naturae, in British
Moralists, ed., D. o. Raphael (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1969), 98.
17 Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and
Immutable Morality, also in British Moralists, 109.
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true goodness," he says, "are things so truly noble and
excellent, so lovely and venerable in themselves, and do so
necessarily approve themselves to the reason and
consciences o f me n •••• 1118
n •••

And William Wollaston states:

it is true that whatever will bear to be tried by right

reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it
wrong." 19 In Hume's judgment, all these thinkers had
greatly exaggerated and distorted the role of reason in
morality.

But in fact Hume and these thinkers were not

opposed in all respects.
The moral rationalists mentioned above share the
common theses that there is moral good and evil, and that
we can know what it is, independently of any particular
social system.

The impetus behind their work was the

challenge put forth in the writings of Thomas Hobbes, who
argued that "where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing
is Unjust. 1120

These rationalists were zealously attempting

to defend the independent notions of good and evil, moral
and immoral.

They saw virtue and moral goodness as closely

associated with the rational nature of human beings.
underlying thesis was twofold:

The

first, that only rational

18 samuel Clarke, A Discourse of Natural Religion, also

in British Moralists 225; 237.
19 william Wallaston, The Religion of Nature
Delineated, in British Moralists, 292.
20 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,

Press, 1967), 110-111.

(Oxford: Oxford University
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beings could control their passions and appetites, and
hence only rational beings could be responsible for their
actions; and second, that such beings could know, by
reason, good and bad, right and wrong, so as to guide their
actions accordingly.
Now Hume unreservedly agreed with the moral
rationalists on their two points of difference from Hobbes.
He believed that there is moral goodness and virtue
independently of any political system, and that we have
knowledge concerning that morality.

However, he went even

further than his rationalist predecessors in his critique
of Hobbes in pointing out that not only was the Hobbesian
wrong in his ethical theory concerning the dependence of
morality on social systems, but also about human
psychology.
Hobbes

po~trayed

human beings in their "natural

condition" as self-centered, vain, aggressive, powerhungry, and indifferent towards the plight of others;
capable of being subdued only by an awesome sovereign.

In

our natural condition, these selfish tendencies are neither
virtuous nor vicious.

No such appraisals apply to beings

outside of a civil order.

Hume's predecessors, Shaftesbury

and Hutcheson, had already introduced an entirely different
vision of the human psyche.

Human beings, according to

their view, are not driven exclusively by self-interested
motives, as Hobbes thought, but are motivated also by moral
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·ments--natural affections of sympathy and benevolence,
sent 1
not onlY towards our families, relatives, or loved ones,
but even to strangers, at least towards those who are close
enough to us to evoke our natural sympathy.

Vice and

virtue, moral goodness or evil, are regarded as a function
of our natural affections.

Thus, Shaftesbury states:

we have found, that to deserve the name of gQ.Qg
or virtuous a creature must have all his
inclinations and affections, his dispositions of
mind and temper, suitable, and agreeing with the
good of his kind or of that system in which he is
included, and of which he constitutes a PART. To
stand thus well affected, and to have one's
affections right and entire, not only in respect
of oneself, but of society and the public: this
is rectitude. integrity or virtue. And to be
wanting of any of these, or to have their
contraries, is depravity. corruption and vice. 2 1
In rejecting Hobbesian psychology, the moral sentiment
theorists emphasized the role of natural inclination in the
virtuous life, something the moral rationalists had
neglected.

Hutcheson and Hume, however, did more than

simply highlight the role of natural sentiment for
morality:

they criticized their rationalist predecessors

for over-emphasizing the role of reason in morality.
Hutcheson argued that reason was an inadequate guide in
moral matters.

He states:

Notwithstanding the mighty reason we boast of
above other animals, its processes are too slow,
too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in
21 Lord Shaftesbury, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue. or
Merit, in British Moralists, 205.
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every exigency, either for our own preservation,
with the external senses, or to influence our
actions for ~9e good of the whole, without this
moral sense.
Indeed, Hume went so far as to say that "no action can
be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human

nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense
of its morality," thus firmly excluding reason as a moral
directive(~,

479).

Although Hume admits that some actions

are done merely from a sense of duty, he maintains that
actions are really moral (or virtuous) only if there is a
general human tendency to commit such actions.
Accordingly, he claims that it is on the basis of a moral
sense, rather than reason, that we approve or disapprove of
actions, and thereby make moral distinctions.

Qn1Y because

we have natural inclinations for affection and sympathy can
we recognize something as moral or immoral.

Only because

of our natural moral sentiments can we be moved to act
morally.

Even when we act. for the sake of duty, our

ability to act benevolently and to recognize benevolence as
good depends upon "distinct principles" in human nature
"whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious"
479, emphasis added.)

(~,

For Hume, then, like for Shaftesbury

and Hutcheson, human beings lack virtue, and their actions
lack morality, whenever it is the case that natural
affections, towards ourselves, our families, and other
22 Hutcheson, Concerning Moral Good and Evil, 348.
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hUJllan beings, are deficient.

The further claim that only

moral sentiments can make moral distinctions, and that .Q!1lY
moral sentiments can motivate require further arguments
concerning the inadequacies of reason in these respects.
It is interesting to note that Shaftesbury, Hutcheson
and Hume all speak of the loveliness or the beauty of
morality and virtue, and the ugliness of their opposites.2 3
The beauty of virtue and morality naturally instill us with
a sense of pleasure, and attract us to them.

It will be

interesting later to contrast comments made by Kant on this
head, but now I turn to Hume's specific arguments against
the moral efficacy of reason.
In addition, then, to correcting the psychological
deficiencies of the Hobbesian framework by pointing out
natural tendencies in human nature for sympathy, thereby
establishing the role of natural human sentiments in
morality, Hume raises arguments to prove that reason plays
a limited, and subservient role in ethics, both as a source
for determining what is moral and as a motivator.

Hume

argues that reason can never, in and of itself, provide a
motivating force for moral action.

This conclusion is

based on the basic premise that reason is that capacity by
which we make judgments concerning truth or falsehood

(~,

23 shaftesbury calls virtue the "chief of all
excellencies and beauties" 223; Hutcheson says that in the
face of moral actions "we feel joy within us, admire the
lovely action, and praise its author," 309.
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4 5a).

Reason discovers truth or falsehood in either of two

ways.

He states:
The understanding [reason] exerts itself after
two different ways, as it judges from
demonstration or probability; as it regards the
abstract relations of our ideas, or those
relations of objects, of which experience only
gives us information (T, 413).

When reason is involved in demonstration, it is simply
concerned with abstract relationships, that is logical
relationships between ideas.

Since demonstration has only

to do with the relation of abstract ideas, it is a process
by which we can arrive at certainty.

Demonstrative

reasoning includes mathematical, geometrical, and deductive
reasoning.

For instance, if I know that something is a

triangle, I know that the sum of its angles is 180 degrees.
Or if I know that all men are mortal, and Socrates is a
man, then I know that Socrates is a mortal.
But, Hume says, demonstrative reasoning is completely
removed from the world of "realities," in which our will is
always placed; so demonstrative reasoning cannot by itself
have any influence over the will (T, 414).

While we may

apply our abstract reasonings to actions in reality, we do
so only because they are instrumental in determining causeeffect relationships.

For instance, conclusions based on

principles of arithmetic can be used by merchants to
determine how best to handle their accounts; principles of
geometry or physics can be used by architects in order to
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ensure the construction of solid structures.

But the

abstract reasoning, by itself, is not motivating.
When reason judges from probability, it is simply
concerned with causal relationships between our alternative
actions and the "prospects of pain or pleasure" (.'.1'., 414).
For example, if I want to have

f~iends,

I must restrain my

selfish desires, since friends will object to either being
ignored or used as instruments of my own desires.

But this

means that reason, by itself, has no autonomous influence
or motivating power, but is dependent on ends or goals we
naturally have.

For without awareness of an end, reason

cannot justify any action as a means to it, and awareness
of ends is from our desires, not from reason itself.
Hume's argument, more formally, is the following:
1.

Reason is the discoverer of truth or falsehood.

2.

Reason discovers truth or falsehood either by judgments

based on demonstration or probability;
3.

Demonstration is concerned with abstract ideas.

4.

Abstract ideas are outside of the real realm of human

action.

s.

The will only functions in the world of realities, in

the realm of human action.
6.

Therefore, the exercise of reason in demonstration does

not itself motivate the will.
7.

Probable judgments are concerned with cause-effect

relationships.
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s.

But cause-effect relationships pertaining to human

action are meaningless unless the end of the action is
already specified; the end of human action is the
attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, ends we
have by nature and experience in desire; so reasoning about
such relationships depends on prior desires and ends.
g.

Therefore, probable reasoning in itself does not

motivate the will, but the will is m.otivated only by our
natural desires.

Probable reasoning, therefore, only

extends this already experienced motivation from the end to
a means.
10.

Therefore, reason is never, in and of itself,

motivating.
Moreover, since reason alone can never be the source
of volition, neither can it prevent it.

our ends or goals

are determined by our desires and passions, which are given
by nature, not by reason.

Consequently our passions can

never properly be thought of as irrational either.
Passions, described by Hume as "original existences,"
simply occur or exist.

They cannot be thought of as

contrary to reason anymore than an hallucination about pink
elephants.

Just as I cannot be mistaken that I imagine I

see pink elephants (if I am imagining them), I cannot be
mistaken about feeling anger, jealousy, greed, total
indifference towards others, love or sympathy.
is making the point that Descartes makes in his

Here Hunie
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ll§ditations, that only judgments, but not feelings or
desires or perceptions, can be erroneous, that is, contrary
to the truth.

Thus, a particular passion could only be .

irrational if it was directly based on a false belief about
things, or if we were moved to something as a means, but it
was in fact an "insufficient means" to satisfy our end (.1'.,
416).

These views explain Hume's notorious claim that:
'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching
of my finger.
'Tis not contrary to reason for me
to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least
uneasiness of an Indian, or person wholly unknown
to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to
prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my
greater, and have a more ardent affection for the
former than the latter (.1'., 416).
Hume may well be directing this claim specifically

against William Wollaston, who identifies morality with
truth, and immorality with falsehood. 24

Hume argues that

upon reflection, this view is entirely anti-intuitive.
Truth and falsehood do not admit of degrees.

If virtue and

morality were thought of merely as a species of truth, and
vice and immorality of falsehood, then all vices would be
equally vicious; and all virtues equally virtuous (.1'., 460).
Since we recognize a vast spectrum of degrees of both vice
24 A characteristic passage is the following: "No act
(whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and
evil are imputable, that interferes with any true
proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be
right" (The Religion of Nature Delineated, 280). Hume's
criticisms of Wollaston overlap on criticisms of him raised
by Hutcheson. See Illustrations Upon the Common Sense,
360-362, 368.
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and virtue, such judgments of degree must be based on some
other criterion besides truth or falsehood.
In any case, Hume is rejecting the moral rationalists'
views that it is reason which gives us the capacity to make
moral determinations, and that reason is therefore also
motivating to moral action.

Morality clearly has an

influence on our actions, of course.

But since reason

alone is impotent in regard to motivation, because all
motivation ultimately springs from passions which select
the ends of our actions, and since the passions can never
in themselves be irrational, it follows that reason must be
considered subservient to the passions.
To put the same point in different terms, the work of
reason is simply "the discovery of truth and falsehood"
But morality cannot be understood in these terms.

We

recognize actions as good or bad, praiseworthy or
blameworthy, but never as true or false.

When reason

discovers truths, if we are so indifferent to those truths
in our passions that we experience no "desire or aversion"
with regard to them, then reason's discovery of them lacks
any influential power (E, 172).

Thus, reason can determine

which means are probably the most effective for attaining
any particular end, and it can judge, by demonstration,
whether or not there is "agreement or disagreement" between
our judgments or between our abstract ideas.
ali it can do.

But this is

So, restricted to these functions, reason
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could never by itself determine what is moral or immoral,
nor produce any motivation by itself either to act morally
or to refrain from acting immorally.
In addition to these, Hume gives several further
arguments for the motivational inefficacy of reason.
Noting that the moral rationalists believed that morality
can be discovered by rational deduction, Hume counters that
morality cannot be analyzed into any of the types of
relations which are subject to demonstration.

For, he

says, anything subject to demonstration has to do with the
relations of "resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality,
and proportions in quantity and number"

(~,

464).

But

these are not moral relations, as is clear from the fact
that all of these types of relations pertain not just to
our actions or volitions, but to inanimate objects as well.
Furthermore, even if it were true that morality consisted
in some kind of relations which are immutable, natural or
fitting, and accessible to reason and its powers of
demonstration, it would still have to be the case that such
activities of reason would have some kind of effect on the
human will.

He states:

'Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to
conform the will to it. In order, therefore, to
prove, that the measures of right and wrong are
eternal laws, obligatory on every rational mind,
'tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon
which they are founded: We must also point out
the connexion betwixt the relation and the will;
and must prove that this connexion is so
necessary, that in every well-disposed mind, it
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must take place and have its influence ••••
465)

(~,

In other words, even if we could define morality in
terms of certain necessary and eternal, natural and fitting
relationships known by reason in its demonstrative
capacity, we would still have to show that human beings, at
ieast if not defective or uncivilized, are naturally moved
to action by the knowledge (by reason) of these moral
relations.

Hume uses the example of parricide

(~,

467).

There is a parallel relationship between a person killing
their parent and a sapling of an oak tree which kills its
parent tree by outgrowing it.

The relationships in the two

sets of events are parallel; yet we feel outrage and
disapprobation only towards the human offspring.

The moral

"turpitude" then, clearly is not an aspect of the relations
involved in the act of parricide, and hence, not something
discovered by reason.
means of our

n~tural

The moral turpitude is discovered by
moral. sentiments.

Suppose it were suggested that morality is discovered
by reason not through demonstration, but through empirical,
probable judgments of some matter of fact.
that the same reflection still holds:
discover vice in any matter of fact.

Hume argues

reason cannot
The matters of fact

in an act of parricide will be that an off spring
experiences certain passions such as anger or jealousy, or
perhaps does not experience natural affections, or that the
offspring has certain intentions or motives.

But the vice
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in parricide cannot be found in any of these "matters of
fact."

It can only be found when you "turn your reflexion

into your own breast, and find a sentiment of
disapprobation" ('.r, 469).
This, then, is Hume's case for casting reason into the
role of the "slave".

Every act of determining what is

morally correct depends (for its moral content and for its
motivational force) on what is in "our breasts" and not on
what reasons can tell us independently of that.

This is

why he says that morality "is more properly felt than
judg'd of" ('.r, 470).
It is not surprising then, that Hume claims that those
who think that reason makes moral determinations have
confused the operations of reason with the passions.

Those

without a "strict philosophical eye," who judge from "first
view and appearance," have a tendency to attribute moral
perception to reason.

They are misled because some

passions are "calm" and are experienced with the same
tranquillity as the judgments of reason.

What they tend to

think of as judgments of reason are really effects of our
calm passions.

These calm passions include "instincts

originally planted in our natures, such as benevolence and
resentment, the love of life and kindness to children; or
the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil,
consider'd merely as such" ('.r, 417).

~-
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But the calmness of a passion should not be confused
with its weakness, because a calm passion can, in fact,
successfully override a violent one.

Indeed, Hume says,

what we call "strength of mind" is actually "the prevalence
of the calm passions above the violent" (~, 419). 25

our

resistance to immediate temptations which contradict our
more long-term or persistent goals, or to self-interested
temptations which contradict our natural feelings of
sympathy towards others, is also ultimately an effect of
our calm passions, rather than of

reason(~,

418).

Are we to conclude that reason, for Hume, has no
significant role in morality?

This might seem a natural

conclusion, given Hume's emphasis on the role of moral
sentiment in morality.
of his views.

But nevertheless it is a distortion

For Hume's discussion of the possibility of

acting out of a sense of duty is based on a recognition
that.we do not always experience natural affections when we
should.

His discussion of justice as an artificial virtue

recognizes that our natural feelings of sympathy are not
always vivacious enough to secure a stable social order.
Hume's position is that it is always our passions,
sometimes strong and sometimes calm, which are the source
for moral determinations, provide motivation, and
ultimately determine our will.
25 see also £, 196.

But he also recognizes, in
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the two cases mentioned, the necessity of reason in order
to evoke the appropriate passions.

He states:

But in order to pave the way for such a
sentiment, and give a proper discernment of its
object, it is often necessary, we find, that much
reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions
be made, just conclusions drawn, distant
comparisons formed, complicated relations
examined, and general facts. fixed and ascertained
(£, 137).
Just as our appreciation of the aesthetic beauty of
the fine arts is to a great extent dependent on our
intellectual appreciation of it, so moral beauty and
significance is often only perceived after much
intellectual preparation.

Reason makes distinctions

between different situations, between valid and invalid
arguments; it draws comparisons between ourselves and
others, it notes the relations and effects of our actions,
and discovers facts and their relevance.

The possibility

of a moral life, Hume acknowledges, depends on these
processes of reason.

Without these processes of reason we

would often act erroneously, from the point of view of
morality, either by failing to do something that is a duty,
or considering ourselves obliged to do something we really
are not obliged to do.

Reason, then, plays no

inconsiderable role in Hume's full account of morality.
But because of Hume's aim of correcting both the Hobbesian
psychology and the mistakes of the rationalists, the role
of reason receives very little explicit attention within
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aume's ethical works.

In the words of a noted Hume

scholar:
Thus, while it is true that Hume gives to
sentiment the central role in founding morals, it
is also true that he gives to reason an essential
part in morals. Not even in morals does Hume
thoroughly subordinate reason to sentiment in any
but the highly restricted sense of subordination
outlined in Treatise II, 3, 3: If I do not have
a desire for an object, reason cannot cause in
the will an impulse toward--desire f or--that
object. And if I do have a desire, reason cannot
in any direct sense eliminate that desire by
blocking the impulse of the will. But reason can
and does modify our desires, it can and does
modify our sentiments, and it plays sometimes a
crucial rol~ in the formation of our moral
sentiments. 6
Hume's position, then, is not that reason plays
no significant role in morality, but only that it cannot
alone either make moral determinations or provide for moral
motivation.

While he forthrightly states that reason alone

cannot make moral judgements, he also implies that
sentiments alone cannot do the job either.
By way of both comparison and contrast, we now turn to
a parallel examination of Kant's rational internalism.
does Kant say that only reason can make moral judgments,
and how is it that reason provides for moral motivation?
After giving Kant's answers to these questions as a
paradigmatic Rational Internalist, we will be able to
evaluate the challenge Hume presents to rational
internal ism.
26 oavid Fate Norton, 101.

Why
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III
Kant's Moral Rationalism

Far from placing reason in any subordinate role, Kant
claims that reason and reason only determines what is
moral, and that actions which have "true moral worth" are
those which have been motivated by reason alone.

In the

Pref ace to his Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of
Morals Kant explains why he thinks that it is absolutely
necessary to show that the basis of moral obligation is
reason alone.

His task is to "construct a pure moral

philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only
empirical, and which belon.gs to anthropology" (FP, 5).

He

gives two reasons why this task is of utmost importance.
The first reason is that he thinks it is the only way to
explain what he takes to be a fact of our moral experience:
we all know what it is like to experience the moral force
of obligation.

But the force of moral obligation, he

holds, can be properly explained only in terms of its
necessity.

He states:

"Everyone must admit that if a law

is to have moral force, that is, to be the basis of an
obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity •••• "
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(,ff, 5).

Kant claims that the necessity of moral

obligation, like the necessity of causal relationships, can
only be understood in light of the a priori structure of
reason.

Just as the necessity of causal connections cannot

be discovered empirically (because all we experience is the
constant conjunction of two events, but never the causal
connection), neither can the necessity of moral obligation.
The necessity of causal relationships and of moral
obligations can only be explained by the formal nature of
reason.
The second reason for the importance of a "pure moral
philosophy" is that morals are especially prone to
"corruption."

Without awareness of their true normative

principle, it is much more likely that either we will fail
to adhere to moral obligation, or that we will be led into
error in our moral judgments.

Any reliance on anything

empirical, even if it concerns something that is in
"certain respects universal," will fail to provide a secure
guideline for morality.

Kant's moral philosophy must

constantly be understood with reference to his task of
providing a basis for the phenomenological experience of
the universal binding force of moral obligation.

Focussing

on this task is necessary for a proper perspective for
interpreting Kant's ethical works, especially the
Fundamental Principles and the Critique of Practical
Reason.
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The dual role of reason as moral determinator and
moral motivator is crucial for Kant's enterprise.

His view

is that if reason could determine what is moral but not yet
motivate, then moral obligation would be dependent on some
other motivator, which may or may not be present.

And if

reason could motivate but not determine what is moral, then
there would be no essential connection between the
recognition of morality and the obligation to act
accordingly.

So either if reason could make moral

determinations and yet not motivate, or if reason could
motivate and yet not make moral determinations, there would
be no accounting for the necessity of moral obligation.
Thus, Kant, in his search for an adequate "foundation" for
morality, must establish that reason functions in both
ways.
Kant's starting point for the discovery of the
"foundations" of morality is what he sees as a universal
fact of our moral experience, the feeling of constraint by
a moral obligation, and his project is to analyze and
explain how that experience is possible.

His methodology

requires that he focuses, then, on what Hume would regard
as a rather narrow aspect of our moral experience:

the

experience of knowing that we have a moral obligation when
either we have no inclination to fulfill it, or we have
inclinations which conflict with the fulfillment of duty.
The examination of this kind of moral experience will shed

192

iiqht on the essence of a good will.

An

understanding of

the nature of the good will, Kant claims, will lead to the
discovery of the conditions of the possibility of morality.
Kant distinguishes three categories of actions pertaining
to morality:

those which are inconsistent with duty, those

which are done (merely) in accordance with duty, and those
which are done for the sake of duty.

Actions which are

inconsistent with duty certainly do not shed light on the
nature of the good will.

Actions done merely in accordance

with duty are motivated by self-interest, natural
inclination or desire.

While such actions have "legality,"

Kant says that these also are not the kind of actions which
illuminate the nature of the good will.

They do not

illuminate the nature of the good will because they rest on
a contingent basis.

They do not have the kind of basis

which can account for the universality and necessity of
moral obligation.

So Kant focuses on· the types of action

in which he thinks the good will is most obvious:
which are done for the sake of duty.

those

Only actions done for

the sake of duty embody the characteristic necessity and
universality Kant is seeking to explain.

Kant reserves the

appellation of "true moral worth" only for the actions
which are done for the sake of duty, because only these
actions reflect the elements of the foundation of morality:
freedom and autonomy.
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Actions which are done solely for the sake of duty,
and which therefore are said to have true moral worth, can
not be performed on the basis of hypothetical commands.
Rather, such actions are performed on the basis of the
categorical imperative:

Act only in such a way that the

maxim of your action could become a universal law of
nature.

This principle is a "formal practical principle of

pure reason" and the only appropriate determining ground of
an absolutely good will.

It is, Kant claims, the only true

normative principle of morality.
An

absolutely good will is one which is autonomous,

that is, ungoverned by heteronomous desires.

The

autonomous will is guided by the purely formal character of
universalizability; and Kant's view is that reason alone
can test the universalizability of a maxim (which he
defines as a "subjective principle of action").

We need to

understand why Kant claims that the test· for
universalizability can be provided only by reason, because
this is what is required to establish reason as a "moral
determinator."

The answer is given in two parts, which I

will review consecutively.

First, Kant gives an indirect

defense of his claim by showing the inadequacies of
alternative bases for morality.

Secondly, he gives a

direct defense of his claim by showing that only reason can
determine universalizability.
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Kant identifies alternative principles of morality
that have been suggested in the history of ethics, and
compares them unfavorably with his own.

As opposed to the

formal principle of the categorical imperative, which is
principle possible for the autonomous will, the other
principles are "material" and determined by heteronomous
will.

They include both "empirical" and "rational"

principles.

Empirical principles, including the principles

of self-love and moral feeling, are completely and
obviously inadequate, and the rational (but material)
principles of perfection, or the will of God, are also, but
less obviously, "spurious."
To begin with the empirical principles, Kant claims
that the principle of self-love, or of private happiness,
is by its nature completely contrary to morality.
states:

He

"So distinct and sharp are the boundaries between

morality and self-love

tha~

even the commonest eye cannot

fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or
the other" (CPrR, 37).

The complete inadequacy of self-

love as a principle of morality is based on the fact that
self-love actually "undermines morality" by "driving it to
ruin" and "destroying its sublimity" (FP, 59; CPrR, 36).
Kant is calling attention to the common experience that
self-love is a motive which often conflicts with moral
obligation.

So the principle of self-love destroys the

SUblimity of morality by "putting the motives to virtue and
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to vice in the same class."

If self-love can lead us to

foresake our duty, it certainly cannot guarantee adherence
to moral principle.

Kant's appeal here works successfully

against a simple-minded egoist, but is not strong enough
for a more sophisticated theory of self-love or egoism.
The second empirical moral principle Kant identifies
is the principle of moral feeling.

Kant explicitly

mentions Hutcheson in the context of the discussion of
moral feeling, and one expects that his criticisms would
apply also to Hume, since his views on moral feeling are
consistent with his predecessor's, in that they both
believe that it is moral sentiment that determines what is
moral and that provides the motivation to be moral. 27

Here

I will simply explain Kant's reasons for rejecting moral
sense theories, and reserve an evaluation of his reasons
for the last section.
Kant judges the principle of moral feeling to be "more
refined" than the principle of private happiness, and even
"nearer to morality and its dignity" (CPrR, 40) because:
•.• it pays virtue the honor of ascribing to her
immediately the satisfaction and esteem we have
for her, and does not, as it were, tell her to
her face that we are not attached to her by her
beauty but by profit (FP, 59).
Nevertheless, for Kant, moral sense cannot be the basis of
moral obligation.

Four reasons are offered:

27 The reference to Hutcheson occurs in the Fundamental
~inciples, 59n.
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The first is that moral sense cannot provide the basis
for moral obligation because moral sense is a feeling, and
"feelings which naturally differ infinitely in degree
cannot furnish a uniform standard of good and evil" (l.f,
59).

The second reason is that since the moral sense

theorists believe that the natural response to morality and
virtue is pleasure, and the natural response to immorality
and vice is pain, then "everything is reduced to the desire
for one's own happiness" (CPrR, 40).

Kant seems here to be

saying that for the moral sense theorist, people really act
morally in order to secure their own happiness after all.
Based on the presumption that it is true that the
moral sense theorist believes that people act only in view
of their own happiness, the third reason is that moral
sense cannot be the basis of moral judgment because we do
not always see our own happiness as a consequence of that
of others.

Kant does not in fact object to having the

happiness of others as an end, a point of which utilitarian
or universal consequentialists should take note.
outrightly:

He says

"The happiness of others may be the object of

the will of a rational being •••• " (CPrR, 35)

His objection

is that moral feeling cannot provide the basis of a moral
obligation, or be the "determining ground of the maxim"
because we simply cannot presume that all people, at all
times, experience the appropriate moral sentiments.
states:

He

197

Not only would one have to presuppose that we
find in the welfare of others a natural
satisfaction but also one would have to find a
want such as that which is occasioned in some men
by a sympathetic disposition. This want,
however, I cannot presuppose in every rational
being, certainly not in God(~, 35).
We simply are not moved by sympathy in every instance
we ought to be, and we do not always find satisfaction in
the welfare of others.

Thus, in.Kant's view, moral sense

theories cannot account for the necessity of moral
obligation.
Kant's fourth reason for denying that moral sense
could be a basis of moral obligation is that those who do
respond sympathetically, experiencing pleasure in the face
of virtue and pain in the face of vice, must have a prior
appreciation of what is morally good, and must already be
virtuous.

The consciousness of moral obligation, Kant

believes, is experienced, not only by the virtuous, but by
everyone.

So he concludes:

"Therefore, the concept of

morality and duty must precede all reference to this
satisfaction and cannot be derived from it" (CPrR, 40).

He

in no way wants to deny, nor to belittle, the importance of
such a subjective feeling of satisfaction in the
performance of one's moral obligations.

In fact, as we

have seen earlier, he urges that this is a feeling that we
ought to cultivate, indeed, that its cultivation is a duty
(CPrR, 40).

He only wants.to insist that it cannot itself
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tell us what our duty is, nor can it provide a dependable
motivating source.
The rational, but material, moral principles are
ranked by Kant as higher and closer to morality than the
empirical material principles.

The rational principles

include the notion of God's will (adopted in the divine
command theory of morality) and the notion of perfection.
God's will cannot serve as a basis for morality, Kant says,
first, because it is impossible for us to have any
comprehension or intuition of God's perfection by which to
make our moral judgments.

Secondly, if we attribute to God

the character of infinite goodness, we can deduce moral
obligations only on the basis of our own ideas of goodness,
whose basis we are in fact trying to identify (and Kant
believes are discoverable only through the categorical
imperative) : but if we do not attribute to God the
character of infinite goodness, then we are left only with
a God of "glory and dominion" whose prescriptions may well
be contrary to morality.
The notion of perfection also cannot provide a basis
.
for morality.

.
.
"Being
empty and indefinite,"
Kant says, "i't

inevitably tends to turn in a circle an cannot avoid
tacitly presupposing the morality which it is to explain"
(FP, 59).

So, this criticism is actually the same as the

one raised against divine command theories; we need to
already have a criterion of goodness in order to know that

199

God's will is what ought to be done, and we need to already
have a criterion of moral goodness in order to have an
adequate grasp of what perfection is.
Proceeding now to the second, more constructive part
of Kant's defense of his claim that only reason can be the
determining ground of morality, we need to examine the
process of determining universalizability, the criterion of
moral goodness, the "canon of the moral appreciation" (FP,
41).

His starting point, we have seen, is that the

inescapable experience of the force of moral obligation can
only be understood in terms of the a priori character of
morality, that is, in terms of a directive for action
having universality and necessity.

The good will, i.e. a

will conforming solely to this directive, is therefore
determined by the mere form of the moral law.

The form of

the moral law is precisely its universalizability.

In

order to determine the mor.ality of any maxim or subjective
principle, then, the maxim must be tested for this
universality.
Kant identifies two tests for universalizability:

1)

a maxim cannot be universalized if it contains a
contradiction which has the effect of undermining the
Possibility of society and 2) a maxim cannot be
universalized if its maxim, when universalized, brings the
Will into contradiction with its own nature.

Of course,

anything that undermines the possibility of society also
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brings the will into conflict with itself, given our
intrinsically social natures.

This suggests, perhaps, that

the second criterion is a sufficient criterion of
morality. 28

In any case, maxims must be tested for the

presence of contradiction.

But it is reason, and reason

alone, that identifies contradiction; from this it follows
that reason is the sole determining ground of morality.
since universalizability, which is based on the absence of
contradiction in our maxims, or between our maxims and the
nature of our wills, is a purely formal notion, judgments
concerning universalizability can only be made by reason.
Now that we have examined what it means for Kant to
say that reason, and reason only, determines what is moral,
we can turn our attention to the claim that reason also is
the source of a purely moral motivation.

Kant argues that

it would be impossible for him to demonstrate how it is
that the moral law can be motivating, for this would be the
same as showing how freedom is possible (FP, 76; CPrR, 48).
We can't prove that the awareness of duty is motivating,
anymore than we can prove that we are free.

Nevertheless,

28 Notice that a maxim for making a promise without the
intention of keeping it violates not only the first, but
also the second, criterion. This shows that Kant's second
example can be shown to be immoral in light of the second
criterion as well. To pursue the suggestion that the
s7cond criterion may be a sufficient one would take the
discussion too far afield.
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we must assume that we are free in order to make sense out
of morality.

Kant states:

[Freedom] holds good only as a necessary
hypothesis of reason in a being that believes
itself conscious of a will, that is a faculty
distinct from mere desire (namely, a faculty of
determining itself to action as an intelligence,
in other words, by laws of reason independently
of natural instincts) (.rE, 76).
Kant is saying that the consciousness of the moral law
(consciousness of the necessity of moral obligation) shows
in itself that freedom is not only possible, but actual
(~,

49).

The concept of freedom is derived from the

consciousness of the moral law.

Freedom means being able

to act independently of heteronomous desires, and on the
basis of moral judgments, which are made by reason.
Freedom must be presupposed, Kant says, in order to account
for the awareness of a moral obligation.

Thus, Kant gives

a "transcendental deduction" or an a priori proof of
reason's motivating power.
Having given this transcendental proof of reason's
motivational influence, Kant proceeds to discuss in detail
"in what way" that motivational influence is experienced
(CPrR, 75).

While rejecting the ideas that only sentiments

of sympathy or of moral approval are moral motivators, Kant
nevertheless does have his own theory of "moral feeling".
Kant introduces the notion of moral feeling, or Achtunq in
the Fundamental Principles and devotes a chapter of the
analytic in the Critique of Practical Reason to it.

In

202

these works, and especially in the latter, Kant can be seen
as xedefining moral feeling; that is, giving an account of
it that differs from his "moral sense" predecessors.
However, Kant's discussion of the role of Achtung, the
feeling of respect for the moral law, seems to raise a
serious difficulty for the interpretation of Kant as a
Rational Internalist.

"It seems possible," Nagel comments,

"that Kant's postulation of moral interest as the
motivating impulse for phenomenal moral behavior
compromised the effort" to establish moral reasons as
themselves the independent source of moral motivation
11).

(~,

Mark Timmons, in a recent article, argues that Kant's

positing of a mysterious, a priori feeling (Achtung) was
indeed superfluous and merely symptomatic of his
unreflective Aristotelian heritage, and that if Kant could
have liberated himself from that influence, he would have
expostulated an account of morality similar to Nagel's. 29
Timmons thus suggests that Kant did in fact "compromise the
effort" to give an account of ethics which shows that
reason itself is the source of moral motivation.

E. J.

Bond, who rejects Nagel's Rational Internalism, states:
"But even Kant recognized that

~

motivational factor was

necessary to account for being moved to act on moral
29 Mark

Timmons, "Kant· and the Possibility of Moral
Motivation," Southern Journal of Philosophy (1985, vol~ 23,
No. 3): 377-398.
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qrounds, beyond the mere recognition of the law, and he
called that "reverence" or "respect" for the law. 1130

The

comments on the part of these writers point to a possible
inconsistency in Kant's works.
motivating or is it not?

Is reason independently

Since the criticism raised by

these commentators puts Kant's Rational Internalism into
question, and since Kant has been identified as a
"paradigmatic" Rational Internalist, it is important to
clarify the role that moral feeling has in morality.
The most significant way in which Kant's moral feeling
differs from previous accounts is that for him, moral
feeling, or respect for the moral law, is "produced solely
by reason" (CPrR, 79).

Although moral feeling is produced

by reason, we experience this respect for the moral law as
a result of our dual natures.

God would not experience

moral feeling, because God has no sensuous nature, and
thus, nothing which comes into conflict with reason.
states:

He

"Respect for the law cannot be attributed to a

supreme being or even to one free from all sensibility,
since to such a being there could be no obstacle to
practical reason" (CPrR, 79).
Kant proceeds to describe the ways in which the
motivational influence is experienced, phenomenologically,
as it were.

He speaks of these experiences as the

JOE. J. Bond, Reason and Value (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), 11.
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"subjective effects" of the moral law.

By "subjective"

effects, Kant does not mean effects which vary according to
individuals, but simply effects of the moral law which are
experienced on the part of the subject.

He regards these

subjective effects as necessary, given our dual natures.
Perhaps the most significant subjective effect of the
moral law is the awareness of our autonomy, or of our
"supersensuous" existence--in short, the awareness of our
intrinsic worth.

For Kant, we become aware of our

"supersensuous" nature in the consciousness of our
independence from natural influences and of our freedom to
act according to universal laws which are self-imposed.
This is the consciousness of our distinctive natures as
rational beings.

It is the consciousness of the sublimity

of our natures (CPrR, 91).
Kant speaks of the negative subjective effect of pain
which is the necessary res.ult of the conflict of the moral
law with our natural inclinations.

The moral law is

experienced as something which checks our natural
inclinations and desires, and hence is the source of pain
and humiliation (CPrR, 75).
known a priori.

Kant states:

The negative effects can be
"we can see a priori that

the moral law as a ground of determination of the will, by
thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling
which can be called pain" (CPrR, 75).

The negative effects

"awaken" the feeling of respect for the moral law.

Respect
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is the positive "subjective effect" of that motivation.
since the moral law humbles, it must at the same time evoke
respect for itself; there can be no humiliation except in
the face of something which is the object of respect.

In a

sense, the experience of respect is primary, because it is
only in the face of this respect that the negative effects
of pain and humiliation can be felt.
Kant speaks of yet another way in which the moral law
is experienced.

We experience a sense of pleasure when we

have in fact overcome our inclination and have fulfilled
our duty (FP, 77).

Kant argues that since we are sensual

beings, it must be possible for the moral law to exercise
itself in this way.
It may be illuminating to consider the effects of the
moral law on the holy will.

The holy will is the one which

is unaffected by sensuous desires and completely from
inclination.

(God has a holy will, and virtuous human

beings strive to have one.)

Reason, in the form of the

moral law, would be motivating for the holy will without
hindrance.

The holy will then would not respond to the

moral law with pain.

Pain is felt only because the human

(unholy) will experiences inclinations which conflict with
the moral law.

So the subjective effects of the moral law,

whether pain or respect or the feeling

o~

worth, are as

they are because of our dual natures as beings who on the
one hand are subject to natural laws, and on the other
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hand, subject to laws which they impose on themselves
through reason.
Let's turn now to the suggestion that Kant's inclusion
of a discussion of moral feeling compromises his rational
internalism by contradicting the claim that reason only is
motivating.

Suppose we interpret Kant, as Nagel, Timmons,

and Bond have done, as saying that it is the respect for
the moral law, rather than reason itself, which motivates
moral action.

The first problem with this interpretation

is that if indeed it is the case that respect for the moral
law is produced and thus is entirely dependent on reason,
then it is reason which ultimately motivates.

The

subjective effects are the results of the already
motivating power of reason in the form of the moral law.
(Since Kant speaks of the moral feeling as the effect of
the moral law on the subject, we can speak of reason
producing moral feeling.)
Secondly, the interpretation jars with repeated claims
made by Kant to the contrary.

Properly speaking, Kant

seems to say, it is not respect which motivates moral
action; it is rather reason in the form of the moral law
which motivates.
states:

In the Critique of Practical Reason he

" ••• the moral incentive of the human will, can

never be anything other than the moral law" (CPrR, 74).
Kant specifically excludes respect as the incentive or
motivational influence:

"Thus respect for the law is not
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the incentive to morality:

It is morality itself, regarded

subjectively as an incentive ••• "(~, 78).

He refers to

the pure moral law as the "sole and undoubted moral
incentive" (CPrR, 81) and claims that the "genuine
incentive" of pure practical reason is "nothing else than
the pure moral law itself •••• " (CPrR, 91)

Further, Kant

speaks of the "immediate determination of the will by the
[moral] law" (E.f, 19) and he says that the influence of the
moral law is "by way of reason alone" (Il, 28).

These

passages show that we should not think of the feeling of
the respect for the moral law as the incentive for
morality, or even as a cause of moral motivation.

The

feeling of respect, for Kant, is the result of the already
motivating power of reason.

It refers to the way we

experience the moral law as motivating.
Kant's identifying the moral law as the "sole and
undoubted" moral incentive does not conflict with our
conclusions in addressing Prier's criticism of Kant in
Chapter 4.

There I showed that for Kant there are

"incentives" to moral conduct other than reason.

Passages

were cited to indicate that for Kant feelings of sympathy
and benevolence are an important part of our moral lives.
But there I was using the word "moral" in its common,
everyday sense, and not in the limited, strict sense in
Which Kant uses it.

For Kant, there are many incentives

for "moral" actions--if by moral we mean actions that are

208

morally correct; actions which have "legality".

But there

is only one genuine incentive for "moral" actions in the
strict sense--that is, for those that have true moral
worth.
The careful examination of Kant's discussion of moral
feeling, then, reveals no inconsistency in his claim that
reason is an independently motivating power.

We are

justified in concluding that Kant's discussion of the role
of moral feeling as the respect for the moral law in no way
compromises his Rational Internalism, but rather is
entirely consistent with it.
Kant obviously must have felt that his ethical works
would have been incomplete without a discussion of the
moral feeling of respect, since he introduces the notion in
his Fundamental Principles and develops the notion so
extensively in the more mature Second Critique.

The

discussion would not, however, been incomplete in the sense
that without moral feeling there would be no incentive for
morality; but only in the sense that its treatment of the
psychology of morality would have been incomplete.

There

would have been no account of the subjective effects of the
already motivating influence of reason in the form of the
moral law.

Kant's ethical works should not be faulted for

including the discussion of the moral feeling of respect,
for its inclusion adds to the richness of the account and
coheres with important elements of our moral experience.
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we do feel pain when we ought to do something which
conflicts with our inclinations to do otherwise, and we do
feel respect for the dictates of morality.
In conclusion, then, the inclusion of the discussion
of Kant's moral feeling, the respect for the moral law,
does nothing to undermine the claim that reason is itself
motivating.

overall, I have attempted to render a

sympathetic account of both Kant and Hume's position on the
role of reason in ethics in order to provide a solid
preparation for a comparison of their views, and for a
critical evaluation of Hume's challenge to rational
internal ism.

IV

Evaluation of Hume's Challenge

A comparison of the moral theories of Hume and Kant
reveals agreement on the following essential points:

they

both are moral realists, that is, they both believe that
morality is objective and that there are moral truths; they
both believe that we have access to moral knowledge; and
they both believe that morality is universal (at least in
some sense).

Further, they both believe that we can act

for the sake of duty, and they both call our attention to
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the beauty of the sympathetic disposition and the natural
satisfaction of the moral life.

Finally, they both

recognize that the natural feelings of sympathy can differ
significantly in degree, both between persons, and within
the same person at different times.
The comparison also reveals that Kant's criticisms of
moral sense theorists are not truly applicable to Hume, and
that some of Hume's criticisms of the moral rationalists
are not truly applicable to Kant. 31 In the last section, I
identified four criticisms of the moral sense theorists
given by Kant. 32

Kant's first criticism is that the moral

sense theories must be false because moral commands are
necessary, but moral feelings "differ infinitely in
degree."

But Hume does not think of moral sentiments as

varying.

He thinks of them rather as universal, necessary

responses of all but the most uncivilized and corrupt
spirits, capable of providing the basis of a universal
standard of morality.

Our feelings of compassion and pity

may vary tremendously, but our moral sentiments of approval
or disapproval are stable.

31 1 do not think that Kant's criticisms apply to
Hutcheson either, the moral sense theorist Kant probably
had foremost in mind. since we are concentrating on the
differences (apparent or real) between Kant and Hume, I
will restrict my attention only to showing that the
criticisms do not apply to Hume.
32 see 194-196.
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Kant's second criticism is that moral sense theories
reduce morality to the desire for one's own happiness
insofar as they speak of moral approval and disapproval in
terms of pleasure and pain.

But while it is true that Hume

says that we do experience pleasure in view of moral
actions and moral characters, and pain in view of immoral
ones, he does not say that we always act in order to
experience pleasure or avoid pain.

The third criticism is

that moral sense theories presuppose that moral actions are
always done out of a sense of sympathy.

But, as I have

argued, Hume does not claim that all our moral actions have
to be inspired by active feelings of sympathy within the
moral agent.

He allows that even in the absence of

sympathy or compassion, I can recognize an obligation and
be motivated to do it simply out of a sense of duty.

The

fourth criticism is that moral sense theories presuppose a
virtuous disposition, because only the virtuous respond
sympathetically to others and take pleasure in moral
actions, but this response depends on the prior recognition
of what is morally good.
criticism is unfair.

As I have suggested, this

Hume is right that moral motivation

is more likely to be present in an already virtuous person,
but he does not say that only virtuous persons can
experience moral motivation.

All but the most uncivilized

can recognize, through moral approbation, that something is
a duty.
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some of Hume's criticisms of the moral rationalists
apply just as weakly to Kant's Rational Internalism.

Hume

says that if reason is the discovery of truth and
falsehood, and if morality is determined by reason, then
all virtuous acts would be equally good and all vicious
acts would be equally bad, since truth and falsehood are
not matters of degree.

He also claimed that if vice or

virtue were to be discovered in some relation, discoverable
by reason, that vice and virtue would be attributes not
only of human beings, but of animals and even inanimate
objects.
Kant avoids these conclusions by freeing reason from
the limited task of discovering truth and falsehood, and by
showing that the relations or the contradictions which are
immoral are not just any contradictions or relations, but
those which, when expressed in maxims, contain
contradictions which undermine the possibility of society,
or contain contradictions between the maxim and the nature
of the will.

While the same relation exists between a

sapling and a tree and between a child and a parent, the
immorality, or vice, of ingratitude pertains only to the
latter relationship, because only rational beings are
capable of formulating maxims, and of testing their
universalizability.

Only human beings naturally desire

evidence of gratitude; only they can realize that a
contrary maxim brings their will into conflict with itself.

213

tor Kant, degrees of immorality or of vice are explained in
terms of how flagrantly a person's maxims, when
universalized, undermine the possibility of society or are
conflicting with their own natures.
since these criticisms refer to merely apparent
differences between Kant and Hume, we have yet to identify
the real differences between them, in particular, with
regard to their theories of moral motivation.

From the

beginning I have proposed that the differences between Kant
and Hume can be explained in large part in light of the
differences in their emphases.

Hume's focus was determined

largely by his rejection of Hobbesian psychology of human
beings as essentially egocentric.

His focus is very broad,

covering all aspects of our moral or virtuous lives-whatever we find amiable, pleasing, or praiseworthy in
human conduct.

For Hume, actions done out of a sense of

duty constitute both a small portion of our moral or
virtuous lives (a point I believe Kant could readily admit)
and an exceptional rather than paradigmatic portion.
Hume's discussion of actions done out of a sense of duty is
brief, and his estimation of them is that both such
actions, and the persons who commit them, are lacking in
qualities we naturally admire.

The actions, and the

persons, are deprived of the beauty attending actions which
result directly from our natural inclinations for
benevolence and sympathy.
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Kant's focus on the other hand is, in comparison, very
narrow.

Because his question was how moral judgments, and

hence morality, are possible, he set for himself the task
of analyzing the kind of moral experience that he thought
would best enable him to answer this question:

the

experience of feeling the force of moral obligation.

We

feel the force of moral obligation most clearly when we
either lack the inclination to act morally, or when we have
inclinations which are contrary to the fulfillment of moral
obligation.

In either of these situations, in other words,

when we act morally, we do so for the sake of duty only.
Through his analysis of actions which are done because (and
only because) duty requires, Kant identifies the aspects of
human nature that make us moral beings.

In the phenomena

of acting for the sake of duty Kant identifies the
existential conditions of our moral lives as autonomy and
rationality.

Kant agrees that the naturally sympathetic

disposition is beautiful to behold (CPrR, 85); that the
sympathetic disposition deserves praise and encouragement
(FP, 15-16); and that there is a satisfaction found in
acting morally (CPrR, 40).

But rather than viewing the

actions done for the sake of duty as deficient, Kant sees
in them the clearest reflection of human dignity.

Human

beings have dignity because we are capable of morality; we
are capable of morality because we can give ourselves
categorical imperatives, because we are free and rational.
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A sympathetic nature is beautiful, but the power we have to
act independently of our inclinations is sublime (,ff, 59;
~,

89).

Their difference of focus is reflected in the amount
of attention they each devote to the phenomenon of acting
for the sake of duty, and in the way this phenomenon is
analyzed.

But despite the difference of emphasis on this

point, we may think of them as giving to a great extent,
complementary, rather than contradictory, accounts of
ethical life:

I think that it must be admitted that Kant

is right in his intuition that actions done for the sake of
duty are somehow remarkable or special even while agreeing
with Hume that these actions are not the ones that are
characteristic of moral life.

And I think that Hume's

description of the virtuous person as the one who acts out
of naturally sympathetic inclinations is very much in
keeping with common intuitions, and that Hume is correct in
pointing out the important and pervasive role that sympathy
plays in our moral lives.

I do not believe, however, that

therein lie the essential differences between Kant and
Hume, especially for our question, the question of whether
reason is motivating.

I propose that a closer examination

of their respective analyses of action done for the sake of
duty will be instrumental in highlighting the essential
differences between their theories of moral motivation.
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us, even if imperceptibly, a calm passion, for instance, of
benevolence or of moral approval that is causing us to act
(instead of our reasoned judgment about duty)?

Are we to

believe that all that is going on in the mind prior to
actions done out of a sense of duty is a confrontation of
"calm" and "violent" passions?
This interpretation seems supported in the passage in
which Hume claims that what we (those of us who do "not
examine objects with a strict philosophic eye") often
imagine are judgments of reason, are really nothing other
than the effects of the calm passions.

We confuse them

because the calm passions, like reason, exert themselves
"without producing any sensible emotion." Cl'., 417).

On

this interpretation, then, when we act out of regard for a
moral obligation, it is not really reason but a "calm
passion" which ultimately motivates our actions.

But we

don't recognize the influence of the calm passions because
they are faint, low-intensity, feelings.
Now even a sympathetic reader has good reason to be
suspicious about this argument.

Barry Stroud, for example,

is one commentator who has expressed dissatisfaction with
it.

He claims that the argument is both unsound and

contradictory to Hume's own basic principles. 33

The

argument is unsound because the conclusion that actions are
33 Barry Stroud, Hume, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1977), 164-165.
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the result of calm passions which are known "more by their
effects than by their immediate feeling or sensation", only
follows if we already know that it is a calm passion,
rather than something else, that caused the action.

But

this is precisely what is at issue, both in the present
arqument, and in the opposition between Kant and Hume:

is

this a passion or is it reason motivating an action?
In addition, Stroud claims, the arqument is also
inconsistent with one of Hume's basic principles about what
we can know.

Stroud states:

Hume says: "'Tis certain" that there are [calm]
passions and desires; they feel to us just like
"determinations of reason" but he claims to know
they are not. This does not cohere very well with
his fundamental principle that we cannot be wrong
about t~{ contents of our own minds at a given
moment.
so perhaps Hume is insisting too strongly that what occurs
in the mind, for instance, in considering acting out of a
sense of duty, is the influence of a calm passion, rather
than reason.

Is what is going on in the mind simply a

battle between calm and violent passions?

This suggestion

is inconsistent with Hume's admission that reason does have
important work to do to ensure the appropriate moral
response.

so what is the relationship between reason and

the calm passions?

34 stroud, 164.
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Perhaps then an alternative interpretation of moral
acts done for the sake of duty is better.

Perhaps Hume is

saying that we act out of a regard for moral obligation
only because we do, generally, as human beings, experience
feelings of benevolence or sympathy, and we experience a
feeling of approval of them, even though, in a particular
instance, we may find ourselves completely devoid of any
inkling of sympathetic or benevolent feeling. 35

On this

interpretation, although I do not now experience any
feelings of sympathy, I can act out of regard for duty
because there is a natural human disposition for sympathy
and reason has shown this action to be causally related to
the aspects of this disposition that I desire.

Thus, the

calm passions are interpreted here not as occurrent
desires, but as natural dispositions.

This interpretation

seems to be supported by the text in which Hume claims that
calm.passions (benevolence, propensity to good, etc.) are
"certain instincts."

This interpretation is also

attractive because it is successful in explaining
prudential actions, that is, actions which are performed in
light of our future self-interest.

I need not now feel

hunger, not even faintly, in order to be motivated to go to
the grocery store.

My decision to go grocery shopping,

35 This interpretation is suggested to me by an
unpublished paper by Daniel Shaw, "Hume's Theory of
Motivation."
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however, can be understood in terms of my disposition to
avoid the pain of hunger and in terms of my instinctual
desire to preserve my existence.
I do not think that the second interpretation is
successful, however, either in terms of the analysis of
actions done out of a regard for moral obligation, or in
other cases where lively passions are absent.

Why should

the fact of a natural disposition for sympathy motivate in
a situation where the feeling of sympathy is not active in
the moral agent?

Or why should the fact of a natural

disposition for benevolence motivate in a situation where
the feeling of benevolence is not active in the moral
agent?

Can dispositions motivate if they are not

occurrently perceived?
This hardly seems to be an acceptable conclusion.

The

correct interpretation, I think, is that Hume's main point
in his motivational theory is not that reason cannot
motivate, but that reason alone cannot motivate.

Reason

can only motivate in view of ends we naturally desire, that
is, in view of natural dispositions.

Dispositions can be

motivating if those dispositions are called up by the
processes of reason.

Hume, in emphasizing the dependent

role of reason, discusses the role reason plays in bringing
about the motivating influence of instincts or
propensities.

He states:
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Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer,
because he desires to keep his health. If you
then enquire, why he desires health, he will
readily reply, because sickness is painful. If
you push your enquiries farther, and desire a
reason why he hates pain. it is impossible he can
ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is
never referred to any other object (E, 293).
Reason can motivate through instincts or dispositions.

In

this case, reason motivates a person to exercise by
pointing out the causal connections between exercise and
health, and between health and pleasure or absence of pain.
without the instinctual desire for pleasure, it is true,
reason would not have been able to motivate a person into
exercising.

But without reason. the natural instinct to

prefer pleasure over pain could never motivate actions
which are causally related to pleasure.

Without reason, we

could not be motivated to do anything we are not directly
motivated to do, whether it be exercising, or giving up
smoking, or using salt.
Likewise, we could never be motivated to act out of a
sense of duty unless reason was instrumental in activating
our natural dispositions of sympathy, or of moral approval.
Reason can motivate, but not independently of such
dispositions.

These natural dispositions are ultimate

ends; we cannot ask why we prefer or pursue them.

They are

facts about human existence which, Hume says, can never "be
accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely
to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any
dependance on the intellectual faculties" (E, 293).

They
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are reasons in themselves for action, but we cannot use
reason to establish them as reasons.

In short, they are

self-justifying.
Now reason can activate natural dispositions in other
ways than discovering causal connections.

Hume, we saw,

noted that reason is necessary in order to draw
comparisons, establish facts, and note complex
relationships.

However, these are processes we must use to

apply Kant's categorical imperative.

So the difference

between Kant and Hume does not consist in disagreeing that
reason must perform these functions in order to secure the
appropriate moral responses.
Hume formulated his doctrine of the calm passions to
fill the gap between actions and motivation where there are
no attending strong inclinations.

Since he held that

reason is impotent in terms of motivation, there certainly
was some explaining to do.

But his arguments for the

impotence of reason may instead have been an exaggerated
response to his rightful concern to repudiate Hobbesian
psychology and to establish the pervasive role of sympathy
in virtuous conduct.

In fact, from a broader perspective,

his argument may be a result, not only to the moral
scepticism inspired by Hobbes, but also to the speculative
crisis inspired also by Hobbes, but developed by Locke and
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serkeley. 36

That is, given this background, Hume's

suspicions of the power of reason on many fronts are not
surprising.
Actions done out of a sense of duty require complex
reasoned associations.

According to Hume, they are not

motivated directly by inclinations or desires (in the
Kantian sense).

In these actions, aberrant though they may

be, reason evokes our natural responses of moral approval
or disapproval.

The analysis of actions done out of a

sense of duty, then, shows that since reasoning is required
in order to bring about the experience of moral approval,
it seems entirely appropriate to speak of reason as
motivating.
This discussion brings us to what may be one of the
key differences between Kant and Hume's analysis of actions
done for the sake of duty.

A key difference is that Hume

says that the motivation to act morally (concentrating
still on actions done for the sake of duty) lies in our
passional responses to these workings of reason, and Kant
says that the motivation to act morally consists in our
rational response.

For Hume, it is moral approval which

motivates, and moral approval or disapproval are moral
sentiments, affections we naturally have.

On the other

36 oavid Norton suggests and develops this historical
perspective in his book, David Hume: Common-sense Moralist.
Sceptical Metaphysician.
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hand, for Kant, it is the moral law that motivates, the
moral law which is experienced as respect.

This difference

is the reflection of their metaphysical differences, Kant
viewing reason as desire-ful and Hume viewing it as desire1ess.

It was natural for Kant to think of respect for the

moral law as essentially rational, since it arises in the
face of the categorical imperative, which he sees as
issuing from reason.

And it was natural for Hume to think

of moral approval as passional, given his emphases.
Basically, however, both philosophers want to make the
point that we by nature react positively to, that is, are
motivated by, morality.

But whereas Hume was content with

his empirical observations that human beings in fact
respond with a sense of moral approval or disapproval to
morality or immorality respectively, Kant wanted to raise
the response to necessity; just as whereas Hume was content
with·his empirical observations that human beings in fact
make causal inferences on the basis of constant
connections; Kant raised the response to a necessary one.
Now Hume has not succeeded in showing that his account
is the only, or even the best account, unless he has really
given a convincing argument for the inefficacy of reason.
With the possibility that Hume's is an "exaggerated
response" in mind, let us return to his argument for the
motivational inefficacy of reason, examined first in the
second section of this chapter.

A full and comprehensive
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appraisal of that argument is a major undertaking, far
beyond the scope of this work.

But I can present here an

important criticism which suggests limitations of Hume's
position.

The suggestion will illustrate, moreover, as

promised, that much of the difference between Hume and Kant
is more "metaphysical" than ethi9al, and that Hume has not
given a convincing argument against "rational internalism"
as an ethical doctrine.
That premise concerns his definition of reason as the
"discovery of truth and falsehood," which operates either
demonstratively or empirically, in the determination of
causal relations or of matters of fact.

I regard this is

as a "metaphysical" claim because it has to do with the
ultimate nature of reason.

That characterization of reason

can only be regarded as a presupposition of the present
argument.

Certainly, an alternative characterization of

reason is given by Kant who sees it a·s that faculty which
naturally is driven beyond the realm of mere truth and
falsehood {the realm of knowledge), in its search, indeed,
in its desire, for the understanding of things of which
knowledge is impossible.

And, that characterization is a

presupposition of Kant's view of reason as morally
motivating.
Are there any considerations which would lead us to
adopt one view over the other?

In the speculative realm,

Kant claims that the ideas of God, freedom and the soul are
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all ramifications of, and evidence for, the motivating
powers of reason.

In the moral realm, Kant claims that the

vert experience of the force of moral obligations in the
absence of virtuous inclinations or in the presence of
contrary ones, depends on reason's motivating power.

These

claims make sense in view of Kant's characterization of the
faculty of reason as desire-ful (having its own desires).
sut Hume thinks of the natural desires of moral sentiment
or of intellectual curiosity as essentially outside of
reason: as that in view of which reason operates, rather
than as driving reason from within.
At one level, then, the dispute between Hume as
paradigmatic critic of Rational Internalism and Kant as
paradigmatic defender of Rational Internalism resolves into
a dispute between Hume and Kant, the metaphysicians, on
issues far more wide-ranging than the relatively simple
issue of whether reason can motivate action.

Having seen

now how this is so, we must leave this aspect of their
debate behind and return to our focus, Rational
Internalism.
motivating.

Our concern is whether reason can be
Since the key difference between Kant and Hume

is that Hume says that reason can be motivating (in actions
done for the sake of duty) only in light of the fact that
humans naturally respond positively to the recognition of
moral obligation, and that natural response is outside of
reason, whereas Kant says it is inside of reason, the
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opposition between the two is "academic" rather than
"practical."
In conclusion, from reading Kant and Hume
sympathetically, we know that Kant's rationalism is
inspired by the reflection that when we recognize a moral
obligation in the face of inappropriate inclinations, that
recognition is a result of our ability to see that the
maxim behind an action which ignores or defies moral
obligation is in contradiction with the nature of the will.
When our self-interested inclinations are lively, it is
easy to become confused and distracted, and to be
inattentive to our naturally sympathetic or benevolent
responses.

So Kant's account of acts done for the sake of

duty explains how we can reestablish an appropriate, indeed
a moral, response.

I know I am obligated to respond

benevolently when I know that in the same situation I would
desire, by nature, another. person's kindness.

Kant is only

claiming that reason is necessary to identify the situation
as a moral one.

He is saying that "reason alone"

determines morality because only reason can detect
contradiction.

But he is not saying that reason is the

only motivator, that sympathy is irrelevant, that acting
morally is not satisfying in a virtuous person, that reason
can detect all contradictions associated with immorality
independently of knowledge about our natures, or that it
isn't natural for us to be motivated by moral perceptions.
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auine wanted to secure moral knowledge on the basis of
natural passions, but argued that our passions include not
onlY the obvious "violent" ones, but also the calm ones,
such as sympathy or moral approval.

But Hume was mistaken

to have stripped reason of all motivational influence, even
on his own account of its activity.

If we correct for

this, it leaves Hume much closer to Kant that we first
thought.
Both Kant and Hume believe that we are naturally
influenced by the recognition of moral obligation, Hume
believing that we respond though our passions, and Kant
believing that we respond through our reason.

Hume,

however, has not given us any convincing reason why that
response must be understood in terms of our passional
rather than our rational natures.

While both speak in

terms of our natures as divided into the rational and the
sensuous, Hume may be the more guilty in presenting an
artificially dichotomous view.

Kant at least allows desire

to infiltrate both aspects of our existence.

Hume may in

fact be right that in order to make moral judgments it is
necessary to "consult our own breasts," but there is no
reason to believe that when we do, what we find there is
not the influence of reason.
We may conclude, then, that Hume's qhallenge to
Rational Internalism is not convincing, and that his
position may be seen as actually compatible with it.

Hume
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does admit that reason is motivating in the sense that it
can "call up" or activate natural dispositions, including
the disposition to react positively to morality.

Also, he

believes that after "consulting one's breast" and coming to
the recognition that a moral obligation exists, we have a
reason, independent of any other desire or inclination, for
acting morally.
Further, Hume's anti-rational internalism does not
allow for authentic moral indifference any better than
Kant's--in fact, he too would deny that it exists.

The

"sensible knave" does not really believe that he is morally
required to act justly in those cases because he is
constitutionally perverse.
like others.

He doesn't respond to morality

He asks "Why should I?" because he doesn't

really perceive a moral obligation.

Hume believes that

moral approval in itself is the motive for action--that
once-moral approval is experienced there is no need to ask:
Why should I?

This testifies that Hume also thought that

moral motivation is entailed by moral judgment.
Ironically, then, Hume's theory of moral motivation
actually conforms to Nagel's theory of Rational
Internalism.

This point will become clear in the next

chapter, through an exegesis on Nagel's argument in The
Possibility of Altruism.

CHAPTER 6
NAGEL'S RATIONAL INTERNALISM

We have now examined Rational Internalism in light of
objections raised against internalism generally, and
rational internalism specifically, and have shown that none
of these objections succeed in demonstrating that Rational
Internalism is an inadequate theory of moral motivation.
we began our examination of the distinction between ethical
internalism and externalism with Thomas Nagel's versions of
the distinction, and it is only appropriate to return, now,
to his defense of Rational Internalism.

An explanation of

Nagel's defense will provide the opportunity to arrive at a
greater degree of clarity about the relationship Nagel sees
between the genuine and authentic recognition of moral
obligation and moral motivation.

A review of Nagel's

defense of Rational Internalism will be given in Section I;
and a discussion of some criticisms of Nagel's defense of
Rational Internalism will be the focus of Section II.

In

the following and final chapter, Nagel's analysis of the
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relationship between moral cognition and moral motivation
will be compared to that of Kant, Falk, Korsgaard, and (now
that we have shown that the differences between Kant and
aume are not as great as they appear), to Hume's account as
well.

When these tasks have been completed, we will be in

a position, to draw all the threads of explication,
distinction, and argument of the previous chapters together
into a statement of Rational Internalism and its view of
the relationship of moral cognition and moral motivation.

I

Nagel, in The Possibility of Altruism, attempts to
show that reason has a motivational capacity, and that we
need not explain altruistic or moral acts in terms of any
present desires an agent may have.

By "altruism" he does

not merely refer to the narrow class of self-sacrificial or
supererogatory acts, but much more generally, to the
capacity to take active concern in the well-being of
others.

By altruism, he means "any behavior motivated

merely by the belief that someone else will benefit or
avoid harm by it" (PA, 16).

Since "altruism" is used in

this more general sense, and since so much of morality has
to do with obligations to others, by showing how altruism
is possible, we may say that Nagel in effect shows how
(this part of) morality is possible.

(However, "altruism"

233

is broader than morality, since it includes actions
concerned with the well-being of others to which we have no
obligation.)
Nagel structures his argument by first presenting an
analysis of prudence, by which he means "practical
foresight" (rather than "self-interested" action).

His

analysis is constructed to show how prudence is possible.
Through his analysis Nagel shows that the best explanation
of the phenomena of prudential activity is not, and cannot
be, given in terms of any actual desire experienced by the
agent.

Instead, it involves a (formal) structure of

practical thinking such that the agent has a reason to
promote his or her future welfare.

By showing how prudence

is possible, we may say that Nagel shows how the remaining
part of morality, the part that involves obligations to
ourselves, is possible--keeping in mind that prudence is
broader than this part of .morality.

That is, he rejects

the view that prudence can only be explained in terms of
some present desire about the future that the agent has.
He then draws a parallel between prudence and altruism and
shows that altruistic actions need not be explained in
terms of any actual desires in the agent for the well-being
of others, nor in terms of any antecedent feelings of
sympathy or benevolence.

Rather, it is best explained on

the basis of a (formal) structure of practical thinking
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such that the agent has a reason to promote the well-being
of others.
That is, to begin with an overview of the argument,
the possibility of prudence and of altruism can be
understood independently of all such desires or sentiments
and instead in terms of "direct reasons" agents have for
the promotion of their future interest, or for the
promotion of the interests of others.

Ultimately, the

possibility of having direct reasons for prudence or for
altruism must be understood in light of a motivational
framework or structure provided by an inescapable
"conception of oneself."

Prudence, he argues, is best

explained in terms of the "metaphysical conception" of a
person as "a temporally persistent being" (PA, 58)--one who
persists over time, who is aware of himself as a being with
not only a present, but a past and future as well.
Prudence is possible because we conceive of ourselves as
beings for whom the future, past and the present are all
equally real.
Altruism is then also explained in terms of a
"metaphysical conception" of a person, namely, as "one
among others."

Altruism is possible because we conceive of

ourselves as beings who recognize the equal reality of
others.

Nagel's account of altruism is not logically

dependent on the account of prudence.

Although the account

of altruism does build on points established in the
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discussion of prudence, the analysis of prudence is used
chiefly as an heuristic device--an helpful preparation for
the analysis of altruism.

This means, of course, that the

analyses should be examined independently: the analysis of
prudence might be satisfactory while that of altruism might
not.

Since we are concerned with the problem of moral

motivation, the analysis of prudence will be examined only
to the extent that it provides an introduction to the
analysis of altruism.
Nagel begins his analysis of prudence by clarifying
the notion of desire and its relation to action.

In

response to the common assumption that underlying any
intentional act there must be a motivating desire, he
claims that a distinction must be made between two sorts of
desires.

An unmotivated desire is one which "simply comes

to us" as a result of appetites or emotions.

Unmotivated

desires "assail us"--they come to us whether we want them
to or not (PA, 29).

But motivated desires "are arrived at

by decision and after deliberation" (,EA, 29) •

Of course,

action can often be explained, at least in part, by the
presence of desires that simply come to us.

Nagel admits

that in some sense, at least, it is true that there is
always some desire operating in action.

The desire which

is present in acting which is not a result of unmotivated
desire is the desire which is a result of deliberation.
Nagel calls this "motivated desire."

But the claim that
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some sort of desire is always operative because there is
always at least "motivated desire," even if there is no
11unmotivated desire" is trivial.

For then, the explanation

for any act not motivated by unmotivated desire will not be
anything other than the reason given for that action.

That

is, "motivated desire" l i nothing other than the reason for
the action; and therefore it doesn't make sense to speak of
the motivated desire as that which motivates, and so claim
that it is distinct from the reason itself, so that, even
when reason is operative, so is some sort of (distinct)
desire.
Thus, using Nagel's example, when I become thirsty, I
experience an unmotivated desire; but when I deposit my
change into the slot in the pop machine I do so because I
reason that this would be a means to acquire that which
would satisfy my thirst.

To explain the activity of

depositing my change, it is only trivially true that I am
acting on a desire to deposit my change.

This desire would

be a motivated desire, based on, or rather none other than,
my reason to do so motivating me to do so.

I put the dimes

into the slot not because I desire to deposit them, but
because I recognize this activity as a means to satisfy my
thirst.

The explanation of the motivation for acts in

terms of a recognition of means-end relationship discovered
by reason is better than the account that insists on the
presence of operative desires for each particular action.
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Nagel says that no further explanation of this fact is
needed.

It is part of what it means to be a human being:

we simply are the sorts of beings who can act on reasons
such as means-ends relationships.
Thus, just as I need not explain present actions
always in terms of unmotivated desires, I also need not
explain prudential activity, that is, activity undertaken
in light of my future interests, in light of present
unmotivated desires.

The means-end relation which is the

source of reasons for many of my actions is also operative
as the source of reasons to act in light of future desires.
Nagel argues that if we know we will have a desire in the
future, the capacity of reason to recognize the means-end
relation will generate a reason to act in the appropriate
way in the present.

So prudential activity need not be

explained in terms of a present unmotivated desire.
Nagel further shows that the view that a present
desire must be operative is problematic in several ways.
First, I could now have a desire for something in the
future, and at the same time I could possibly foretell that
I would no longer have that desire at the relevant future
time.

Second, I may be able to foretell that in the future

I will have a certain desire but at the same time I may
presently have no such desire.

Third, it is possible that

my present desires for the future could be in conflict with
desires which I expect I will have in the future.

All of
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these possible situations present problems for those who
insist that in prudential activity there must be a
presently operative unmotivated desire.

How am I to

determine how my desires for the future are to be weighed
aqainst my present desires--some of which (in the third
example) even conflict directly with the future ones.
Those who want to posit a present unmotivated
prudential desire (i.e., a desire to fulfill my future
desires) cannot explain how it is that desire is to be
balanced by the other desires involved.

Nagel is not

denying that there may indeed be such a present prudential
desire; instead he wants to show that, even if there is
such a desire, that desire does not adequately explain how
people in fact choose to act.

The positing of a present

prudential desire is presumably supposed to explain why a
person chooses to act in a certain way; but, it does not.
The posited prudential

de~ire

is no more than one among

several possible existent desires, both desires for the
present and other nonprudential desires for the future; and
it can't itself resolve their multiplicity into a single
course of action.
TO present a picture of human beings as beings that
always must act on the basis of some unmotivated desire or
other is therefore to give an inadequate account of human
activity.

We act prudentially, Nagel says, because there

is good reason to do so, not because of the presence of
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unmotivated desires.

We act prudentially because we are

distinctly open to our futures, and are such beings as can
reason about means-ends relations between present activity
and future desires.

We are not simply subject to whatever

whims our desires for the present or for the future present
us with.

Indeed, the further recognition that desires for

the future do not always provide good reasons for acting in
a certain way shows that it would be better to look
elsewhere for the sources of prudential activity.
According to Nagel then, prudential activity is best
explained, not by reference to desires, but on the basis of
reason itself.

We do not need a present desire to provide

the "bridge" to our future because that bridge is provided
by the nature of reason, in Nagel's terms, by "formal
conditions of practical reason" (PA, 43).

Practical

reason, to begin with, is general by nature.

That is, if

we desire something--if we recognize something as a value-we have a reason to act in a way which directly or
derivatively promotes that value.

If we have reason to do

something in the present, that reason applies, at least in
a prima facie way, also to the future.

(Other

considerations or reasons may also enter in, however.)

And

if we have a reason to do something in the future, we have
a reason to direct ourselves in the present to that future
goal.

In these ways, reasons are timeless, or "tenseless".

Thus, the possibility that humans can act prudentially is
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due to "the metaphysics of the person"--or, in more simply,
bY the way in which human beings conceive of themselves.
with respect to prudence, human beings see themselves

a~

beings that persist through time--beings with a past,
present, and future; as temporal beings.

Because reasons

are tenseless, and because persons are temporal beings, it
is possible to conduct oneself in light of future
considerations, and to experience regret for not having
adequately prepared for the future.
Failure to make provisions for the future indicates
what Nagel calls a dissociation on the part of the
individual from their future self.

Such dissociation from

the future can be explained in terms of cowardice, or
weakness.

But to admit to the possibility of this

dissociation does not at all refute Nagel's position that
reason can provide the motivating impetus for acting in
light of future considerations.

It is only to admit that

the motivational powers of reason is influenced by other
motivational influences, such as of the emotions or of
appetitive desires.

our response to such dissociation,

however, is that it indicates a defect in the person.

We

intuitively think that a person ought to make provisions
for their best interests for the future.

Nagel explains

this intuition by pointing to our temporal natures and the
character of reasons as generally applicable through time.

241

This is sufficient as a summary of Nagel's argument
a}:>out reason's motivating role in prudential judgment about
actions.

The way for Nagel's analysis of altruism has now

been prepared.
The possibility of acting out of concern for the
interest of others without appea.ling to our own self
interest or to antecedent sentiments such as feelings of
sympathy or compassion--the possibility of altruism--is
shown to be independent of the presence of any unmotivated
desire on the part of the subject.

Nagel reminds his

readers again that of course it is trivially true that
there is always some sort of desire behind altruistic
action in the sense of a motivated desire which is a result
of deliberation, i.e., which is the reason for acting
itself.

But he wants to deny that there must be an

unmotivated desire--one that simply comes to us--present in
order to explain moral or altruistic .incentives.
Above, Nagel identified problems with the assumption
that there must be unmotivated prudential desires in order
to explain prudential activity, including the argument that
such an assumption cannot explain how the posited
prudential desires are to be balanced with other present
desires, either for the present or for the future.

Here he

argues analogically that the assumption that there must be
(unmotivated) "altruistic desires" is also problematic.
The suggestion that moral activity must be explained in
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terms of unmotivated desires, which are in turn a result of
sentiments of sympathy or benevolence, is problematic in
that those sentiments are "neither universal nor obvious
enough to explain all altruistic motivation, and that they
are evidently false to the phenomena" (.fA, 80).

While

sometimes it may appear that certain altruistic acts are
based on sympathy or feelings of benevolence, indeed it is
certainly not obvious that there are always such desires
underlying altruistic acts.

And sometimes it seems more

obvious that an altruistic act is contrary to any present
desire.
Note that this three-part argument parallels the one
given above regarding prudence.

Furthermore, Nagel claims,

the explanation given by egoists that self-interest
provides the unmotivated desires necessary for altruism is
also problematic, but not for reasons traditionally given. 1
Egoism is always already mistaken in that it begins with a
mistaken conception of the nature of a person.

Nagel seems

to suggest that, if those who think that they are egoists
would reflect on even rather simple cases, they would
realize that their primitive moral responses are not based
on self-interest, but rather on objective reasons, that is,
reasons which apply to all other persons.
1 Nagel cites Brian Medlin, Kurt Baier and G. E. Moore
as philosophers who show the inadequacy of egoism by
pointing to various contradictions to which the theory
leads.
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so, if I realize that I am standing on another
person's gouty toes, I will recognize that I ought to
remove my heel.

While the explanation that egoism would

qive--that it is somehow in my own self-interest to remove
my heels from the other's gouty toes--might in some cases
be true, in most cases it would be overly complex and
unsuitable to the simplicity of the actual experience.
Of course, Nagel is not denying that some unmotivated
desires might be the actual motivating influence in any
particular altruistic action.

For instance, it is very

possible that reasons of self-interest or feelings of
sympathy could be the motivating influence behind an act.
I

~

remove my heel because I fear the consequences of not

doing so.

But Nagel's claim is that such reasons are not

necessarily the motivating influence.
motivating.

Reason itself can be

The motivational influence of reason in

altruism can be explained,, as in prudence, as due to the
"metaphysics" of a person--the way we necessarily conceive
of ourselves.
The conception of ourselves that is reflected in the
most pervasively accepted moral principle, the Golden Rule,
which calls upon us to ask ourselves how we would feel if
we were treated in ways we are considering treating others,
is the conception of ourselves "as one person among others,
and of others as persons in just as full a sense" (.fA, 88).
Recognizing others as persons in the full sense means
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recognizing the full reality of other persons, and
recognizing the full reality of others requires us to view
ourselves as "identical with a particular, impersonally
specifiable inhabitant of the world ••• among others of a
similar nature" (PA, 100).
Altruism, then, like prudence, is required by reason.
Because we view ourselves as "one among others," the
reasons which we act upon must be capable of being
evaluated in terms of this conception.

So a reason which

applies subjectively, but only subjectively, is not
acceptable in light of our self-conception as one among
others.

That is, our reasons must be such that other

persons such as ourselves would also accept them.
Obviously, Nagel's distinction between subjective and
objective reasons here calls to mind Kant's distinction
between subjective and objective maxims.

We can judge our

reasons to be objective because we are capable of viewing
ourselves impersonally and objectively, and a test of this
is whether other persons would accept our reasons.
Practical judgments based on subjective reasons can be
motivational, but can be motivational through reason only
when the subjective reasons are also objective in the sense
just explained.

The motivational content of the

unobjectifiable subjective reason, when put into the
context of the impersonal standpoint of reason, where the
Subject regards him or herself as one among other persons--
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as someone, rather than as an isolated I--pales in
significance.

But if the subjective reason is also

00 jectifiable and consistent with the impersonal
standpoint, then the motivational content is unchecked,
unless perhaps there are other operative conflicting
obiective reasons.

This is not to say that the

unobjectifiable subjective reason ceases to be a motive, or
even becomes a weaker motive; but only that subjective
reasons which are objectifiable are also motivating, and
there may be more than one objective reason motivating at
the same time.

Thus, in altruism, as in prudence, we

experience tensions between various types of reasons.
Nagel states:

As

"Ethics is a struggle against a certain form

of the egocentric predicament, just as prudential reasoning
is a struggle against domination by the present" (PA, 100).
Just as the efficacy of prudential reasons can fail because
of the influence of more proximate present desires, the
efficacy of altruistic reasons can fail because of the
influence of more proximate personal desires.

But at the

same time, more proximate reasons and desires do not always
"win" and yield action.

Nagel is clear that, among

multiple motivations in a given situation, any of them
could in principle be efficacious for action.

(The

structure of this process of getting from being multiply
motivated-to-act to actually acting is a complex question
that must be passed over in this work.)
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Nagel's argument for the direct motivational influence
of reasons in altruism is strikingly simple, like his
arqument for reason's motivational influence in prudence.
He first removes the obstacle of the view that all our
actions must be explained in terms of some (unmotivated)
desire.

Reasons are shown to be. motivational in themselves

and also through means-ends relationships, both in terms of
present and of future concerns.

He then shows that certain

types of reasons are motivational because of the nature of
human beings:

since we are temporal beings we can be

motivated directly by reasons derived from a concern for
future welfare; and since we are beings who can regard
ourselves impersonally as "one among others" we can be
motivated by the concerns of others.

Reason extends its

influence across the barriers of time and of individual
persons.

Reasons are "general" in that they apply

tenselessly and impersonally.

So Nagel has demonstrated

the motivational efficacy of reason by examining the
structure of reason-giving in light of the structure of
reason givers.

II

Having examined Nagel's analyses, we now should look
at some of those who have criticized Nagel's work in the
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EQssibility of Altruism.

Given the amount of publicity the

book has had, one would have expected it to have generated
a large body of literature in response.
has been strikingly little.

Amazingly, there

But upon further reflection,

this lack of critical response proves not to be amazing at
all, but in fact quite natural.
Two early book reviews of Nagel's book were critical
but without supporting argument.

John Benson, in his

review, simply asserts that the analysis of prudence is the
"more successful part of Nagel's book, but that Nagel did
not succeed at "providing a metaphysical foundation for
morals. 112

But Benson gives no reason for his criticism.

Bernard Gert also claims that while Nagel's repudiation of
the view that desire must always be operative in prudential
action is correct, the analysis of altruism as a necessary
constraint on reason is not.
either.

But he gives no reasons

Gert also asserts without argument that, while it

is irrational not to respond to reasons which pertain to
one's future well-being, it is not irrational to act
immorally, even while regarding oneself impersonally. 3

But

without argument, no real criticism of Nagel's defense of
Rational Internalism has been advanced.
2John Benson, Philosophical Quarterly, Jan., 1972,
vol. 22): 82-3.
3 Bernard Gert, Journal of Philosophy (1972, vol. 69):
340-344.
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Stephen Darwall, on the other hand, has advanced an
arqument purporting to show that Nagel's analysis is
defective.

In his book, Impartial Reason, Darwall defends

the thesis that practical reason is impartial.

That is, in

his own words, he argues that "reasons to act are grounded
in principles that it would be (relatively) rational to
choose were a person to adopt a perspective impartial
between agents and to select principles for all to act
on." 4

Darwall acknowledges the influence of Nagel's work

on the development of his own position, but sees his own
work as correcting the defect of Nagel's analysis.
Like Nagel, Darwall rejects the Desire Based Reasons
Thesis, the thesis that all reasons for action are those
grounded in the desires of the agent. 5

Darwall introduces

his objection to Nagel's analysis by claiming that Nagel's
title, The Possibility of Altruism, is misleading.

Rather

than having shown that altruism is a possibility, Nagel's
analysis is said to lead to the conclusion that
"considerations regarding the good of others must be

4 stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason, (Ithaca: Cornell
Univer~ity Press, 1983), 4.
5He attributes variations of this view to Gilbert
Harmon ("Moral Relativism Defended"), Donald Davidson
("Actions Reasons, and Causes" Journal of Philosophy 60
(1965), David Hume, and rational-decision theorists. He
cites Duncan, Luce, and Howard Raiffa's Games and
Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey (New York:
Wiley, 1957) as a review of such theories.
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reasons for~ person to act. 116

Instead of showing that

altruism is a rational possibility, Darwall claims that
Nagel has shown that altruism is a "rational necessity 11 • 7
AS stated, this accusation is ambiguous.

Does Darwall mean

that for Nagel altruism is necessarily rational?

Or does

he mean that Nagel shows that self-regarding reasons are
necessarily irrational?

I take it that Darwall interprets

Nagel's analysis in the latter sense, which would mean that
Nagel overshoots his goal, proving more than he had
intended.
Darwall claims that the conclusion that altruism is a
rational necessity follows from what he calls Nagel's
"thesis of objectivity. 118

According to Darwall, this is

the thesis that all reasons to act that an agent might have
must also be objective, that is, applicable to all others.
He states:

"According to [the thesis of objectivity], no

reasons for acting are ultimately subjective. 119
"Irreducibly" subjectiv __ reasons (reasons which cannot be
applied to others), says Nagel, entail solipsism.

But we

are not solipsists, according to Nagel, because we can see
ourselves impersonally, that is, from an impersonal
6 Impartial Reason, 120.
7 Ibid., 120.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
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standpoint.

Therefore, on Darwall's interpretation, Nagel

must conclude that "irreducibly" subjective reasons are
irrational, and the "applicability-to-all" criterion must
be fulfilled by every rational reason for action.
Darwall argues at length to show that this larger
thesis that "altruism is necessary" depends on an
assumption that Nagel makes unwittingly in The Possibility
gf Altruism and retracts later and in the second edition of
the same work.

The assumption that Nagel has made is what

oarwall calls the "thesis of universality," according to
which "no fact can be a reason for anyone unless that same
fact would be a reason for anyone to act similarly in
relevantly similar circumstances. 1110

The two theses

combine to show, Darwall argues, that altruism is
necessary; that all our actions must be geared to the wellbeing of others •
. Now, it seems that Nagel didn't intend this additional
assumption, nor the extended thesis to which it leads, that
altruism is necessary.

After all, he entitled his book The

Possibility of Altruism, not The Necessity of Altruism.
And while Nagel argues explicitly for the thesis of
objectivity, he does not argue explicitly for the thesis of
universality, without which he would not be committed to
the extended thesis.
lOibid., 117.

Further, Darwall does not give
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compelling evidence that Nagel actually did hold the thesis
of universality.

Nagel's project was to show that it is

perfectly reasonable to act in such a way as to treat
others as one would

li~e

to be treated oneself.

He wanted

to show that actions which come into conflict with the
well-being of others are irratio_nal because they violate
the conception of
equally real.

o~rselves

as one among others who are

But he has not argued that for something to

be a reason for action, that it must have the
characteristic of being performed in view of the well-being
of others.
In the Postscript to the Second Edition, Nagel
modifies his claim that "only objective reasons are
acceptable."

He claims that subjective reasons are

acceptable as long as the claims of the impersonal
standpoint are met.

He states:

the subjective reasons that provide our starting
point may continue to exert a legitimate
independent influence in the lives of those who
acknowledge parallel objective reasons as well,
for the personal standpoint may retain its power
after the claims of the ljpersonal have been
acknowledged (PA, viii).
Now, Darwall takes this comment as an evidence that Nagel
had accepted the thesis of universality and hence was
committed to the claim that altruism is not only possible,
but necessary.

However, the postscript can be read in

11 see also Thomas Nagel, View From Nowhere (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 159.
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another way:
his position.

Nagel is taking the opportunity to clarify
When he said that "the only acceptable

reasons are objective reasons" he meant only to say that
any reason which conflicts with the impersonal standpoint
is not acceptable; they are unacceptable because they are
inconsistent with the view we have of ourselves as one
among others.

Nagel was simply making the Kantian point

that subjective maxims which cannot be universalized are
unacceptable maxims, and that maxims which are not
objective are "self-defeating"; that is, they bring the
will into conflict with itself.

He states:

"Whenever one

acts for a reason, I maintain, it must be possible to
regard oneself as acting for an objective reason, and
promoting an objectively valuable end" (.fA, 96-97).

If

Nagel holds a thesis of universality, it is not that all
reasons, if rational, have the characteristic of promoting
the well-being of others.

Rather, his thesis of

universality would only be that every rational person must
have, among his reasons for acting, altruistic reasons.
Regarding motivation, Darwall sees Nagel as arguing
that since personal practical judgments, such as "I have a
reason to do A," have motivational content, then so do
impersonal practical judgments, and this produces a
problem.

First, since reasons are objective, if we

acknowledge a reason for action from a personal standpoint,
that reason applies also from an impersonal one.
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Therefore, if I am motivated by a personal consideration,
that consideration will also motivate me to act so that
others will be enabled to do the same.

Darwall states:

"This means, Nagel claims, that if we are
able to make the same practical judgments
ourselves from personal and impersonal
standpoints, then accepting an impersonal
practical judgment ('S has a reason to do
must routinely move one to want S to do A
do whatever would lead to S's doing A. 1112

to be
about
A')
and to

The extension of motivational content from personal to
impersonal practical judgments, as Darwall sees it, is the
problematic area of Nagel's analysis.

He claims that

Nagel's argument is fallacious because it is ambiguous.
The ambiguity Darwall discusses concerns the meaning of the
claim that personal practical judgments have motivational
content.

The claim that personal practical judgments have

motivational content can be said to have two senses, says
Darwall:

"Is it [the motivational content] part of what

one judges?

Or is it, rather, part of one's judging:

namely, the attitude that one normally has when one judges
that there is reason for one do to A? 1113

Now, Darwall

thinks that Nagel is committed to the former
interpretation, that the motivational content of personal
practical judgments is part of what one judges, presumably,
because the motivation is supposed to be present either
12 Ibid., 124.
13 Ibid., 127.
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from a personal or from an impersonal standpoint.14

But

oarwall thinks that there is no justification for Nagel to
adopt the former over the latter interpretation, and that
it is only obvious that something is a reason for someone
to act if, upon rational consideration, the person is given
some motivation to so act so that the motivational content
is part of the judging.
Now this last comment sounds very close to what Nagel
himself says, i.e., that the reason and the motivation are
identical, and to the claim that Darwall himself attributes
to Nagel in the following passage:
As Nagel is thinking of it, the motivational
content of the personal practical judgment cannot
simply be some fact about how one would be moved
were one to make the judgment, rather it is the
motivation or attitude itself .1 5
So it is difficult to see why Darwall attributes the
unacceptable view to Nagel, unless Darwall thinks that, for
there to be a conflict between the personal and impersonal
points of view, this conflict must be between their
contents (what one judges).

But Nagel's argument, in fact,

seems clearly to be that one would be "trying" to have
mutually exclusive motivations simultaneously.

It is this

impossibility, written of also by Kant, that has been
described as "self-defeating" by scholars searching for
14 Ibid., 126.
15 Ibid., 127.
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English language to express it.

In any case, there is

little reason to think Nagel has made the particular error
oarwall attributes to him, of losing sight of the beingmotivated in favor of what-one-is-motivated about.

so

Nagel's arguments in support of Rational Internalism remain
unscathed.
If it is true that Nagel's thesis of objectivity
entails that we are motivated by all reasons for action, it
is not the position that Nagel meant to adopt.

All he

meant to show is that since we are not solipsists, we
recognize that our reasons to act might be others' also,
and that our reasons are not objective if they cannot be
extended beyond ourselves.

What is important for Nagel is

that subjective reasons must be evaluated from an
impersonal standpoint.

Criticisms such as Darwall's, I

suspect, led Nagel to clarify his claim that "only
objective reasons are acceptable".

But Nagel's defense of

the possibility of altruism, acting for the sake of others
independently of any occurrent desire or antecedent
sentiment, is not dependent on the claim that all reasons
for action must be objective.
his thesis of objectivity.

Nagel is willing to modify

So the objection that Darwall

raises does not in itself undermine Nagel's defense of
Rational Internalism.
E. J. Bond is another who has raised criticisms
against Nagel's analysis of altruism.

In his book, Reason
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--and Value,

Bond seeks to find a solution to the following

dilemma:
If practical rationality and morality are a
matter of reason or cognition, which are
objective and universal, they must lack the power
to motivate, since that power depends upon the
presence of the relevant contingent desires. If,
on the other hand, practical (including moral)
reasoning is confined within the limits of the
agent's contingent desires,· there can be no
universal or objective reasons for action. 16
While stated in a way that applies beyond the sphere
of morality, we have seen this dilemma concerning practical
reasoning expressed by Frankena, who inclined towards (what
he sees as) externalism, because he believed that morality
is objective, but could not explain how the motivation to
be moral would be accounted for. 17

Applied to morality,

the dilemma for Frankena was the following:

if morality is

objective and universal, then it is difficult to explain
how a person can be motivated to act morally, but if moral
motivation is tied to subjective desires, then moral
motivation is "held hostage" to whatever subjective desires
exist.
Bond defends a view of practical rationality in which
value is seen as independent of desire and yet as connected
with motivation.

He argues that the solution to the

dilemma consists in the necessary connection between desire
1 6 Bond, Reason and Value, 6.
17 see Chapter 1, 39.

257

and motivation, between reasons and motivation, and between
reasons and value.

That is, Bond believes there can be no

motivation independently of desire, that reasons can be
motivating, that this motivational influence exists because
reasons are grounded in values.

Practical moral reason is

possible ultimately because "all value is necessarily
objective.n 18

His criticism of Nagel, generally stated, is

that Nagel fails to provide a true solution to the dilemma.
His main criticism is stated in the following passage:
Nagel would appear to have a way out of this
dilemma. Not just the agent's future as well as
his present desires create reasons for him, but
the desires of every person create reasons for
every person. Where there is a desire, present
or future, mine or yours, there is a reason. And
the understanding that such desires exist can
motivate actions: thus _it is possible to be
prudent and to be moral. Nothing is said here
about goods, only about reasons and desires.
Nothing is said about value or justification,
only about reasons and the possibility of action.
Reasons remain firmly attached to desires. So
whereas Nagel's account, if accepted, would show
how universal prudential and moral reasoning is
possible and can be effective, it is silent on
the subject of goodness or worth, and that is
because it is supposed that value theory,
including ethics, is a branch of motivation
theory, metaphysical though it may be.
Ultimately there is no worth. only desire and its
satisfaction. So this is not a true solution to
our dilemma, which partly concerns the seemingly
necessary connection between reasons and value
achievable by action, between practical reason
and the good. 19
18 sond, 84.
19 Ibid., 7. (Emphasis added, except for "future" and
"every".)
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But Nagel's account does offer a solution to this
dilemma.

Nagel's point is to argue that it is not the case

that agents are motivated only by unmotivated desires:
reasons also motivate, and this is the proposed link
between moral reason and motivation.

Bond stresses that

motivation must be linked to desire.

In response, Nagel

holds that it is (trivially) true that motivation is always
connected to desire: but he focuses on "motivated" desires,
desires we have upon reflection and deliberation.

The

motivated desire is the reason for which the agent acts.
Bond, however, finds this analysis wholly
unsatisfactory.

He speaks of Nagel's "motivated desires"

as "logical ghosts."

In identifying the reason for the

action with the motive for it, Bond says that for Nagel the
desire is:
nothing at all, a mere inference from the fact
that the act was done, a logical ghost and
nothing more •.. Nagel~s want exists only as an
inference from an action: no action, no want. It
is a logical ghost that can play ao part at all
in the motivation of the action. 2
Bond explains this claim further by arguing that
cognitions, by themselves, cannot function as motivators
because they are not connected to real desire, which in
turn is connected to value.

He believes that behind every
action there is an actual ("real, live, present") desire. 21
20 Ibid., 13.
21 Ibid., 36.
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Now, these desires come into being, not spontaneously, like
Nagel's unmotivated desires, but rather, like Nagel's
motivated desires, upon reflection.

They are based, not on

subjective motivating reasons (like Nagel's unmotivated
desires), but on grounding or justifying reasons, which are
based on facts outside of the agent's beliefs or current
desires.

Grounding reasons are motivating because they are

tied, necessarily, to values.

So Bond thinks that Nagel's

"motivated reasons" are "logical ghosts" because Nagel has
not "grounded" them in values.
Regarding Bond's first reason for this claim, Nagel
neither says nor implies that motivated desires are simply
logical inferences from actions.

How could they be if, as

we have pointed out, Nagel holds that not every motivation
leads to action.

Nagel recognizes that there are numerous

ways that a particular instance of motivational influence
can be blocked.

Further, for Nagel, moral reasons for

acting, are necessarily objective. 22

The objectivity of

moral reasons exists because values are objective.

He

states:
The principle underlying altruism will require,
in other words, that all reasons be construable
as expressing objective rather than subjective
values ••• Therefore, the acceptance of prudence,
or all altruism, is no substitute fro a general
theory of value and human interests. Both
22 Even though Nagel has modified his claim that all
reasons are objective, he still is committed to the view
that moral reasons must be.
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prudence and altruism impose conditions on the
derivative influence of primary reasons whose
sources lie elsewhere (.fA, 88).
The point about the objectivity of values is
reiterated several times in the text. 23

Nagel realizes

that the possibility of altruism depends on a view of
values as objective, and that a substantive theory of
values must be worked out in order to give a complete
account of ethical life.

He recognizes that his work in

The Possibility of Altruism is directed to the task of
identifying formal conditions of practical reason, formal
conditions which provide a basis, though an incomplete one,
for the content of a moral theory. 2 4
Nagel's work should not be criticized for
concentrating on developing only part of the basis of
morality, anymore than an apple should be criticized for
not being an orange.

Nagel has not said anything which

contradicts Bond's analysis, because Nagel does recognize
the objectivity of moral values, and hence, Nagel does also
23 see PA, p. 89: "There may be values which have
nothing to do with interests at all;" p. 90: "The principle
behind altruism is that values must be objective, and that
any which appear subjective must be associated with others
that are not;" and p. 97: "In any case the requirement of
objectivity can be regarded as a condition on whatever
values one holds."
24 He states: "I am therefore not in a position to
present a substantive moral theory, but that has not been
my aim. I have tried rather to argue for certain formal
conditions on rational motivation which will determine the
general form of a moral theory and provide a partial basis
for its content (142)."
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believe that behind every act is a "real, live, present,
desire."

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Having rejected, in Chapter Three, certain
formulations of the internalist/externalist distinction in
ethics as unhelpful or uninteresting, we identified
Rational Internalism as an alternative which might be more
successful in characterizing the relationship between moral
cognition and moral motivation.

In Chapters Four and Five

we defended Rational Internalism against common objections
that have been raised against internalism generally, and
against Rational Internalism specifically.

In Chapter Six

we reviewed Nagel's defense of the possibility of altruism
and interpreted it as a defense of Rational Internalism.
We saw that there seem to be no successful refutations of
Nagel's thesis.

It remains now to present a statement of

Rational Internalism which draws together the threads of
the previous distinctions and discussions into a full
characterization of the relationship between moral
cognition and moral motivation.
262

I will begin in Section
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one, with a discussion of the nature of the necessity that
links moral cognition with moral motivation.

The necessity

has often been characterized by (various types of)
internalists as logical, or causal; however, I will argue
that for the Rational Internalist, the link is a necessary
one, but it is neither logical, nor causal.

In Section

Two, I will offer a general characterization of Rational
Internalism.

Then I will give a negative characterization;

that is, I will stipulate the kinds of claims to which
Rational Internalism is not committed.

We will have

arrived then, at a comprehensive statement of Rational
Internalism; a theory of moral motivation which most
accurately accounts for the common sense notion that when a
person recognizes a moral obligation, they are motivated to
fulfill it; and that the recognition of the moral
obligation is a reason in itself to do so.

I

The originators of the internalist/externalist
distinction in ethics have characterized internalism as the
view that the necessary relationship between moral
cognition and moral motivation is a logical one.

Falk

(though he does not think of internalism and externalism as
theories of motivation, as we have seen) attributes this
view to Kant.

Only Kant, in his view, has adequately
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conceived of the relationship between obligation and moral
motivation in the "purely formal motivation sense."l

He

thinks of Kant as being committed to the view that having a
motive to act morally is a logical implication of saying
one has an obligation. 2

As we shall see, this is a

problematic interpretation of Kant's view.
Frankena characterized the internalist position
precisely in terms of logical entailment.

For him,

internalism is the view that having a moral obligation
logically implies having motivation. 3

The logical

implication is natural given the noncognitivist view that
moral judgments are merely expressions of emotive
responses.

According to the emotivist, moral judgments

analytically imply motivation--the meaning of a moral
judgment is nothing other than the expression of an emotive
feeling.
Later writers, except Thomas Wren, either casually and
unreflectively refer to the entailment as logical, or
simply talk about entailment, without specifying the nature
of that entailment. 4

But if a theory of moral motivation

1 see Chapter 1, 31.
2 Falk, 35.

3 Frankena, 73; See Chapter 1, 39.
4Milo, Robertson, and Korsgaard do not specify clearly
the nature of the entailment relation. Byron Haines makes
reference to the relationship as a logical one (see Chapter
Two, 64, note 14. Charlotte Brown also thinks of the
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is to be advanced, it must specify hQy£ moral cognition
entails moral motivation.

Wren, as we saw in Chapter 2,

suggests that internalists have either thought of the
entailment relationship as expressive or as causal. 5
According to the causal interpretation, the belief that
something is moral "brings about" the motivation to act
morally.

Wren states:

"This version is properly

attributed to Kant and other rationalists such as Piaget,
who have in one fashion or another ascribed causal efficacy
to the intellectual component of moral judgment. 116

Now it

is true that Kant thinks of moral judgment as having causal
efficacy, in the sense that moral judgment can lead to the
fulfillment of moral obligation, and also in the sense that
moral judgment causes moral feeling ("the subjective
effects of the moral law").

But a theory of moral

motivation is a theory about the connection between moral
cognition and moral motivation.

Since causal connections

have temporal connotations, such that if A is the cause of
B, A must be temporally prior to B, the causal
interpretation of the connection between moral cognition
and moral motivation would view moral cognition as the
cause which precedes the motivation to act morally.

But

relationship in logical terms (see Chapter Five, 162, note
10.)

5 chapter 2, 10.
6 Wren, 67.
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Kant explicitly prohibits this interpretation.

Rather, as

we saw in Chapter Five, he claims that the moral judgment
(in the form of the moral law) .i.§. the motive. 7 The motive
is identified with the moral judgment.

And this is the

view I want to claim for Rational Internalism.
Furthermore, it is odd to think of a causal connection
as a type of logical connection.

While both are necessary

connections, causal connections can only be known by
experience; but logical connections can be known
analytically.
We saw that for both Hume and Kant the moral judgment
is identified with the motive.

For Hume, there is no moral

judgment without moral approval, and there is no moral
approval without moral judgment.

So Hume could not be

interpreted as holding a causal interpretation of the moral
judgment/motive connection.

Wren claims that Hume, like

other "nonrationalist" philosophers, holds that the
necessary connection is an expressive one; that "moral
reasoning ••• is in some non-distorting sense the verbal
representation or the articulation of [a] de facto
motivational structure. 118

The description of the

expressive interpretation of the necessary connection is
ambiguous because it is not clear what is meant by a
7 see Chapter 5, 205-207.
8 Wren, 67.
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motivational structure.

We do not know if the motivational

structure refers to occurrent desires or emotive responses
so that according to the expressive version, the connection
between moral cognition and moral motivation is necessary
because statements of moral judgment simply express
occurrent desires or emotive

res~onses

of the agent (a view

held by emotivists, but, I have argued, not by Hume); or if
the motivational structure refers to ways in which human
beings are in fact motivated, so that according to the
expressive version, the connection is necessary because
human beings are the kinds of beings who are motivated by
moral considerations (a view I attribute both to Kant and
to Hume).

Wren seems to have the former interpretation in

mind, since he claims that the expressive version sees the
statement of a moral judgment as expressing motivation on
the part of the subject.

According to his analysis of the

expressive version, the statement that "Eve believes that
abortion is wrong" entails (because it expresses) the claim
that "Eve is at least somewhat motivated to oppose
abortion. 119

If we understand the "motivational structure"

to refer to occurrent desires or attitudes which precede
the moral judgment, then I think that it is incorrect to
think of Hume as holding the expressive version of logical
entailment.
9 Ibid, 65.
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We have established that Kant's view of the necessary
relation between moral cognition is not a causal one
because he does not think that moral cognition precedes
moral motivation.

But I do not think that it is correct to

claim that for Kant the necessary relation is a logical one
either.

We cannot simply analyze what a moral judgment is,

and determine on that basis that it is motivating.

The

motivating power of reason is not something that Kant
thinks we can discover analytically.
analytic truth that reason motivates.
cha~acter

It is not an a priori
The motivating

of reason is not true simply by definition.

Kant

does not simply begin by stipulating what he means by
practical reason, and then conclude that reason is
motivating based on his stipulative definition.
is the motivating character of reason known?

Then how

In what sense

is the relationship between moral cognition and moral
motivation necessary?
We have seen, in Chapter 5, that for Kant the
necessity of the relationship between moral cognition and
moral motivation is discovered through an analysis of
actions done out of a sense of duty.

That the recognition

of a moral obligation can be itself a motive for action is
something that we know by the experience of the ineluctable
force of moral obligation, that is, the necessity of moral
obligation.

Our experience of the force of the categorical

imperative--our experience of being obligated--is made
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intelligible only if reason, in its recognition of an
obligation, can motivate.

The motivating power of reason

is the essence of our freedom or autonomy.

Therefore, for

Kant, reason is proven to be practical, that is, to have
motivating power, through the ..f.gQt of the presence of the
moral law. 10 The motivating force of reason is an a priori
truth because of its necessity.
synthetic truth:

But it is an a priori

we know it only because we experience, as

a matter of fact, the motivating force of reason.
Thus, for Kant, the proposition that reason is
practical (that is, has motivating power) is a priori
synthetically true.

Now, the question of whether Kant is

right in identifying a priori synthetic propositions as a
separate class of propositions is beyond the focus of our
concern.

We must leave this epistemological question aside

in order to attend to the nature of the necessity that Kant
sees between moral cogniti.on and moral motivation.
If we understand why Kant sees the practical nature of
reason as an a priori synthetic truth, we will have a clue
to an understanding of that necessary connection.

The

necessary connection cannot be understood causally or
logically (analytically).

Nevertheless, that reason can

function as a motive is necessary--necessary in order to
explain the experience of feeling obligated, even when we
10

~, 43-44.
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have no inclination to fulfill our obligation.

If it

weren't possible to act on reason's pronouncements, we
could not experience this sense of obligation.
"ought" implies "can."

For Kant,

The idea of freedom, then, must be

presupposed in order to explain our sense of duty.

Reason

must necessarily be conceived as a motive in order to
account for, or make intelligible, the experience of moral
obligation and the possibility of morality.
Nagel compares his project in the Possibility of
Altruism to Kant's on just this point.

Besides resembling

Kant's position in viewing reason as motivating
independently of antecedent desires, Nagel's position
resembles Kant's in explaining moral motivation in terms of
a "metaphysical conception" of a person. 11

Kant, he says,

shows the possibility of morality in terms of the concept
of freedom.

He shows the possibility of "ethical motives"

in terms of "structural features" of persons.

Kant shows

that morality would not be possible if it were not the case
that people thought of themselves as free; Nagel shows that
prudence, and ultimately altruism, are explained in terms
of (are linked to) "basic features of the conception which
each person has of himself and of his relation to the
world"--that is, in terms of the "metaphysics of the

11,fA, 14.
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person" (,EA, 19).

The metaphysical conception of a person

as one among others provides the "groundwork" for altruism.
When Nagel defines internalism and externalism as
theories of moral motivation at the beginning of his work,
the way in which moral motivation is "tied to" or
"guaranteed by" moral awareness is left vague, and
intentionally so, since the formulation of the definition
of internalism is meant to cover such a wide range of
internalist theories--weak (emotivism) and strong; rational
and anti-rational. 12

However, his defense of Rational

Internalism indicates that for Rational Internalism, the
nature of the "tie" or of the "guarantee" is one based on
"structural features" of the person, structural features
identified in the process of "interpretation."

Moral

motivation is possible, he says, because of our ability to
see ourselves as simply one among others who are equally
real..

He states:

"To recognize others fully as persons

requires a conception of oneself as identical with a
particular, impersonally specifiable inhabitant of the
world, among others of a similar nature" (PA, 100) •

Since

others have a similar nature, they have the same desires
and needs (PA, 84-85).

Recognizing the full reality of

others amounts to recognizing that their needs and desires
are the same as your own.
12 see Chapter 1.

This is why Nagel concludes that
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the only acceptable reasons are objective ones:

"Whenever

one acts for a reason, I maintain, it must be possible to
regard oneself as acting for an objective reason, and
promoting an objectively valuable end"

(.EA

96-67).

Thus, Nagel concludes, all moral reasons are objective
ones; and the fact that we are c_apable of recognizing the
full reality of others, makes it possible for moral reasons
to be motivating.

Clearly, it is not simply that the moral

reason or judgment causes the moral motivation, rather it
is the motive.

And clearly, the relationship between moral

cognition and moral motivation is not a logical one.

He

states:
What can be asserted with some confidence is that
insofar as rational requirements, practical or
theoretical, represent conditions on belief and
action, such necessity as may attach to them is
not logical but natural or psychological (,EA, 22;
emphasis added).
Nagel's defense of Rational Internalism, then, is not
given in the form of a deductive proof, but rather as an
"interpretation."

He defines "interpretation" as an

"attempt to link practical principles [prudence and
altruism] to equally basic features of the conception which ·
each person has of himself and of his relation to the
world" (PA, 18).

Nagel may have adopted the term

"interpretation" from Heidegger.

Michael Gelven, in his

commentary on Being and Time explains Heidegger's use of
the term:

"Hence Heidegger's account of interpretation is
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an account that focuses on the ability of the mind to make
explicit and to reveal what is somehow already within one's
experience. 1113

The concept of oneself as one amonq others

is a concept which we already know about ourselves, but
which needs to be made explicit in order to explain the
possibility of altruism.
An appropriate overall evaluation of Naqel's project,

then, requires an evaluation of his portrayal of us as
beinqs who think of themselves, and necessarily think of
themselves, in the ways he describes, and whether this
portrayal is adequate in order to explain the possibility
of morality.

His method of interpretation is not a defense

by way of proof, but by way of identifyinq the
characteristics ("deep features of our make-up") which make
practical reason possible.
Now, it would have to be admitted that the nature of
reason as motivatinq could never be demonstrated logically,
because if it were, we would have to beqin with a
presupposition concerninq the nature of reason which would
entail the motivatinq character.

But then the

demonstration would be arbitrary, and hence unsatisfyinq.
It would also have to be admitted that the nature of reason
as motivation could never be demonstrated empirically,
13 Michael

Gelven, Commentary on Heidegger's Being and
Time (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press,
1989), 94.
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because there is nothing which appears to our senses which
could be offered as proof of the motivating power of
reason.

Nevertheless, we do in fact experience the

motivating influence of reason.

The sense of duty, then,

must be a starting point; a fact which needs to be
explained.

We cannot prove the motivational influence of

reason demonstrably or empirically, but we can offer an
explanation of it by identifying the characteristics of
human nature which make the motivating influence possible.
The explanation, to the extent that it is successful, is
deeply satisfying, because it reveals to us the depths of
our own natures.

The explanation does not reveal anything

new, but it contributes to our self-understanding.

Thus,

Nagel states:
There is nothing regrettable about finding
oneself, in the last analysis, left with
something which one cannot choose to accept or
reject. What one is left with is probably just
oneself, a core without which there could be no
choice belonging to the person at all. Some
unchosen restrictions on choice are among the
conditions of its possibility (PA 23).
This explains why it is not so surprising after all
that there have been so few criticisms of Nagel's position.
Since all he is doing is identifying certain undeniable and
unalterable features of our psychological make-up which
explains the possibility of practical reason in the forms
of prudence and altruism, and since the unalterable
features he identifies are truly undeniable (we Q.Q think of
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ourselves as beings persisting through time; we .siQ think of
ourselves as beings who exist among others who are equally
real), he gives us nothing in these "metaphysical
conceptions" with which to argue.
We have seen that Korsgaard also sees the relationship
between moral awareness and moral motivation as a necessary
one.

She speaks of the motive or reason for acting morally

as being implied by or entailed by the moral judgment.
comes close to viewing the relationship as
necessary one when she states:

~

She

logically

"It is part of the sense of

the [moral] judgment that a motive is present. 1114

This

statement, however, is vague and could be accepted even by
an emotivist, which she surely is not.

But we need not

interpret her as maintaining the view of the connection as
a logically necessary one.

For Korsgaard, as well as for

Kant and Nagel, the necessity of the motivational force of
reason must be presupposed in order to make sense out of
morality.

She refers to the necessity of the connection

between moral cognition and moral motivation as the
"internalist requirement" on practical reason.

The

"internalist requirement" must be presupposed in order to
make sense out of the common intuition that once someone
recognizes a moral reason, it doesn't make sense to ask
about any further motive for action.

The demand for a

14 Korsgaard, "Scepticism about Practical Reason," 9.
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justification of morality (the demand for an answer to the
question:

Why be moral?) is superfluous, at least in the

case where a moral obligation is genuinely and
authentically recognized.

Anyone recognizing a moral

obligation in this way knows that the question is
superfluous.

This is the starting-point of our moral

experience that must be explained, and that is explained in
Kant's and Nagel's "metaphysical conceptions" of persons.
We may conclude, then, that for Rational Internalism
generally, the relationship between moral awareness and
moral motivation is necessary, but that the necessity is
neither causal, nor logical.

Yet it must be presupposed in

an account of morality and moral motivation.

Since it must

be presupposed in order to understand ourselves, let us say
that the relationship between moral awareness and moral
motivation is existentially necessary. 15

We discover

reasqn's motivating influence through our analysis and
interpretation of the experience of practical reason and
conduct.

15The term is suggested by Heidegger's "existential
analytic" in Being and Time. The "task" of the existential
analytic is the uncovering or laying bare of the a priori
basis of an understanding of our Being. Heidegger states:
"in the existential analytic we also make headway
with •.• the task of laying bare that a priori basis which
must be visible before the question of 'what man is' can be
discussed philosophically." See Martin Heidegger, Being
and Time, trans., John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), 71.
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II

The discussions in the previous chapters have shown
that the "generic" definition of ethical internalism (moral
belief or judgment entails motivation) is too vague to be
meaningful.

First of all, there.are various ways moral

beliefs or judgments can be arrived at, and not all of
these ways are attended by motivation.

Secondly, the

entailment relationship between moral awareness and moral
motivation can be logical, causal, or what I have called
existential.

Finally motivation has been interpreted

variously to refer simply to "inclination or desire" or to
any impelling force, including reason.

Some have taken the

view that one is motivated to do something only if one
actually does it, and others use the terms more broadly, so
that one can be motivated to do something even if one
doesn't actually choose to do it, and while experiencing
conflicting motivations.

No wonder previous versions of

internalism have been attacked from so many different
directions.

Having sorted through the ambiguities and

confusions, we are now in a position to present a statement
of Rational Internalism as a theory of moral motivation.
will begin with a general statement of Rational
Internalism, which will be followed by a series of
clarifications which summarize the points established so

I
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far, and which identify the limits of the claims to which
Rational Internalism is committed.

Rational Internalism is a theory of moral motivation
according to which reason is a motivator for moral action.
Reason functions as a motivator in two senses:

1.

The

genuine and authentic recognition of a moral obligation is
in itself a reason or a motive for acting morally.

2.

Reason plays a significant role is arriving at the
recognition of a moral obligation.

Clarification 1:

By saying that reason is a

motivator, I mean that the powers of reason can be used to
discover that one has a moral· obligation, and that once the
obligation is recognized, the moral agent has a motive to
act morally.

As I conceive of Rational Internalism, it is

not the view that reason alone, independently of all human
disposition or nature, can discover moral obligation; but
only that reason can function to awaken a recognition of a
moral obligation of which one is not immediately aware in
conjunction with natural human dispositions.

(Both Hume

and Kant are Rational Internalists in this sense.)
Rational Internalism, as I see it, can fully accommodate
facts of our human nature.
Clarification 2:

The Rational Internalist Thesis does

not say that having an obligation entails having
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motivation, but only that genuinely and authentically
recognizing an obligation does so.

Naturally, we cannot be

motivated by obligations we fail to recognize.

The

Rational Internalist thesis can also be stated by saying
that haying a moral reason necessarily entails the
motivation to act morally, if it is understood that one has
a moral reason only if one genuinely and authentically
recognizes it.

Having a reason, then, in this sense, is

not the same as there being a reason.
Clarification 3:

In positing Rational Internalism as

the theory that reason can be motivating, I am certainly
not denying that other factors such as self-interested
desires, emotions, or feelings of sympathy or compassion
can also be motivators to, or reasons for, moral action.
Indeed, there is obviously a lot of evidence that such
other motivating factors exist.

Rational Internalism is

entirely consistent with tne view that sympathy or
compassion are valuable as motivators, and that at least
one of the marks of virtuous persons is that they are
indeed motivated by these factors.

I am only claiming that

even when these other motivators are absent, reason can be
instruniental in bringing about the recognition of moral
awareness, and that when it does, that awareness is
motivating.

So Hume's claim that moral actions are most

often motivated by natural feelings of sympathy or
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benevolence does not exclude him from being a Rational
Internalist.
Clarification 4:

Since Rational Internalism includes

the view that reason is instrumental in bringing about an
awareness of moral obligation, it implies that moral
obligation is objective; that is, that it is something that
can be discovered, and exists independently of any
particular person's consciousness.

My theory of Rational

Internalism, therefore, does not hold morality "hostage to
the vagaries of one's particular conative dispositions. 11 1 6
Clarification 5:

Rational Internalism should not be

interpreted as the view that moral reasons always lead to
the performance of morally right action.

It doesn't deny

that other motivating factors sometimes or even often "win
the day."

All that Rational Internalism is committed to is

the claim that once a moral reason is authentically and
genuinely acknowledged, that ipso facto motivation to act
morally is present.

Since other motivating factors may or

may not be present, Rational Internalism is committed to
the claim that once a moral reason is authentically and
genuinely acknowledged, then some motivation to act morally
is present.

In other words, whatever other motivational

factors may or not be active, still it is the case that if
a moral reason is genuinely and

authenti~ally

acknowledged,

16This was Frankena's objection to internalism as he
understood it (Frankena, 77).
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then there is always sufficient motivation to provide a
reason for the agent to bring about the action.

It would

be possible to give an adequate account of a person's moral
actions simply in terms of the fact that a moral reason was
recognized.

The motivation connected to the moral

awareness is "all that is required" in order for the moral
agent to be able to choose the moral action.

The agent may

in fact choose to do something other than that which is
morally required, but he or she need not have done so.
Thus, the Rational Internalist is not committed to the view
that moral awareness is a motivation that necessitates
action, but only that moral awareness is in itself A
sufficient reason for action.
The moral awareness is not always sufficient for
action, because there may be other factors which interfere
with or block its influence.

The other factors have to do

with.l) contemporaneous motivational influences relative to
passions, desires, emotions, or inclinations which conflict
with the influence of moral awareness; 2) contemporaneous
psychological states such as grief, panic, depression,
distraction, mental or emotional illness; 3)
contemporaneous influences of the awareness of other moral
obligations to which the moral agent is subject; 4)
physical states or conditions such as illness or
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constraint; and 5) states of character such as cowardice,
weakness, laziness.17
The awareness of a moral reason, then, is a prima
facie reason to act.

Nagel says that to say that the

awareness of a moral reason is a prima facie reason to act
means that

"when one can secure or promote such an end for

someone else, and either (a) there are no conflicting
reasons, or (b) all other considerations balance out, then
one has sufficient reason to act" (.EA, 128).

The awareness

of a moral obligation, then, is one reason among others to
act, albeit, one which has a certain priority over others.
When a moral agent recognizes a moral obligation and
chooses to neglect it because of some other non-moral
motivational influence it is tempting to say that another
inclination or desire has "overridden" the motivational
influence of the moral obligation.

Talk about "overriding

desires" is misleading, however, since it suggests that
persons will act morally if moral motivation is present
unless there exists at the same time within the agent a
desire which overpowers the specifically moral motivation,
and that the agent could not choose to act morally while
under the influence of such a powerful contrary
inclination.

Extended to the non-moral realm, talk of

17 1 combine in this list factors that inhibit or block
the influence of moral awareness identified by Korsgaard
and Nagel (See Chapter 4, Section 1), and I add some
suggestions of my own.
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overriding desires suggests that whenever the agent has
several different motivations the agent will act according
to whatever desire is strongest.
In such a view, a motivational determinism is
suggested:

human beings act according to whatever

motivation (moral or non-moral) is strongest.

There are

two problems with such a theory of motivation.

First, it

does not cohere with experience, because we think of
ourselves as (at least at times) resisting powerful
influences.

Second, the claim that we always act according

to the strongest motivational influence is suspect because
the only criterion for the relative strength of a
motivational influence is whether or not the moral agent
chooses to act on its basis.

on this view, even when

powerful influences are resisted, the claim is that they
are resisted only because of stronger influence.

But the

only way to determine which is the strongest motivational
influence is by looking to see what is done, and then the
claim that the person acted according to their strongest
desire is trivially true. 18

In short, talk of "overriding

desires" is misleading because it neglects the concepts of
freedom and responsibility.
Clarification 6:

My theory of Rational Internalism

does not deny that "Acratic," "Conventional," or
1 8 E. J. Bond, Reason and Value, 25.
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"Emotional," or "Intellectual" moral indifference is
possible. 19 Acratic Moral Indifference is explained in
clarification 4 above; Conventional, Emotional or
Intellectual Indifference are all explained in terms of the
fact that where such indifference exists there is no
genuine or authentic recognition of a moral obligation.
The moral obligation is not experienced by the subject.

In

Conventional Moral Indifference, the recognition exists
that others accept a moral standard, and expect compliance,
but that recognition is not motivating because the agent
fails to perceive the moral obligation for themselves.
Emotional or Intellectual Indifference is explained in
light of the constitutional incapacity of the moral agent
to experience moral obligations.

However, the Rational

Internalist does deny that Genuine Moral Indifference is
possible.

It denies that it is possible for a moral agent

to genuinely and

authenti~ally

and remain unmoved.

perceive a moral obligation

Ironically, what has been brought to

light in the Chapter Five, is that Hume, who appeared to
present the most formidable challenge to Rational
Internalism, would also deny the possibility of Genuine
Moral Indifference.

For him, any moral judgment is formed

on the basis of moral approval, and sometimes, even if
rarely, the moral approval itself is the motivating factor.
19 I have made these distinctions between kinds of
moral indifference in Chapter 4, 118-124.

285

A person who lacked a sense of moral approval in Hume's
mind is constitutionally or emotionally deficient.

And

lacking in the moral sentiments of moral approval or
disapproval, the deficient person would be incapable of
making a moral judgment, since doing so is based on such a
capacity.

So for Hume also the recognition of a moral

obligation also necessarily entails moral motivation.
Clarification 7:

The necessity which connects the

recognition through reason that something is a moral
obligation and moral motivation is neither logical, nor
causal, as shown in the first section of this chapter.
characterize the necessity as an existential one.

I

This

means that the motivating character of reason is
presupposed in the very experience of the force of moral
obligation.
Clarification 8:

Since my interpretation of Rational

Internalism claims that reason motivates only in light of
the genuine and authentic recognition of moral obligation,
and since I have allowed for the presence of other morally
motivating influences and for the fact of inhibiting
motivational influences, there is plenty of room for
discussions of the role of virtue in moral motivation.
his evaluation of the current literature on

In

~nternalism,

Wren suggests that "moral philosophers ne.ed to go beyond
their usual portrayal of the "built-into" relationship as
one of logical entailment" (Wren, 77), and hints that moral
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psychologists are on the right track in explaining moral
motivation in "aretaic" terms.

My version of Rational

Internalism is completely open to the suggestion that

mo~al

philosophers follow the lead of moral psychologists in this
way. 20 Genuine and authentic recognition of moral
obligation presupposes some degree of virtue, and the more
virtuous a person is, the more capable they are of making
such moral judgments, and the more often they are likely to
make them.

Thus, the ramification of my theory of Rational

Internalism is that the importance of moral education must
be stressed, a view, of course, held by all major moral
theorists, and indeed, by anyone who has thought seriously
about morality.
Having made these clarifications, we can now see how
this version of internalism can function as a means by
which to categorize ethical theories of moral motivation.
If internalism is understood as Rational Internalism, the
view that reason is a moral motivator (that once a moral
obligation is perceived through, or by the aid of, reason,
motivation is necessarily experienced), then externalism is
the view that reason is not a moral motivator.

The cloud

of confusion surrounding the classification of traditional
moral philosophers as internalists or externalists
identified in the Introduction dissipates significantly
20 wren, 77.
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with the clarifications of Rational Internalism as a theory
of moral motivation.
Thus, Kant is clearly a Rational Internalist, but once
we see that the differences between Kant and Hume are not
as great as they appear, and once we see that for Hume,
too, reason plays an essential role in identifying moral
situations and obligations, we see that Hume is a Rational
Internalist after all.

While Frankena does not explain why

he thought of Plato as an internalist and Aristotle as an
externalist, we can see that they both are Rational
Internalists.

The motivating power of reason is reflected

in Plato's image of tri-partite soul, and in Aristotle's
notion of practical reason.
In Chapter Three I argued that Mill was an internalist
according to Nagel's definition of internalism as the view
that moral motivation is tied to the recognition of moral
obligations, despite the fact that Naqel thought of him as
an externalist.

Mill is certainly a Rational Internalist

in the sense that he believes that the genuine and
authentic recognition of a moral obligation does motivate
one to act morally, and also in the sense the he believes
that reason plays a significant role in determining which
actions contribute to the "general happiness."

The fact

that he talks about sympathy as a sanction for morality
does nothing to exclude him from the class of Rational
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Internalists, just as Hume's talk of sympathy and
benevolence does not.
Emotivism must be excluded from Rational Internalism,
as I have formulated it.

Emotivism denies that there are

moral truths which can be discovered by reason, and holds
that moral judgments are simply expressions of already
existing attitudes or feelings of the moral agent;
attitudes and feelings which are not subject to rational
evaluation, since emotivists believe that moral beliefs are
neither true nor false.
Social psychologists and social learning theorists who
believe that all moral motivation derives only from
conditioning through reward and punishment, are clearly
excluded from the class of Rational Internalists. 21

For

them, reason does not play a significant role in
determining or apprehending morality; rather, morality is
simply a matter of social custom.

Moral motivation is

always a contingent matter, since there is no such thing as
a genuine and authentic recognition of moral obligation.
We cannot speak of persons having moral reasons (in the
genuine and authentic sense); we can only speak of there
being reasons to act morally.
If ethical intuitionism is the view, as Korsgaard has
suggested, that the recognition of moral obligation
21 see Wren's article for examples of social learning
theorists, 72 - 73.
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motivates only by "triggering" a desire to do what is
right, and that it is possible to genuinely and
authentically recognize a moral obligation and yet not be
motivated by it, then intuitionism would not be a Rational
Internalist view. 22 If, on the other hand, intuitionism
does not hold that it is possible to fail to be motivated
by the awareness of a moral obligation (in the genuine and
authentic sense), and if the "desire to do what is right"
is nothing other than the human disposition to approve of
what is good, so that recognizing a moral obligation
necessarily motivates, then it would be an example of
Rational Internalism.
In conclusion, the theory of moral motivation that I
have advanced, and which I have called Rational
Internalism, is a theory which does provide a convincing
and acceptable account of moral motivation.

It is a theory

which is consistent with i.ntuitive beliefs about the
motivating influence of morality.

It is the theory of

moral motivation one can see incompletely developed in the
works of Falk, Kant and Nagel.

Criticisms and questions

about internalist theories have offered the opportunity to
develop the theory more precisely, because confronting the
criticisms has forced us to get clear on the relation
between moral cognition and moral motivation which is
22 Korsgaard, "Scepticism about Practical Reason," 9.
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presupposed in our common intuitions about morality's
influence.

In sorting through these criticisms, then, we

have lifted the layers of confusion and arrived at the core
of the truth about human beings and moral motivation.

In

this way, we have offered a version of internalism which is
both philosophically helpful and interesting.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Articles:

Brink, David. "Externalist Moral Realism." Southern Journal
of Philosophy 24 (Supplement, 1986): 23-41.
Blanke, Richard. "The Motivation to be Moral in the
Groundwork to the Metaphysic of Morals." Philosophy
Research Archives Vol. XI (March, 1986): 335-343.
Brown, Charlotte. "Is Hume an Internalist?" Journal of the
History of Philosophy 26 (January 1988): 69-87.
Cohen, Rachel. "Hume and Humeanism in Ethics." Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 99-116.
Coleman, Dorothy. "Placing Hume in the
Internalist/Externalist Debate." Unpublished paper
(1989).
Clarke, D. s. "Distinguishing the 'Ought' from the
'Rational'." Philosophia 15 (D 85): 251-270.
Dalrymple, Houghton. "Kemp Smith, Hume and the Parallelism
Between Reason and Morality." Hume Studies 12 (April,
1986): 277-91.
Darwall, Stephen L. "Nagel's Argument for Altruism."
Philosophical Studies 25 (1974): 125-130.
Falk,

w. D. "'Ought' and Motivation." Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 48, 1947-8.

Frankena, W. K. "Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral
Philosophy," in Goodpaster, Kenneth. Perspectives on
Morality: Essays of William K. Frankena Notre Dame,
Ind: University Press (1976): 49-73.
Haines, Byron. "Internalism and Moral Training." Journal of
Value Inquiry 20 (1986): 63-69.
Harman, Gilbert. "Metaphysical Realism and Moral
Relativism." Journal of Philosophy (1982): 568ff.
291

292
• "Moral Relativism Defended"
Philosophical Reyiew 84 (1975): 3-22.

----.....------..,.~

~

Korsgaard, Christine. "Skepticism about Practical Reason."
Journal of Philosophy 83 (January, 1986): 5-25.
- - - - - - - - - - · "Normativity as Reflexivity: Hume's
Practical Justification of Morality." (1988)
Unpublished paper.
Kraut, Richard. "The Rationality of Prudence."
Philosophical Review Si (1972): 351-359.

~

Milo, Ronald D. "Moral Indifference." Monist 64 (June
1981): 373-93.
Packer, Mark. "Kant on Desire." Journal of the Historv of
Ideas Vol. L, No. 3 (July-Sept, 1989).
Prior, William J. "Compassion: A Critique of Moral
Rationalism." Philosophy and Theology Vol. 2 (Winter,
1987): 173-91.
Robertson, John. "Internalism about Moral Reasons." Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 67:2 (1986): 124-35.
Smith, Michael. "The Humean Theory of Motivation."
(January, 1987): 36-61.

HiM 96

Sturgeon, Nicholas. "Altruism, Solipsism, and the
Objectivity of Reasons," Philosophical Review 83
(1974).
Timmons, Mark. "Kant's Strategy in the Ethical Works: the
Construction of a Rationalist Internalism."
Southwestern Philosophical Studies 8 (October, 82):
103-111.
Wren, Thomas. "Can Moral Beliefs Motivate?" Proceedings of
the Catholic Philosophical Association 59 (1985): 5880.
• "The Possibility of Convergence
----------between Moral Psychology and Metaethics" in T.

Wren,

ed. The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing
Discussion between Philosophy and the Social
Sciences._Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.
Williams, Bernard. "Internal and External Reason." I_n Moral
Luck New York: Cambridge University Press, (1981):
101-113.

293

Books:
Ardal, Pal. Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise.
Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1966.
Baier, Annette. Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and
Morals. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1985.
Blackstone, William T. Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary
Ethical Theory. Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1965.
Bond, E. J. Reason and Value. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Darwall, Stephen L. Impartial Reason. Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1983.
Hume, David. Treatise on Human Nature. Edited by P. H.
Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
• Enguiry Concerning the Principles of
Moral s. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd edition. Westport,
Conneticut: Greenwoord Press, 1975.

~~~~~~~-

Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.
Translated by Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1959.
~~~~~~~-·

Critigue of Practical Reason. Translated by
Lewis White Beck. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1956 •
. Lectures on Ethics. Translated by Louis
Infield. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1963.

~~~~~..,....-~-

. The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue.
Translated by James Ellington. Indianapolis and New
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964 •

~~~~~~~-

• The Educational Theory of Immanuel Kant.
Translated and edited by Edward Franklin Buchner.
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1908.

~~~~~~~-

294
~~~~~~~-·

Critique of Judgment. Translated by J. H.
Bernard. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1951.

Mackie, J. L. Hume's Moral Theory. Boston: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1980.
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Edited by Oskar Piest.
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill co. Inc., 1981.
Murdock, I. The Sovereignty of the Good. New York:
Schocken, 1970.
Nagel, Thomas. The Possibility of Altruism. New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1970.
The View from Nowhere.
University Press, 1986.

New York: Oxford

Norton, David Fate. David Hume: Common Sense Moralist.
Sceptical Metaphysician. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1982.
Raphael, D. D., ed. British Moralists 1650-1800. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1969.
Ross,

w.

D. Foundations of Ethics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1939.

Stroud, Barry. Hume. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1977.

APPROVAL SHEETS

This dissertation submitted by Sharon Elizabeth Sytsma has
been read and approved by the following committee:
David ozar, Director
Associate Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University of Chicago
Mark Waymack
Assistant Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University of Chicago
Thomas Wren
Professor, Philosophy
Loyola University of Chicago
The final copies have been examined by the director of this
dissertation and the signature which appears below verify the
fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that
the dissertation is now given final approval by the committee
with reference to content and form.
This dissertation is therefore accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

director

<__5

